Fake news and social media regulation in Zimbabwe : a case study of the 2019 national #shutdown by Gambiza, Grace
COPYRIGHT AND CITATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS THESIS/ DISSERTATION 
o Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if
changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that
suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
o NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
o ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your
contributions under the same license as the original.
How to cite this thesis 
Surname, Initial(s). (2012). Title of the thesis or dissertation (Doctoral Thesis / Master’s 
Dissertation). Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Available from: 
http://hdl.handle.net/102000/0002 (Accessed: 22 August 2017).    
Fake News and Social Media 
Regulation in Zimbabwe: A Case Study 




Supervisor: Prof. Nyasha Mboti 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Masters in 





I, Grace Gambiza (Student #218097537), hereby declare that I am the sole author of 
this study entitled Fake News and Social Media Regulation in Zimbabwe: A Case
Study Of The 2019 National #Shutdown.I further declare that the work presented in 
this dissertation is authentic and original unless clearly indicated otherwise, and in 
such instances full reference to the source(s) is provided. I do not presume to receive 
any credit for such acknowledged quotations, and there is no copyright infringement 
in my work. I declare that no unethical research practices were used or material gained 
through dishonesty. I understand that plagiarism is a serious offence, and that should 
I contravene the Plagiarism Policy, notwithstanding signing this affidavit, I may be 
found guilty of a serious criminal offence (perjury). This would among other 
consequences compel the UJ to inform all other tertiary institutions of the offence and 
to issue a corresponding certificate of reprehensible academic conduct to whoever 
requests such a certificate from the institution. 
Signed at Auckland Park Campus on this 31st day of October 2020 
Signature:  
Print name: Grace Gambiza 
ii 
Dedication 
To Njere-Vushe Gambiza, thank you for your continued love, support and theories. 
You have always been there to cheer me up. And to my “munchkins”, Danai, 




This was a culmination of two years of hard work that at one point made me to imagine 
the imaginable. At one point, I had to juggle at once all important things in my life while 
making sure that they all keep afloat. Covid-19 pandemic made me to doubt my 
capabilities. And yet, I still had to strike a balance between the most important things 
in my life. However, I did have the most amazing supervisor, Professor Nyasha Mboti, 
who, through our discussions, would always make me to see the lifelong journey of 
learning as endless. He would always encourage me not to give up. He made me 
realise that a goal can be scored from difficult angles. For that, Thank you Prof Mboti 
for this journey, thus far. 
I would like to thank all my colleagues at the University of Johannesburg’s CMS 
Department for their constant support especially during the country’s lockdown period. 
This was a very emotional episode for me. And a big thank you again to my friends, 
who were there for me, I am very grateful for your love and support. 
Lastly, to my family, thank you for your love. You made me realise that life is not a 
race, yesterday, today or tomorrow.     
iv 
Acronyms 
AIPPA Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 
ANZ Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe 
BSA Broadcasting Services Act 
CIO Central Intelligence Organisation 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ICA Interception of Communications Act 
MDC Movement for Democratic Change 
MISA Media Institute of Southern Africa 
POSA Public Order and Security Act 
POTRAZ Postal Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe 
UJ University of Johannesburg 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
ZANU PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front 
ZBC Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation 
ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
ZIMRA Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 
ZISPA  Zimbabwe Internet Service Providers’ Association






This exploratory study investigated, and sought to establish, the link between “fake 
news” and social media regulation in Zimbabwe. The question of so-called “fake news” 
and social media regulation has become a central concern for governments worldwide, 
the private sector, media regulators and – gradually – media scholars. The ubiquitous 
presence of “fake news” on social media, on a national and global scale, has provoked 
a flurry of government-sponsored and private sector sponsored regulations. Facebook 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg recently proposed that governments should help Facebook to 
regulate social media and weed out fake news. This surprising plea suggests that 
social media companies may be losing the battle against “fake news”. In these 
circumstances, most governments worldwide have not needed prompting. The 
internet blackout of January 2019 in Zimbabwe, which is central to this study, caps off 
a string of internet disruptions on the continent. Togo, Sierra Leone, Cameroon and 
Chad are among the African countries that faced substantive internet restrictions in 
2018 alone. But in all this busy “regulatory” activity, three questions stand out for media 
scholars. The first one concerns matters of definition. What really is fake news? 
Despite the very public discourse about “fake news”, there is still no accepted criterion 
of defining fake news or an industry standard for noticing and recognising fake news. 
There is as yet no standard or universally agreed definition, amongst media scholars 
of the concept. The second question is about power. Who decides what should be 
regulated, and how? The third and last question is about the regulation of digital 
platforms. Whereas scholarship on digital regulation (in the traditional sense of new 
media) is widely available, scholarship on social media regulation is only in its nascent 
stages, signalling a dearth of studies systematically engaging the issue of social media 
regulation. Owing to the fact that fake news (and social media itself) are recent 
innovations, and because the controversies are coming thick and fast, media scholars 
who deal with issues of media regulation, media freedom and freedom of expression 
have not yet fully woken up to the full implications of the clamour to regulate social 
media. Is social media regulation, to weed out fake news, a good thing or a bad thing? 
This leads to an ancillary question. What does the clamour to regulate social media 
reveal, if anything, about the would-be regulators and about the nature of fake news? 
This qualitative study grappled with these questions, with an emphasis on the nexus 
of “fake news” and social media regulation. It utilised an interpretive approach to 
analyse thematic issues raised from purposively selected key informants from 
government, civil society and media-policy making circles in Zimbabwe, with the 
January 2019 National #Shutdown serving as the basis for the exploration. The study 
found that the “fake news” during the January 2019 demonstrations was not really the 
ultimate provocation of the blackout of the internet as claimed by the government 
during that time and that the explanations appear to have been a cover up for a 
government caught in a panic by the latest cycle of crisis. The major conclusion is that 
social media appear to pose a constant threat to the government, which frames them 
as an “asymmetric threat” and regime changers who are being used for “command 
and control” type of attacks on the country’s national security grid. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The question of “fake news”1 and social media regulation has become a central 
concern for governments worldwide, the private sector, media regulators and – 
gradually – media scholars (cf. Rochefort, 2020). In recent years the ubiquitous 
presence of “fake news” on various social media platforms, from national to global 
scale, has provoked a flurry of government-sponsored and private-sector sponsored 
regulations to deal with it (Allcott et al.2017). For instance, Facebook CEO, Mark 
Zuckerberg, recently proposed that governments should help Facebook to regulate 
social media and weed out “fake news”.2 This may be because, as Parkinson (2016) 
writes, influence of verifiably false content on Facebook cannot be regarded as ‘small’
when it garners millions of shares and that social media companies have a 
responsibility when millions of users receive false information from their sites3. Still, 
this plea from Zuckerberg is surprising, not least because it suggests that social media 
companies may be losing the battle against “fake news”. Indeed, Koebler and Cox 
(2018) point out that “Moderating billions of posts a week in more than a hundred 
languages has become Facebook’s biggest challenge.4   
The “fake news” phenomenon has motivated various governments to react. 
Responses are, in certain cases, “a genuine effort at seeking resolution while in some 
cases, an excuse for predators of press freedom to seize the opportunity to muzzle 
the media on the pretext of fighting false information” (Reporters Without Borders, 
1 The use of scare quotes around “fake news” is an acknowledgement of the challenges and cynicism
that accompany the notion. 
2 Schulze, E. (2019). “Google and Facebook should be regulated for news content, UK government 
report says”, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/12/google-facebook-apple-news-should-be-regulated-uk-
government-report.html  
3 Parkinson, H. (2016). “Click and elect: how fake news helped Donald Trump win a real election”,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/14/fake-news-donald-trump-election-alt-right-
social-media-tech-companies. 
4 Koebler, J. and Cox, J. (2018). “The Impossible Job: Inside Facebook’s Struggle to Moderate Two
Billion People”, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwk9zd/how-facebook-content-moderation-works 
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2019).Indeed, most governments worldwide have not needed further prompting. They 
have independently started to promulgate laws that penalise the spreading of “fake 
news”. At the same time, “fact-checking” organisations – some sponsored by multi-
billionaires such as George Soros – have sprouted in an attempt to deal with the real 
or perceived scourge.  
The internet blackout of January 2019 in Zimbabwe was one in a chain of internet 
disruptions on the African continent5 justified by claims to fight fake news. “On 21 
December 2018, the Sudanese government blocked internet access to popular social 
media sites in an attempt to quell nationwide protests triggered by economic instability 
and price hikes. Gabon experienced an internet shutdown on 7 January 2019 in the 
wake of an attempted military coup. A few days later, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) saw widespread disruption of internet connectivity following the 30 
December 2018 elections. Togo, Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Chad are among other 
African countries that faced substantive internet restrictions in 2018 alone”. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to make conclusion that these trends are not a passing phase. Rather, 
all indications are that they represent the solidification of a new norm. But in all this 
busy “regulatory” activity, three related questions stand out for media scholars.  
The first question concerns matters of definition. What really is fake news? Despite 
the very public discourse about “fake news”, there is still no accepted criterion of 
defining fake news or an industry standard for noticing and recognising fake news. 
There is as yet no standard or universally agreed definition, amongst media scholars 
of the concept (Tandoc, Lim and Ling, 2018). The second, related, question is about 
power. Who decides what is fake and what is true (or factual)? Michel Foucault’s 
theorisation about “regimes of truth” can serve as a caution to us not to regard the 
label of fake news as innocent and value free (1978). The third and last question is 
about media regulation. Whereas scholarship on media regulation (in the traditional 
sense of the media) is widely available, scholarship on social media regulation is only 
in its nascent stages. Owing to the fact that fake news (and social media itself) are 
recent innovations, and because the controversies are coming thick and fast, media 
5 APC (2019). Internet shutdowns in Africa: "It is like being cut off from the world", 
https://www.apc.org/en/news/internet-shutdowns-africa-it-being-cut-world  
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scholars who deal with media regulation issues, “media freedom and freedom of 
expression” have not yet fully woken up to the implications of the clamour to regulate 
social media (Iosifidis and Andrews, 2020). Is social media regulation, to weed out 
fake news, a good thing or a bad thing? This leads to an ancillary question. What does 
the clamour to regulate social media reveal, if anything, about the would-be regulators 
and about the nature of fake news? This study is an attempt to grapple with these 
questions, with an emphasis on the nexus of “fake news” and media regulation.
On January 15, 2019, Zimbabweans woke up to an unprecedented event: a total 
internet shutdown across the nation. This followed a call by “Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU)” for a three-day national stay away in protest to the 120 percent 
fuel hike announced by President Emmerson Mnangagwa on 12 January 2019 (City
Press, 2019). On the first day of riots on 14 January 2019, “live video footage, news 
updates and breaking news made their way to the world through Facebook, WhatsApp 
and Twitter. News of real victims of the brutality had to compete with false or contrived 
information and exaggerations, and the desperate denials from the government, which 
sought to convince citizens that there was nothing unusual going on and everything 
was in fact normal (Mberi, 2019). “Videos and images of the military patrolling the 
streets, and pictures of the wounded, were said – by the police and the army – to be 
the work of a few rogues that had broken into armouries and stolen army uniforms and 
weapons” (Mberi, 2019). It was in the context of the Zimbabwean government’s heavy-
handed reaction to protests that so-called fake news spread and thrived. 
The real and perceived spread of the “fake news” seemed to be the cue for the
government’s action to order all network providers in Zimbabwe – Econet, TelOne, Net 
One and ZOL – to switch off the internet (The Zimbabwe Mail, 2019). On 21 January 
2019, Zimbabwe’s High Court, acceding to a challenge from civil society, “ordered the 
government to restore full internet connectivity to the country, citing that government's 
shutdown of the internet was illegal because the Minister of State for Security, Owen 
Ncube who ordered the internet closure, did not have powers to issue such a directive.” 
Despite the order from the High Court, internet connectivity was not immediately 
restored. After eight days of intermittent connectivity, the internet finally came back on. 
Initially, the government denied shutting down the internet, with the then “Deputy
Minister Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Energy Mutodi, claiming on 
4 
state television during the internet shutdown that there was no shutdown at all, but 
rather network congestion.  
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Figure 1: Message sent to Econet Subscribers 
When government eventually owned up to being the perpetrator, it gave somewhat 
conflicting reasons for the shutdown (see Fig 1). Eventually, the Zimbabwean 
government admitted that it blocked access to the internet citing “a threat to national 
security, and defended the move through the Interception of Communications Act 
(ICA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, (AIPPA).” Interestingly, 
it has not yet been definitively established who ordered the shutdown. Was it the 
Minister of State Security, Owen Ncube acting unilaterally (see Fig 1), or was he acting 
under the orders of the Vice-President, Constantino Chiwenga, or the President, 
Mnangagwa, who was not in the country? What does power and its hierarchies, 
opacity and regimes of “command and control” have to do with it? How does the 




internet threaten the status quo? How does the status quo utilise the internet for its 
own purposes? In the interviews I did with government officials, the military concept of 
command and control (Vassiliou, Alberts, and Agre, 2015) kept cropping up in relation 
to the “threat” of social media. What role does the concept of “command and control” 
(the strategic use of a technology – in this case social media – to accomplish certain 
goals) play in all this? This research broadly tackles these issues in a bid to establish 
the flurry of “fake news” during this period and how this led to the internet shutdown 
by the government. 
“Zimbabwe has five international gateways for internet traffic: state-owned TelOne and 
Powertel; and privately owned Dandemutande, Econet, and Africom,” (Chimhangwa, 
2019).” “State control over two of the country’s gateways gives the government some
ability to restrict access to internet and mobile networks, if desired,” (Freedomhouse, 
2019).One of the network providers, Econet Wireless subsequently sent out a 
message to subscribers saying it has been ordered to close down all internet activity 
(Fig 1).  
There is a salient political dimension and background to the shutdown. The visible role 
of the military in the governance of Zimbabwe since the 2017 coup has signified that 
social media has increasingly been framed as both a “national culture” and a “national
security” issue. Hence, as the coup was unfolding, the Commander of the Zimbabwe 
Defence Forces (ZDF), General Philip Sibanda, stated that: 
The contemporary trends in which social media has become a dominant 
phenomenon is posing a threat of loss of identity for people in the 
developing world. Cultures of powerful nations have been marketed 
through Western-owned media platforms while the people from Third 
World countries become inevitable consumers of these marketed 
products. Consequently, Africans have to some extent become carbon 
copies of our erstwhile former colonisers.”
Not surprisingly, the army, soon after a coup, specifically singled out social media as 
constituting a “serious threat” (Matsilele 2019: 296). Even before the coup, army 
generals had been warning of an “asymmetric threat” to Zimbabwe from social media. 
In 2016 one of the Generals who was later to benefit from the coup, Gen. Chiwenga, 
stated: 
6 
It is the ZDF’s hope…that the internal component of this asymmetric 
threat to the country will take heed and desist from these divisive 
activities for the betterment of the whole nation…. Recent events in 
Zimbabwe clearly demonstrate that State institutions, socio-political 
systems and even territories can now equally be threatened by 
manipulation of ideas through the use of social media (Matsilele 2019: 
298). 
 “In 2018 the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), General Philip 
Sibanda, asserted that the military was:” 
Training officers to be able to deal with this new threat we call cyber 
warfare where weapons – not necessarily guns but basically information 
and communication technology – are being used to mobilise people to 
do the wrong things.7
It is not specified what “wrong things” are, or how they are measured. Hence the first 
point to be made is that the ruling class in Zimbabwe has never hidden its dislike of 
social media, whether for cultural or national security reasons. 
The second point draws from the first, but more in terms of what needs to be done 
about the “asymmetric threat” that social media poses. Ndavaningi Mangwana, the 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Communication, has consistently threatened 
social media regulation in Zimbabwe. He has argued, for instance, that social media 
platforms are a modern-day information gateway that should be for sharing facts and 
not circulating false information (Mberi, 2019). He added that those, “[p]lanning to 
revolt against legitimately elected governments were easily commanding and 
controlling their operations using social media networks and applications” (Mberi, 
2019).  The Zimbabwean government had “last interfered with online content in July 
2016, when WhatsApp was reportedly blocked during large scale anti-government 
protests dubbed Tajamuka/Sesijikile”, (Matsilele 2019). “While the government denied 
that it had blocked the service, sources in the telecoms sector revealed that they had 
7The Telegraph (7/8/2016). “New Zimbabwe law allows seizure of smartphones and laptops as 
Mugabe turns on social media" https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/07/new-
zimbabwe-law-allows-seizure-of-smartphones-and-laptops-as-mu/ Retrieved 20 February 
2018 
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received instructions from the government to shut down WhatsApp” (Mberi, 2019). 
“The WhatsApp outage followed months of threats by government officials to restrict 
social media use and foreshadowed the restrictions to come.” 
The January 2019 internet shutdown in Zimbabwe, and the partial one in 2016, must 
also be read in the context of the legal and policy landscape. Of great importance in 
this regard is the ‘Cyber Bill’. The Cyber Bill, “which combines other legislation such 
as the Electronic Transactions and Electronic Commerce Bill, Data Protection Bill and 
the Computer Crime and Cybercrime Bill, has been in the works since 2015.” It has 
since “been approved by Zimbabwe’s Cabinet” and seeks to ensure that the “internet
and related technologies are used for the good of society, not to violate national 
security”. It purportedly aims to address “cybercrime and increase cybersecurity in
order to build confidence and trust in the secure use of ICTs”. “Zimbabweans who 
“abuse” social media platforms will face a maximum of ten years in prison, and those 
outside the country “who cause harm back home” using “social media or any other 
computer-based system” will be “extradited and prosecuted”. Interestingly, the 
legislation’s approval came just weeks after the internet shutdown of January 2019.”
However, critics are not convinced as they argue that one of the major aims of the Bill 
is to criminalise social media use and to give the state interference and surveillance 
powers. They do not see it as adding anything to protecting individual liberties, or 
accountability in the processes of combating cybercrime. 
The spectre of regulation of social media thus looms large in Zimbabwe. The excuse 
for regulation is to control the “asymmetric threat” posed by, among other things, social
media driven disinformation and fake news. But how does the Zimbabwean 
government define fake news? Does it even define it at all? Do we know who produces 
it, why, how? Are the motives of the government pure? What are the implications for 
media freedom? Certainly, the question of “fake news” and “social media regulation” 
is a local and a global one.8 Governments (and experts and think tanks) the world over 
are seen rushing to figure out policies to deal with “fake news” on these social media 
platforms. However, because of the complexity surrounding the notion of “fake news” 
everything about “fake news” is still a developing story. This study proposes to explore 
8 UNESCO (2018). Handbook for Journalism Education and Training 
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the nexus of fake news and social media regulation in Zimbabwe using the January 
2019 National #Shutdown as a backdrop to understand exactly how “fake news” 
figures in the media regulation matrix.  
 
Research Objectives 
The study has two objectives, namely: 
 
1. To explore the nexus of fake news and social media regulation in Zimbabwe 
using the January 2019 National # Shutdown 




The study thus turns on the following research questions: 
 
1. What was the role of “fake news” in the January 2019 National #Shutdown in 
Zimbabwe?  
2. What does the Zimbabwean government’s response to “fake news” during the 
#Shutdown tell us about the relationship of “fake news” and (social) media 
regulation? 
 
Structure of Thesis 
“Chapter one introduces the study. The background to the research, which explores 
the phenomenon of fake news and social media regulation in Zimbabwe, was 
presented. The chapter provided a statement of the problem, research questions and 
also objectives of the study. The scope, justifications of the study, together with 
assumptions, delimitations as well as limitations of this study were also included in the 
chapter. Chapter two establishes the context of the research problem. It clarifies the 
significance of this study by providing an understanding of what other academic 
researchers have so far covered and written on fake news and social media regulation. 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework guiding the study. The chapter 
introduces Habermas’ theory of public sphere and explains how it informs the study. 
Chapter four outlines and explains the qualitative research approach which was 
employed in the research study. Principal methods of data collection, data analysis 
9 
and the sampling technique are explained. These methods are very significant as they 
aid in obtaining the findings that are examined and presented in Chapter 5. In this 
study, Chapter 5 will present and analyse the findings from this study. It discusses 
what these findings mean in view of the objectives of the study. Research questions 
posed in Chapter 1 of this study will be answered through findings. Chapter 6 
summarises and highlights recommendations for future scholarship. 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 1 outlined background to this study and provided a detailed introduction to 
“fake news” and social media regulation using the January 2019 #Shutdown in 
Zimbabwe as a backdrop. The chapter also discussed the current state of fake news 
and how governments the world over are calling for social media regulation. 
Objectives, research rationale and justification of the study were also presented in this 
chapter. The next chapter will review existing literature on fake news and social media 









The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate relevant literature on the themes, 
conceptions and thoughts of “social media and fake news” regulations. The literature 
to be reviewed in this section explores the nexus “between fake news and social 
media” regulation and how “fake news” figures in the media regulation matrix. The 
section will therefore address matters of definition and power regarding fake news, as 
well as scholarships regarding social media regulation especially on implications of 
the clamour to regulate social media under the guise of weeding out fake news. The 
literature will be closely “guided by the following research questions: 
 
1. What was the role of “fake news” in the January 2019 National #Shutdown in 
Zimbabwe?  
2. What does the Zimbabwean government’s response to “fake news” during the 
#Shutdown tell us about the relationship of “fake news” and “(social) media” 
regulation? 
 
Literature on the history of fake news and media regulation in Zimbabwe will also be 
surveyed, focusing mainly on the January 2019 National #Shutdown in Zimbabwe 
which frames the context around which the study is premised.  
 
Perspectives on Fake News and Online Media 
Fake news was one of the main issues blamed for the internet blackout on 15 January 
2019 in Zimbabwe. Since this study examines the nexus between fake news and 
social media regulation and explores how this notion figures in the social media 
regulation matrix, it is imperative to understand how “fake news” is defined and 
contested. This would also assist in locating the Zimbabwean government use of the 
term and understand the nature and role the notion played during the January 2019 
National #Shutdown. An important element of this exercise is that it will also set the 
11 
scene for the discussion and analysis chapters where I evaluate data gathered from 
interviews with key informants who were close to the #shutdown events. 
Perspectives on fake news 
The concept “fake news”, “has no single definition because it refers to a wide variety 
of things” (Gerlfert, 2018: 86). It can refer to intentionally fabricated information (Levi, 
2018), and to information disorders such as misinformation and disinformation (Lazer 
et al., 2018). Still, the phrase is an umbrella term referring to “real threats to meaningful 
public debate on the Internet” (Klein and Wueller, 2017: 07). A number of loose 
taxonomies have been proposed to define “fake news,” some focusing on the content
of the material disseminated and some focusing on the intent behind the 
dissemination, and some on both. The breadth and complexity of the reference to “fake 
news” is used by some as a reason to reject the phrase itself, (for instance, Farkas 
and Schov, 2017). The looseness of the term has made it useful because anyone can 
effortlessly rebuff reproach by blaming “critics” of telling or spreading “fake news” 
(Mutsvairo, 2019). That is, “fake news” is a handy cover and camouflage, whereby
even an individual spreading fake news can accuse those who accuse him to be 
spreading fake news themselves!. No one is immune to the accusation of purveying 
fake news, or to have their criticism (whether legitimate or not) dismissed as nothing 
but fake news. Zimbabwe is no exception to this, due in large part to a sharply 
polarised political environment. In the political battlefield different parties routinely use 
the strategy against their opponents (Dolezal, Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2017). 
Whether it is a leader from a totalitarian or democratic state pushing back against 
criticism from journalists and opponents or just ordinary citizens refusing to accept 
reality, the insidious use of “fake news” has become a go-to excuse for potentially 
weakening or silencing opposing and alternative voices9. Some scholars have gone 
further arguing that the term “fake news”, presents a range of dangers to public 
discourse (Levi, 2008). Boczkowski (2016) discusses how challenges to journalism 
and its cultural authority are further legitimizing the misuse and mislabelling of the 
term, especially in the realm of politics. Thus, discourse around “fake news” has been
further fragmented and obfuscated by the more recuse of the “fake news” term to 
discredit some news organizations’ critical reporting (Tandoc et al., 2018:139). Be it 
9 Cf. The Republic at Risk: American Democracy One Year into the Trump Administration (2018: 45) 
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politically or financially motivated, the question of “fake news” remains exacerbated by 
the ever-increasing popularity of social media.Tandoc et al., (2018:145) assert that 
Popularity on social media is thus a self-fulfilling cycle, one that lends well to the 
propagation of unverified information (2018:150). On the other hand, Maduro and de 
Cock Burning (2019) weigh in on the complexity of fake news, arguing that it 
“undermines trust in all forms of media and reinforces the view that it is impossible to 
discern fact from fiction. At any rate, there is little doubt that fake news – whatever it 
is – is an important category of political communication, that it is intricately intertwined 
with politics, and that it has a political dimension and agenda (Rodny-Gumede, 2018). 
This is the case, at least, in this current study. 
The concept “fake news” is considered controversial, this is all because, in part, it is 
poorly defined and there is no standard, universal or broadly accepted definition for it 
in academic literature or media discourse (Wasserman and Madrid-Morales, 2018; 
Ribeiro and Ortellado, 2018). It is an open field, a minefield, and a moving target. This 
makes the study of fake news exciting, but also largely ungovernable. If there is no 
standard definition, it means that there are multiple definitions and no scholarly 
consensus. However, this is expected in a burgeoning field. Is fake news the same as 
disinformation or just an aspect of it? Is it disinformation or misinformation? 
Disinformation is taken to mean deliberately creating false news in order to sway public 
opinion while misinformation implies unknowingly spreading or sharing such 
information on social media. Worse, attempted definitions tend to consist of a wide 
and diverse range of connotations rather than a single meaning (Ellis, 2018), many 
depending on context, one’s preferred reading, ideological camp and other factors. 
Part of the problem of defining “fake news” has precisely been a question of scope 
and scale. Where do we start and end? Lee (2016), for instance, argues that no one 
knows how much of the information that is currently available online is false. There is 
just so much to go through, and no one anywhere can get through all the existing 
information in order to classify it. Hence whatever is called fake news is bound to be 
an extremely small sample of all the information that exists. Researchers end up 
assigning “fact-checking” and moderation to algorithms, AI and bots to read on behalf 
of humans. Scholars such as Freeze, Baumgartner and Bruno (2020) recommend that 
“fake news” be rejected and replaced by a shared definition of the terms ‘mis-
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information’ and ‘disinformation’. While these terms are less politically loaded than the 
term ‘fake news’, one needs to pay heed to the fact that the term “fake news” is likely 
here to stay as” “[p]art of the vernacular that helps people express their frustration with
the media environment”,(Nielsen and Graves, 2017: 01). “It is therefore useful to 
explore its contours further and discuss whether “fake news” pose a threat that would 
justify their regulation. 
Other scholars even insist that there is nothing new about “fake news” and, in fact, 
that it is a mere latter day iteration and manifestation of propaganda (McNair, 2017). 
One definition of “fake news”, for instance, is that it is the “deliberate dissemination of 
false information expressly intended to misinform”, (Ogola, 2017a). But what is so new 
about this? The “deliberate dissemination of false information, expressly intended to 
misinform” took place in the Garden of Eden 6000 years ago! The congressional 
testimony of a young Kuwaiti girl in 1990 about Saddam Hussein’s atrocities – 
testimony which propelled the U.S. into the First Gulf War – but later proved to be 
false, was a clear form of fake news.10 Klein and Wueller (2017)  argue that, “[v]arious 
traditional media outlets, which have recently started to  be subjected to the “fake
news” label, should be excluded from the “fake” category because “they are not 
intentionally or knowingly false in nature” (2017: 6). Some occurrences such as 
“accidental mistakes in reporting, rumours that originate outside news articles” 
“conspiracy theories, satire that is unlikely to be misconstrued as factual, false 
statements by politicians and reports that are slanted or misleading but not outright 
false” may also fall outside of the “fake news” category, (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017: 
214). Others have argued that fake news is an aspect of psychology, because people 
tend to effortlessly trust false information as long as it backs their existing worldviews, 
(Weeks and Garrett, 2014). But, once again, neither gullibility nor psychology are new. 
So the question about what is really new about fake news is worth posing. It also needs 
to be noted that, moral panic aside, “fake news” are “not automatically illegal if they do 
not violate laws” on privacy, defamation, hate speech and misleading advertising, in 
10 The New York Times revealed, in 1992, that “The girl’s testimony was actually orchestrated by the 
big public relations firm Hill & Knowlton on behalf of a client, the Kuwaiti-sponsored Citizens for a Free 
Kuwait. The client’s aim was to secure military support from the U.S. through raising awareness about 
the dangers posed to Kuwait by Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. The girl who gave the testimony was 




countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom, (Katsirea, 2018: 163). Also, in 
some instances, people share “fake news” “not because they want to destabilise a 
country” or “because they want to shore up their political credentials among likeminded 
friends” but because they want to help, entertain or inform friends and family,” 
(Tandoc, 2019). Thus, while “fake news” is “often created to destabilise society, it may 
be shared to enhance and maintain friendships (Duffy, Tandoc and Ling, 2019). These 
latter points are meant as a caution against generalisation.” 
 
Still, there are some standard features. Apart from the observation that fake news 
causes distortions in the information market (Turker, 2018), broadly, dominant 
literature on fake news concerns itself with the distinction between “truthful” and “false” 
information (Farkas and Jannick, 2018). Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) have provided a 
general definition, which is that fake news is “news articles that are intentionally and 
verifiably false, and could mislead readers”. For “fake news” story to be constituted as 
“fake news”, it must meet “certain criteria”. Bell and Owen suggest that, “[i]t needs to 
have an emotional appeal, appear authoritative, immersion to the digital world, and 
intensified social network presence,” (2017: 03).”On the other hand, Rubin, Chen, and 
Conroy (2015) equate fabrication to “fake news,” while “Rubin, Conroy, Chen, and 
Cornwell (2016) add hoaxes to that category.” Thus, “defining and determining what 
constitutes “fake news” belongs to a complex and contested terrain.” One way 
identified to detect “fake news” has been to focus on the motivation. “Some stories 
that are poorly verified “sit on the boarder” but are not exclusively fake.” However, one 
way of identifying “fake news” is by looking at credibility and believability of the source 
(Westerman, Spence, and Van Der Heide, 2012). Furthermore, Klein and Wueller, 
2017; and Tandoc et al., 2018) observe that all forms of “fake news,” “regardless of 
format, take the form of parody and satire, both of which are intended to attract the 
attention of its audience. In addition, they claim that “fake news” is typically 
characterised by fabrication since it consists of fictitious material, the manipulation and 
misrepresentation of visual images to create distorted public perceptions, as well as 




It seems that, to do justice to the definition of fake news, one has to specify that it is a 
phenomenon that has a digital aspect. Fake news either starts on the internet and 
digital networks, or it is amplified there. After all, traditional forms of fake news did not 
enjoy the dimension of amplification that present day fake news enjoys, particularly 
due to social media. There is little doubt that the #Shutdown in Zimbabwe in January 
2019 would have happened in the manner it did if it was not for social media, in 
particular social media amplification. Undoubtedly, the Internet changed the face of 
the world and, through “social media” has had a major role in “popular protest 
movements.” “There is no doubt that social media has become a conduit for all sorts 
of content, true and false, useful and harmful, by exploiting the low levels of digital 
literacy among many internet users and the lack of gatekeeping mechanisms typically 
found in traditional news media.”  
“Thus, in identifying the nexus between “fake news” and “social media regulation”, it 
is critical to focus on the new type of “fake news” that has surfaced in the “modern 
political landscape- that is“online fake news.”This nature of “fake news” is defined as
“the online publication of intentionally or knowingly false statements of fact”. Morton 
(2018) acknowledges that the, “[a]dvent of the information and communication 
technologies opened up a myriad of opportunities for people to create and disseminate 
content through multiple services and platforms”. There is little doubt, therefore, that 
the “fake news” that is central to this study has “evolved with the emergence of online 
media”. Boczkowski (2016) asserts that the materialisation of “fake news”, “can be 
attributed to the ease with which people can now mass communicate and the inability 
to detect bias in the media environment.” He argues, “One element that distinguishes 
the contemporary moment is the existence of a fairly novel information infrastructure 
with a scale, scope, and horizontality of information flows unlike anything we had seen 
before” (2016: 6).” 
At any rate, the subject of “fake news” is yet “to be fully examined, especially in African 
contexts.” Elsewhere the study of fake news has tended to be too sectoral. For 
instance, its impact on elections and democracy has been widely studied (Allcott and 
Gentzkow, 2017; Barthel, Mitchell and Holcomb, 2016). Particularly following its 
(disputed) impact on the electorate in 2016 in the United States of America, as well as 
16 
 
Brazil and the UK’s Brexit. However, not much has been done to define fake news 
independently of particular, seminal case studies. If we are always thinking of Donald 
Trump’s surprise election win over Hilary Clinton in 2016, or Jair Bolsonaro’s in Brazil, 
or Brexit, it means we merely privilege the ideological struggle between left-wing and 
right-wing, liberal versus conservative. Such discussion adds little to, say, the African 
context where the link between fake news and the Alt-right or fascism is not at all 
obvious.  
 
In this study I have deliberately sought to privilege a case study that does not fit these 
dominant frameworks. By using Zimbabwe, and the #Shutdown, as an example, I draw 
on an a typical example in order to find a link between social media regulation and 
fake news in a context not informed by contemporary western ideological struggle. 
Issues of media regulation are more pertinent in the Zimbabwean context than, say, 
the Alt-right or the right wing versus liberal dichotomy. At any rate, this study is relevant 
because social media regulation is currently in its nascent stages, and a lot more is 
bound to be witnessed in this space. While “fake news’s” role in “further polarising 
already divided societies has been examined” (Cf. Vargo, Guo, and Amazeen, 2017) 
the focus has once again been “hijacked” by the liberal/conservative, right wing/left 
wing, Brexit/Remain dichotomy. Such a focus is largely irrelevant to African contexts. 
While scholars such as Mantzarlis et al. (2018) and Fregoso (2019) (see also 
UNESCO, 2018) agree that “fake news” content has potential destructive 
consequence on political life, but as far as rigorously identifying the exact nature and 
quality of this effect is concerned, and how to address it, literature is still lacking. “The 
fact that the meaning of “fake news”, thus despite its widespread usage in recent 
years, remains unsettled; “presents a big challenge when trying to understand national 
responses to the phenomenon because the term itself is sometimes not directly 
employed when initiatives apparently directed at tackling “fake news” are taken.” The 
above is very true in the Zimbabwean context. This is why the study seeks to 
understand, in part, how the Zimbabwean government defined and understood fake 
news, given as the reason for shutting down the internet during the January 2019 
National #Shutdown.” 
 
“A core observation I have made is that people who engage in serious considerations 
of subjects in which “fake news” features tend not only to acknowledge the definitional 
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difficulties, but to offer caveats and disclaimers. A recent UNESCO handbook for 
media personnel, for instance, declares that it “avoids assuming that the term fake 
news has a straightforward or commonly understood meaning,” (Ireton and Posetti, 
2018: 7)”. As already intimated, to some, fake news can only exist in a setting of 
disinformation – in other words, taking the view that publishers must have the intent of 
spreading untrue statements for these statements to be characterised as fake news 
(Frank, 2015; Klein and Wueller, 2017). As Morton (2018) acknowledged above, “the 
advent of information and communication technologies opened up a myriad of 
opportunities for people to create and disseminate content through multiple services 
and platforms, even if not all actors equally take advantage of this bright side of the 
Internet or, more importantly, even if not everyone is online.” Studies suggest that 
those who have access to online technologies are aware of their power to settle, 
confuse or amplify a contest, debate or controversy. Many participate, knowingly or 
not, in creating and spreading (purposefully or not), content of dubious veracity or 
unverified origin, (Pavleska, 2018).  
 
While the slew of recent studies on fake news the world over (Cf. Wasserman, 2017; 
Fuchs, 2017; Niklewicz, 2018 and Tandoc et al., 2018) not only confirm that this is a 
nascent yet important area, but also that most of these studies mainly focus on 
alternative conceptions of fake news and its complex definitions, how to detect it, and 
how to apply fact-checking against it (Sharma, 2019). Discussions of the relationship 
between fake news and regulation have not marched in step. Where discussions on 
the regulation of the internet and social media have happened, they tended to focus 
on the themes of privacy and hate speech and how to stop the spread of hate speech 
and protect people’s privacy. The qualitative, nuanced and context-sensitive 
understanding of “fake news” and its special relation to media regulation is only 
starting to emerge as a major concern. Thus, the existing scholarship rightly point to 
the problems of defining “fake news”, but more attention needs to be paid to how, 
despite these problems, governments are pushing for media regulation in the name of 
fighting “fake news.” Niklewic (2018) and Beauchamp (2019), for example, argued that 
the “content published on social media platforms – including fake news is a true 
reflection of people’s emotions, and hence it is the essence of democracy. Instead of 
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trying to regulate the platforms, they claim, mainstream politicians should make better 
efforts to convince people.” 
 
Of course, “the moral panic around “fake news” “has not been limited to the United 
States, but has formed the backdrop and discursive reference point for debates about 
the impact of the spread of similar fabrications on politics in African countries, where 
a sudden and steep proliferation of fake news websites as well as fake social media 
accounts have raised concerns,” (Wasserman, 2017:312-316). However, it seems 
reasonable to assert that, “news – whether ‘fake’ or ‘real’ – should not be understood 
outside of its particular contexts of production and consumption.” As Willems and 
Mano (2017:1) argue, “the experiences of African audiences and the engagement of 
users with media are always grounded in particular contexts, worldviews and 
knowledge systems of life and wisdom”. They further argue that “African media 
audiences and users carry their contexts and cultural repertoires in the same way a 
tortoise carries its shell’ (2017: 4).”  
 
“Although fake news stories can be, and for a long time have been, transmitted through 
conventional media outlets, such as print and radio broadcasting, social media has 
emerged as the main and predominant mode of their dissemination and profitability11”. 
Social media have become the, “[d]ominant source of information for significant parts 
of our societies,” (Niklewicz, 2017:335). To date, “there has been an absence of a 
medium just as powerful as Facebook and other social media platforms in human 
history,” (Lopes, 2014:6). Getachew (2019) argues that the power of the social media, 
especially when supported by video, is truly immense and can shape or decide the 
future or destiny of a country12. The ability of the media to mobilise for political cause 
has been pointed out as one of the numerous positive aspects brought about by these 
social media platforms. It is unquestionable that the strengthening of free speech is a 
result of social media (Enarsson, 2018).  This is despite the negative impact on public 
debate that also comes with these media. Various governments are thus taking 
measures to curb this through regulation, with limited success. 
 
11 Countering fake news: A survey of recent global initiatives (2018) 
 




“Some of the sites in the eye of the storm are Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and 
WhatsApp, although every social media site hosts and spread fake news to varying 
degrees. Moinuddin, Menzies, Morrow and Vezer, suggested that some, “[f]ake news 
sites receive 50%-80% of their traffic via Facebook alone” (2017:2). They added that 
“fake news” creates confusion, which can have pernicious effects. In the same study 
undertaken by Moinuddin et al. (2017) results showed  that almost two-thirds of 
Americans had  reported that “fake news” had caused them a great deal of confusion, 
and just under one-quarter have shared a made-up news story. The unforgettable 
notorious “pizzagate” conspiracy story, which saw a “would-be vigilante” bringing a 
gun into a pizza restaurant in a Washington, DC and open fire, shows how far the lines 
between online and offline can be blurred. This is not the only “example of the danger 
fake news can pose to the public”13. In 2018, two Indian men were lynched based on 
fake news which was spread through social media (AFP.2018, July). Such social 
media driven mass hysteria leading to lynchings in India have since increased in 
incidence and prevalence.”  
 
“The surge of “fake news”, videos and claims also comes as many governments step 
up pressure on Facebook, WhatsApp and other platforms to act against fake news. 
Morgan argues that “Governments are becoming increasingly concerned about fake 
news, misinformation and the way the public sphere can be manipulated. Several 
governments have announced enquiries, are establishing units to debunk fake news 
and are proposing legislation and regulation” (2018:42). According to Morgan (2018), 
Gambia and Egypt have long had legislation aimed at combating fake news, arguing 
that German parliament recently passed a law to fine social media companies with 
more than two million users for failing to remove certain content (such as fake news 
and hate speech) within 24 hours. Thus, it seems that the “disruptive and 
democratising power of social media is not lost on African and European governments 
as restrictions on social media access and usage are becoming something of a trend” 
 





(Gumede, 2016).14  The Zimbabwean government is no exception to the above as 
social media regulation calls continue to gain momentum. In April 2020, President 
Mnangagwa threatened anyone found peddling false news with 20 years’ 
imprisonment.15” 
“Dominant social media sites, for their part, insist that they are platforms, not 
publishers (Flew, Martin and Suzor, 2019).They say that they are not responsible for 
what users post or do after posting or reading. Nevertheless, these sites were blamed, 
for instance, for inciting more than 20 lynchings in a mere two months in India16. 
According to Flew et al, “Fake news may also have deleterious political consequences, 
as fabricated stories can be designed with the intent to influence elections and 
undermine democratic processes, hence several governments are ostensibly taking 
steps to prevent fake news from distorting their political landscapes”(2019:33-50). The 
platforms themselves have tried to push back against fake news, despite saying that 
they are not publishers. Facebook recently updated its policies to allow for reporting 
and removal of posts flagged as inappropriate, the barring of certain content from 
being posted or shared and the suspension of accounts in order to curb the spread of 
fake news. Haciyakupoglu, Hui, Suguna, Leong and Rahman argue that, “[a]ny 
attempt to regulate the social media against fake news is Herculean given issues 
surrounding the definition of “fake news”, “the global dimension of cyberspace vis-à-
vis the territorial boundaries of regulation, challenges in identifying the actual 
perpetrator of fake news and lastly, the sophistication of disinformation campaigns”(
2018:3-12).” They further argued that “content-related regulations in social media 
cyberspace would also face obstacles” (2018). Allcott and Gentzkow (2017: 211-326) 
attributed the rapid growth in the scale of “fake news” to the disappearance of  access 
barriers to information consumption and the openness in access to information 
brought about by  social media sites.” 
14 Gumede, W. (2016). Censorship of the Internet, social media rising in Africa. Democracy works 
Foundation, Policy Brief 8
15 Aljazeera (14/4/2020). “Zimbabwe president threatens fake news author with 20 years’ jail”,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/zimbabwe-president-threatens-fake-news-author-20-years-
jail-200414150840843.html 
16 Srivastava, A. (22/8/2018). Fake News add to India’s flood torment, Mail & Guardian 
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Studies have also linked “fake news” to post-truth. These include Calcutt (2018) who 
sees post-truth as a symbolic shift from an era where truth and rationality used to be 
sacrosanct, to an era where emotion rides roughshod over truth and rationality”. The 
fact that various countries have stepped into the "knowledge era" or founded a 
"knowledge-based society" is as disputable as the one that people live in a "post-truth" 
age or society. The “knowledge – era” and the “post-era” are useful in locating the 
dynamics of fake news and the motivations surrounding the creation and circulation of 
fake news in Zimbabwe during the January 2019 National #Shutdown protests which 
prompted an internet shutdown. In Zimbabwe, information might be selected for its 
“feel good” effect in a context where democracy and economic prosperity are illusory 
for the common person. “The different perspectives on “fake news,” “post-truth politics”
and “post-factuality” are all geared towards addressing the “question of what can be 
labelled as valid, proper or “true information” online and offline, and what should be 
counted as “fake news” or disinformation” (Farkas and Jannick, 2018). Generally, 
these debates have been amplified in the era of online publication and the rise of 
citizen journalism.” 
For Dutta (2019), the issue of internet has spawned mammoth opportunities and 
limitations for various governments the world over. However, the nature of internet and 
its regulation is currently posing challenges in various countries. This can be attributed 
to the dramatic change within the media fraternity. “The proliferation of digital spaces 
for members of the public to express themselves offers great opportunities for 
strengthening democracies. Yet, there are significant concerns over the rapid 
circulation of digital disinformation. These include dissemination of violence, harmful 
health and wellbeing effects, and influence of foreign governments on domestic 
politics. This therefore raises serious questions about who gets to be the arbiter of 
truth and how the decision on what truth is made in the context of democratic societies 
(Dutta, 2019)” 
“Huges (2019) draws the link between social media regulation and fake news, noting 
that relying on social media to “communicate with friends and family has become a 
threat to free speech around the world as fewer people actually talk on the phone (let 
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alone meet face to face). People are now being arrested for ‘hate speech’ for posting 
criticism about their government’s policies on Facebook.” This is not just happening in 
countries traditionally accused of authoritarianism and human rights violations. It is 
also happening in the so-called free world. “In Germany a law “counteracting hate 
speech and fake news on the internet”, called Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz 
(Network Enforcement Act) has been in force since 1 January 2018 (Zlotowski, 2018). 
In Singapore, a parliamentary committee made 22 recommendations after a five-
month inquiry, and called on the government to enact laws to check the spread of ‘fake 
news’ (Sim, 2018). In the Philippines, the idea of a ‘fake news’ law to penalise the 
malicious distribution of false news and other related violations was broached in June 
2017 (Senate of the Philippines, 2017)”. “In India ‘guidelines’ said to be aimed at 
curtailing “fake news” were hastily withdrawn without explanation, one day after the 
law was introduced.”  
 
“In France, parliament introduced a law to prevent the spread of false information 
during election campaigns, by enabling parties or candidates to seek a court injunction 
to prevent the publication of ‘false information’ during the three months leading up to 
a national election and the main target, according to the Culture Minister, were stories 
spread by ‘fake news’ bots that are ‘manifestly false and shared in a deliberate, mass 
and artificial way’ (Agence France-Presse, 2018a). The law gives France’s broadcast 
authority power to take any network ‘controlled by, or under the influence of a foreign 
power’ off the air if it ‘deliberately spreads false information that could alter the integrity 
of the election’ (ibid.). The move is seen as Western Europe’s ‘first attempt to officially 
ban false material’ (Fiorentino, 2018).” 
 
“In Australia, the problem of ‘fake news’, propaganda and public disinformation was 
one of the terms of reference in a federal Senate inquiry that examined the future of 
public interest journalism. The committee, however, ‘only received a limited amount of 
information directly addressing the role fake news and misinformation has had on 
democratic processes’ but it noted that the matter was viewed with seriousness 
overseas (Senate Select Committee on the Future of Public Interest Journalism, 2018, 
para 2.70). Australia has not introduced specific anti-fake news laws although recently-
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introduced legislation was designed to address an unprecedented threat from 
espionage and foreign interference in Australia (Horne, 2018).” 
 
“In the United Kingdom, “a government committee which considered the subject in 
detail published an interim report in 2018 and the final report in 2019 (Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport Committee, 2018 and 2019b, respectively). The very first statement 
in the Interim Report’s ‘conclusions and recommendations’ section states: ‘The term 
“fake news” is bandied about with no clear indication of what it means, or agreed 
definition’ (Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2018: 64). In its final report, 
the committee observed:””  
 
[w]e have always experienced propaganda and politically-aligned 
bias, which purports to be news’ but that this activity had taken on 
new forms and that people are now able to give credence to 
information that reinforces their views, no matter how distorted or 
inaccurate, while dismissing content with which they do not agree as 
‘fake news’, which creates a ‘polarising effect and reduces the 
common ground on which reasoned debate, based on objective 
facts, can take place (Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 
2019b: 5). 
 
“The above account shows “a variety of world governmental responses to the 
perceived “fake news” dilemma, reflecting two extremes. At the one end lies a 
discernible effort to define the problem and formulate a considered course of action 
through formal inquiries and consultation with stakeholders, before recommending or 
embarking on a regulatory course of action. “At the other end lies ill-considered 
responses, as happened in India”. A key concern with the introduction of laws 
purporting to regulate ‘fake news’ is the potential for government overreach, and 
“scary” responses to the spread of misinformation and disinformation,” (Funke and 
Mantzarlis, 2018). Baard (2019) observes that “fake news” in its strict sense may be 
cohesive in the required sense. Hence, regulating “fake news” can be lawful and 
legitimate up to a certain point. Surprisingly, Russia and Singapore introduced 
regulation to clamp down on “fake news” and misinformation in March 2019 – moves 
critics say are an excuse to extend government control and stamp out speech they do 
not like (Waters and Murphy, 2019). Sensing how quickly the winds have 
changed, internet companies have been shifting their ground. Interestingly, Mark 
Zuckerberg caused a stir in March 2019 when he called for government regulation 
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citing harmful content – specifically, he noted that “hate speech, terrorist propaganda 
and more” needed to be addressed.” 
 
“Fake News” and Social Media regulation in Africa  
“Closer to home, governments across the continent have also jumped to the 
bandwagon of calling for social media regulation. “Various states contend that internet 
shutdowns are needed to quell public protests, violence and misinformation fuelled by 
social media or mobile phone messaging applications, citing the role of the Internet in 
the Arab Spring five years ago, when protests toppled regimes in Egypt and Tunisia” 
(Mukeredzi, 2017). There is no doubt that “fake news” is intricately intertwined with 
politics (Freeden, 2019) thereby rendering very important attention on how this 
connection figures in the regulation of social media platforms. “Some countries are in 
the early stages of tackling issues related to fake news and misinformation. For others, 
misinformation has already been a long struggle and the digital aspect merely brings 
a new dimension. Budoo (2020) noted that several African governments have recently 
announced enquiries and are establishing units to debunk fake news and are 
proposing legislation and regulation. The momentum for governments to tackle fake 
news and misinformation is now translating into practical actions, many of which could 
legitimise the actions of non-democratic nations and harm free speech (Morgan, 
2018).”  
 
Thus, “within various regions on the African continent, there has been something of a 
proliferation in the spate of social media regulations, with a number of governments 
putting in place measures to curb the influence and usage of the medium in recent 
times”. This has however allowed many governments to extend control over any voices 
that are critical of the government rather than genuinely dealing with fake news 
(Mutsvairo and Bebawi, 2019). “Governments argue that social media platforms 
encourage the spread of rumours which can trigger public unrest. This was the case 
in 2016 in Uganda during the country’s presidential elections. The government 
restricted access to social media, describing the shutdown as a “security measure to 
avert lies intended to incite violence and illegal declaration of election results (Ogola, 
2019)”.This followed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government’s order to 
cell phone companies, such as Vodacom, to shut down internet for three days as 
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voting ended in the highly disputed presidential election. Alongside the shutdown in 
the DRC, many complained that text messaging became more difficult and media was 
increasingly censured. Radio France Internationale was closed. The shutdown in the 
DRC made it easier for government to put out fake election results, (Dahir, 2019).” 
 
“Some “of the motives guiding the formulation of” social media regulations may indeed 
be  justified (or justifiable), “especially when the need to regulate social media 
accounts that allegedly create, publish and distribute falsified information that can 
potentially cause to considerable damage is played up”17 .  A similar narrative is 
obtainable from South Sudan, where it is reported that the ongoing conflict has been 
somewhat fuelled by online rumours and hate speech. “Accusations have also been 
made about a particular ‘false’ Facebook post blamed for the death of over 150 
persons. Such incidences give some credence to the notion that social media can 
actually be a dangerous tool in the wrong hands”. The narratives on the social media 
platforms have given most African countries reasons to contemplate regulation. Some 
of these countries include South Africa (Isi, 2018)18. Zimbabwe and Zambia have 
proposed laws to restrict the use of social media. Egypt and the Gambia have long 
had legislation aimed at combatting fake news, which has been routinely criticised by 
free speech advocates. Several governments including Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
introduced “fake news” laws in 2018. In September 2019, “WeeTracker reported that 
the Ugandan government had implemented a law mandating that a daily levy of USD 
0.05 be paid by all social media users in the country, in a move that the government 
hopes will “curb online gossip” and raise funds for dealing with the consequences of 
online gossip.””  
 
“Since the beginning of 2016, African governments have shut down the internet at 
least 21 times with some shutdowns going for months (Access Now, 2017). Indeed, 
this has particularly been a common tactic with authoritarian states such as Ethiopia, 
Togo, Cameroon, Gabon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. With regards to 
Cameroon, the internet was shut down twice in 2017 in some of its provinces for 




18 Gift Isi, Afro Hustler, Governments’ Social Media Regulation in Africa: How Possible? 24 April, 2018 
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the country for 37 years, famously denounced social media as ‘a new form of terrorism’ 
and ‘a social pandemic’, a clear indication of how much his regime is worried by the 
political influence of social media. Indeed, Africa accounted for 11 of the 56 global 
Internet shutdowns recorded in 2016, according to Deji Olukotun cited in Rowlands 
(2016). This represents a 50% increase from 2015. Shutdowns occurred four times in 
Ethiopia, twice each in Gambia and Uganda, and once each in Chad, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, Mali, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Open Internet 
promoters say the shutdowns highlight how internet attacks and abuses, including the 
proliferation of internet-regulating laws, surveillance and interceptions of 
communication are worsening on the continent, just as there is an increase in Internet 
diffusion.  
 
This rise in internet shutdowns comes as an increasing number of Africans are 
communicating via the Internet. This, according to Mukeredzi (2017) has made various 
governments to see the connectivity as a threat rather than an opportunity. These 
fears and the attendant internet shutdowns have come at a financial cost. The 
Brookings Institution, a Washington, DC–based think tank, analysed the costs to an 
economy from a shutdown of the internet. In seven African countries surveyed in 2016, 
where the internet was shut down, an estimated $320 million in revenue was lost 
(Murekedzi, 2017). Ogola (2019) sums up the link between internet shutdowns and 
government: “[W]hile internet shutdowns do not “stop demonstrations. Nor do they 
hinder the production and circulation of rumours: they encourage them instead”. He 
also notes that many people are also circumventing the shutdowns through the use of 
virtual private networks (VPNs). “These are networks that redirect internet activity to a 
computer in a different geographical location, thus enabling access to sites blocked in 
one’s own country.””  
 
“The list of African countries that have blocked access to social media during elections 
and other politically sensitive periods continues to grow, suggesting that this is 
becoming a new norm. 19  “Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Gabon, Gambia, the Republic of Congo, and Uganda, are amongst African countries 
 
19 The Conversation, shutting down the internet doesn’t work – but governments keep doing it, February, 2019 
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that have popped up on the radar”, in recent times. “In countries like Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, and Tanzania, there were introductions of cybercrime legislations which 
were thought to jeopardize freedom of expression in some quarters”. It has been 
argued that governments recognise social media as a threat to their monopoly of 
power. Tellingly, the internet shutdowns in these countries have mostly specifically 
targeted social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter and messaging apps, such as 
WhatsApp. As such, a burgeoning field of studies has traced how social media has 
played a major role in facilitating actual political participation through protests against 
increasing government corruption, increasing levels of poverty and unemployment, 
among other government shortcomings (cf. Chatora, 2012). Despite studies having 
been done on fake news in protests especially after the Arab spring (Rampersad, 
2019), not much has been done on the link between “fake news” and social media 
regulation, despite the fact that the phenomenon of media regulation has been an 
omnipresent topic in African media studies. Has the link not been made because this 
is not traditional media but social media that is in the line of fire? Despite the 
proliferation of laws against “fake news” in Africa, no major studies have been outlined 
in this area of the nexus between “fake news” and social media regulation. This study 
seeks to close this gap.” 
 
The issue of regulating social media platforms has always been a controversial one 
since it involves inter-boarder communication (Kayode-Adedeji, 2017:06). This is a 
major reason this platform is difficult to regulate. Facebook has gained notoriety for 
facilitating the spread of false information, while WhatsApp, which attracts many users 
in the Middle East and Africa because of encrypted communication, has also emerged 
as an expedient epicentre for far-reaching viral hoaxes, (Mutsvairo, 2019). Going by 
recent internet shutdowns by various African governments, one can take “fake news” 
to mean “information that the government does not agree with (Gukurume, 2017). 
Furthermore, some scholars such as (Gukurume, 2017; Morgan, 2018 and Ogola, 
2019) have argued that social media has provided a discursive space for ordinary 
citizens’ voices to articulate their problems and to challenge the excesses of the 
government, which is epitomised by endemic corruption and bad governance and has 
caused massive unemployment. The scholars further argued that social media has 
created a virtual community of dissent that actively fostered counter-hegemonic 
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discourses, hence affording the hitherto supressed voices an audible voice against 
these governments (Gukurume, 2017; Morgan, 2018). The future of unfettered internet 
access in Africa looks precarious should governments continue on this trajectory. The 
absence in many African countries of enforceable constitutional guarantees that 
protect the public’s right to information means there are few opportunities for legal 
redress (Ogola, 2019)20. This makes the development of legislative regimes that 
recognise and protect access to the internet both urgent and necessary.” 
 
Scholars have argued that, “in most cases, the desire to control the internet is rooted 
in governments’ determination to control the political narrative,”(Ogola, 2019). “Many 
see the internet as an existential threat that must be contained, no matter what 
consequences it will have on other sectors” (Ogola, 2019). “The internet is seen as a 
threat because it disrupts older forms of government political control, particularly the 
control of information” (Shahbaz, 2018). “The stranglehold on the production and 
dissemination of information has always been an invaluable political tool for many 
African governments,” (Voltmer, 2017). “This loss of control, at a time when the media 
has brought politics closer to the people, presents governments with a distinctly 
unsettling reality,” (Rainie, Andersson and Albright, 2017). “Social media, for example, 
inherently encourages political indiscipline and engenders the production and 
circulation of alternative political narratives,” (Ogola, 2019).  
 
In addition, because it is a networked platform, users are simultaneously and 
instantaneously local and international, and are engaged in an information carnival 
that is difficult to police (Ogola, 2019). “Quite often the narratives therein are at 
variance with the self-preserving and carefully constructed ideologies of the state. The 
irony, however, is that as these shutdowns continue, and even proliferate, there is 
scant evidence they actually work,” (Voltmer, 2017). “Instead, they seem to animate 
dissent and encourage precisely the kind of responses considered subversive by 
many governments”. Below are three snapshots of some African countries’ 




20 George Ogola, Pretoria News, Internet shutdowns don’t contain African dissent, 21 February, 2019 
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Snapshot 1: Uganda 
On the eve of 30 May 2018, the Ugandan parliament passed the Excise Duty 
(Amendment) Bill 2018, which imposes taxes on usage of social media. It clearly 
states:” “A telecommunication service operator providing data used for accessing over 
the top services is liable to account and pay excise duty on the access to over the top 
services.” “Services such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter and the like will be charged 
a tax duty of UGX 200 (USD 0.05) per user per day of access. This tax has direct 
implications for creation and consumption of content through social media platforms. 
Similarly, in March 2018, the government of Uganda had also issued a public 
statement announcing that “all online data communication service providers, including 
online publishers, online news platforms, online radio and television operators are 
advised to apply and obtain authorization from the Commission with immediate effect” 
in order to offer communications services,” (Ryakitimbo, 2019). This was however, 
widely criticized by the Ugandan population which blamed the government of using 
vague reasons and ideologies to infringe upon the online space.” 
 
Snapshot 2: Tanzania 
In 2019, the Tanzanian government “jumped on the bandwagon of online content 
regulation with the introduction of blogger licenses and sanctions under the Electronic 
and Postal Communications Act (EPOCA)21”. “These laws have prompted an online 
circus as different stakeholders discuss the extent to which it will limit creativity and 
local content creation online.” “The Act, which requires online content producers to be 
licensed, took effect on 16 March 2018 under Government Notice Number 133. This 
has had a direct impact on application services licensees, bloggers, internet cafés, 
online content hosts, online forums, online radio or television and social media as well 
as subscribers and users of any related online content,” (Ryakitimbo, 2019). 
Ryakitimbo argues that the act makes use of unclear terminology, such as “indecent 
and obscene” or “use of disparaging or abusive words which is calculated to offend an 
individual or a group of persons” and describes false information as content which is 
“likely to mislead or deceive the public… except where it is preceded by a statement 
that the content is not factual” (2019:02). “This vagueness and lack of clarity in the 
 




wording of the policy leaves room for the violation of digital rights and, most commonly, 
misuse of the Act for personal/government gain.””  
 
Snapshot 3: Egypt 
The Egyptian government seems to have hoped onto the bandwagon too as the 
country’s parliament is reported to have recently approved and passed a bill that will 
see social media accounts with more than 5,000 followers being regulated and treated 
like media outlets. The new law is said to be motivated by the need to monitor and 
regulate social media accounts that allegedly create, publish and distribute fake news. 
While these developments may have been heralded as necessary in some quarters, 
they have been described as disturbing and greeted with cynicism and scepticism in 
others. Egyptian protesters had been forced to contend with some internet monitoring 
before the 2011 uprising, but not to the extent seen in Tunisia before its uprising. 
During the uprising, protesters were highly successful in circumventing internet 
controls, using tools like Hotspot Shield and Tor, which maintain the anonymity of the 
user while online (York, 2011a; Daily Mail, 2011), and other techniques they had 
learned before. After the regime blocked Twitter, people tweeted the websites of proxy 
servers to circumvent the control (Idle and Nunns, 2011, p. 41). However, once the 
protests began to threaten the Mubarak regime‘s existence, the state used a more 
aggressive — and cruder — method than Tunisia‘s government to impede internet 
and mobile phone access. On January 28, 2011, the Egyptian government shut off the 
Internet and mobile phone services for the entire country, resulting in a blackout that 
lasted almost one week (Ishani, 2011).  
 
The blackout, which lasted nearly a week, forced activists to find more innovative 
workaround solutions, such as setting up FTP (file transfer protocol) accounts to send 
videos to international news organizations (Ishani, 2011). Another solution they found 
was using landlines to connect to internet services in neighbouring countries by calling 
international numbers with older dial-up modems, a connection that was slow but 
sufficient for posting tweets about events on the ground (Sigal, 2011; Seibt, 2011). In 
brief, the Egyptian regime‘s shutdown of the internet was not only costly, but it also 
backfired. It enraged Egyptians accustomed to internet and mobile phone access 
(Daily Mail, 2011). Young, educated Egyptians were affected by their years of access 
to the internet, which shaped their outlook and connections to each other and led to a 
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sense of entitlement to internet access, ―so much so that when this access was 
revoked [when the regime turned off the internet during protests] they ended up 
flooding the streets (Vila, 2011).”  
 
The Social Media Context 
Social media has received much of the criticism for disseminating “fake news.” But 
what is it and what does it do? Social media is defined as an alternative media of mass 
communication that makes use of new information and communication technologies, 
such as the internet and mobile phones, to create, store and distribute multi-media 
messages” (Mhiripiri  and Mutsvairo, 2016: 415; Mboti, 2016).”Since social media are 
internet-based platforms, they allow users to create profiles for sharing user-generated 
or curated digital content in the form of text, photos, graphics, or videos within a 
networked community of users who can respond to the content. The terms social 
media and social networks are often used interchangeably, but social media are the 
sites that allow users to share content and connect with other users, and social 
networks refer to the communities of users who are found on social media sites.” For 
this study, social media will refer to online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and 
WhatsApp which were mainly utilised during the January 2019 National #Shutdown.” 
 
“In recent years, social media has turned out to be a massive player in shaping public 
discourse in a democratic space (Marda and Milan, 2018). Gerbaudo (2019: 25) noted 
that “[t]he efficacy of social media platforms stems from their original role as services 
for interpersonal networking aimed at facilitating social interactions among friends, 
acquaintances, and communities of interest.” He further argues that in Africa, “[s]ocial 
media has been harnessed to make political demands on human rights, accountability 
and good governance” (2017:49-70). Don Schultz describes social media as 
“participatory and self-expressive Web sites . . . where members/participants expose, 
discuss, reveal, and expound on their personal lives, activities, hopes, dreams, and 
even fantasies for others to see and marvel upon” (2007:10). The uptake and use of 
social media has increased tremendously with the emergence of networking sites such 
as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube amongst other platforms (Mhiripiri and Mutsvairo, 
2016). What cannot be disputed is the interconnectedness of people from various 
corners of the world, who discuss and share information on these platforms. Chatora 
(2012) further argues that social media has facilitated the sharing and expression of 
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diverse opinions within the online communities. The same social media has been used 
as counter discourse in Zimbabwe due to the hostility and rigidity of mainstream 
media. Fraser (1992) equates social media to spaces for incubating dissent towards 
the mainstream or conventional publics. Similarly, Square (2002) notes that counter 
publics are spaces that stimulate debate, planning and mobilisation.”  
 
“The novelty in social media is the overabundance of information it presents relative 
to previous communication technologies (Gerbaudo, 2019). The issue of social media 
as alternative media has also been studied by various scholars. According to Moyo 
(2020), social media space has been the go-to alternative for a country hungry for 
information. She argues that the same space has also been a revolutionary space for 
government criticism, exposure of corruption and other excesses and demands for 
accountability. The constricted media landscape in Zimbabwe is pushing the 
population to seek alternative news space, and social media is providing this. Moyo 
(2020) further noted that social media has become the same space that the 
government has its eyes on although it faces dilemmas. The government itself needs 
the digital media space for its own propaganda. Indeed, some scholars are of the view 
that the alarm around the effect of fake news has been blown out of proportion 
(McNair, 2017).The unlimited freedom means that social media platforms are 
susceptible to misuse, misinformation, and thus, fake news. But how is this some sort 
of evil bogey? Any medium would be abused, whether new or old. Lack of policy 
implementation or laws which could either curb fake news or hold the perpetrator 
accountable for their action have only made the situation complex and challenging.” 
 
“Critics question whether social media platforms are a threat to democracy (Naughton, 
2018). Internet access is still highly an urban aspect, especially in Southern Africa. 
This is despite the urban citizens being a disproportionally influential and vocal group 
in African politics. Hence social media has played a galvanising role in street protests 
and popular uprisings across the continent from Cameroon and Burundi to Togo and 
Zimbabwe. In implicit recognition of the galvanising power of the social media, an 
increasing number of African governments have imposed temporary shutdowns or 
restrictions on internet access especially during elections and more recently during 
major protests in a bid to halt the protests and to silence the demonstrators and the 
opposition parties. In another study, there was evidence that suggested that social 
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media is more polarised in Africa than in any other regions (Kazeem, 2016). Social 
media platforms, compared to the traditional and conventional media outlets, enjoy an 
unchecked, somewhat ungovernable space. Since social media platforms provide a 
free platform for expression of speech and opinions by its users, no laws can be 
practically implemented to restrict the freedom of the users. This makes it almost 
impossible to eradicate fake news from social media as the flow of information, or the 
content, cannot be entirely restricted. This does not however rule out the possibility to 
regulate the platform. There have been various regulating methods implemented by 
different nations to combat the propagation of fake news. These regulatory 
mechanisms have been initiated involving multiple stakeholders, which include self-
regulation by social media platforms and legal injunction to curb fake news (Bali and 
Desai, 2019). Political leaders often view social media as a threat because it can 
provide the public with greater access to information (Molony, 2019). It also has the 
potential to mobilise and challenge leadership.”  
 
“Certainly, social media can be considered to be a double-sided sword, where, on one 
hand, it can be used as a weapon of disinformation and manipulation and, on the other 
hand, it can be a democratic tool to fight injustice, abuse and corruption. It is therefore 
difficult to measure the impact of fake news using a rigid measure or formula (Rodney-
Gumede, 2018). Social media activism has played a crucial role in propping up as well 
as challenging and even toppling an authoritarian state. The so-called Varakashi in 
the Zimbabwean Twittersphere are a corps of pro-government social media users who 
“protect” the reputation of the president ED Mnangagwa, “the ruling ZANU-PF party, 
and the government”, while attacking the opposition MDC-Alliance or any other users 
who attack Mnangagwa and his government on Twitter. In Saudi Arabia, the 
government sponsors pro-government social media activists (“the flies”) to neutralise 
anti-governments activists (“the bees”), a struggle that came to light with the infamous 
assassination of Jamal Khashoggi. Social media tools are thus open to both sides, 
and there is no single morality or ethics that animate online politics.”  
 
“When an election was called in West African State of Gambia, where the dictator 
Yahya Jammeh had ruled for 22 years, opposition parties and candidates had little 
access to state controlled media, resulting in these parties creating dozens of 
WhatsApp groups to communicate with their supporters (Camara, 2016). However, 
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other forms of social media also proliferated. A leading independent group, the 
Gambia Youth and Women’s forum discussed election issues on a public Facebook 
group with over 55 000 followers. The government blocked access to the internet, but 
Gambians used virtual private network (VPN) technology to bypass the shutdown. 
Similarly, Zimbabweans turned to VPN to bypass the internet shutdown during the 
January 2019 National shutdown in order to access information on what was taking 
place. In Burundi, protestors took a prolonged demonstration to the streets in 2015 in 
opposition to the extension of the rule of President Pierre Nkurunzira. The government 
retaliated by trying to thwart the protests by closing independent media outlets and by 
shutting down social media. The protestors used VPN technology as well to access 
social media (York, 2015) in communicating what was happening during the 
confrontations. But there is also a dark side. Social media has been accused of 
generating a cacophony of opinions and information that is degrading public discourse 
(Mueller, 2019). In Sudan, for instance, social media has been condemned for 
contributing towards hatred and conflict among ethnic groups (Camara, 2016). In the 
same vein, social media is likened to the ‘Hate radio’ that flourished in Rwanda during 
the 1994 genocide (Grzyb, 2019).”  
 
Trajectories of Fake News in Zimbabwe  
“Social media penetration in Zimbabwe is highly fragmented, with a larger population 
in the rural areas still without access to internet, the majority of the population in the 
urban areas has access to social media. Access to the internet in Zimbabwe stood at 
52 percent as of mid-2018, according to official government data from the telecoms 
regulator POTRAZ, which incorporates mobile broadband access. Despite this figure, 
penetration in most rural areas remains low compared to urban areas. The Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) market in Zimbabwe is diverse, with 12 licensed 
internet access providers (IAPs) and 27 internet service providers (ISPs) registered 
with the Zimbabwe Internet Service Providers Association (ZISPA) as of 2017. ISPs 
and mobile phone companies are regulated by the Postal and Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ), whose leaders are appointed by the 
president in consultation with the minister of information communication technologies 




For “Zimbabwe’s online landscape continues to grow in vibrancy, with Facebook, 
Google, Yahoo, and YouTube among the most popular websites among Zimbabwean 
internet users” (Freedom House, 2018). “Increasing access to ICTs has spawned 
numerous citizen initiatives, such as the @OpenParlyZw Twitter account, owned by 
the youth ICT network Magamba that actively monitors parliamentary activities. 
Magamba also runs a weekly Facebook comic analysis of key national issues titled” 
“This Week,” and “carries interviews on key national issues. Other citizen journalism 
efforts on social media, such as @263 on Twitter, have morphed into full-fledged 
online news outlets that engage in debates on citizen issues”. It is in this context that 
media researchers have examined the ways in which digital platforms have been 
creatively used to expand political participation (Margetts, 2018).Others have looked 
at the emergent phenomenon of social media dissidence” (cf. Matsilele, 2019), while 
others have focused on the political uses of memes (cf. Kasiyamhuru, 2019). A 
significant body of literature on social media in the Zimbabwean context, for instance, 
has previously focused on how youths make use of social media platforms for political 
activism (Mare, 2017). On the other hand, a growing body of scholarship has also 
focused on political parties in Zimbabwe make use of social media platforms during 
national elections (Gukurume, 2017). The nexus between “fake news” and social 
media regulation reflects a gap in the literature.” 
 
“With street protests largely neutered by the police and army in Zimbabwe (the post-
election violence of 2018 a case in point), it has been argued that the battleground 
between the government and the opposition has shifted to social media (Gukurume, 
2017). In fact, social media polarisation has become pronounced in Zimbabwe in 
recent years. Zimbabwean politicians and independent activists often use Facebook 
and Twitter to reach large online audiences with little to no state interference. Social 
media wars have become regular occurrences (Wasserman, 2017) with opinions 
being disseminated instantly to wide and potentially global audience. Wasserman 
argues that social media statements between politicians tend to be provocative with 
the desired results being to attract likes or retweets. Movement for Democratic leader, 
Nelson Chamisa in 2018 claimed that he reached over 80 000 people with his regular 
Facebook live appearances (Thompson, 2019). Pastor Evan Mawarire rose to fame 
through videos that he released on Facebook and the #ThisFlag that he uses on 
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Twitter (York, 2016). Most of Mawarire’s supporters would tweet taunting the police 
that they could not shoot a hashtag, highlighting the power of the social media.”  
 
“In fact, the first online dissident in Zimbabwe was a shadowy Facebook figure calling 
himself Baba Jukwa who captured the nation’s political imagination between 2012 and 
2015 (cf. Matsilele 2019). Social media also became a key source of information for 
citizens as well as activists in Zimbabwe during the ouster of long-time leader, Robert 
Mugabe, by the army in November and December 2017, helping capture critical 
moments of the political transition. Civil society widely used Facebook, WhatsApp, and 
Twitter to mobilize calls for Mugabe’s resignation amid tensions with the military with 
popular hashtags including #MugabeMustGo, #AriseZimbabwe, and #FreshStart. 
Indeed, fake news” in its various online guises in the Zimbabwean media landscape 
can be said to have crossed a threshold since November 2017 when Robert Mugabe 
was compelled to leave office by the military (Wasserman, 2019). This opinion is 
supported by the view that most things in Zimbabwe changed in November 2017. 
Certainly, the political scene changed, in ways that we are still coming to terms with.”  
 
“The flood of fake news following the coup was somewhat unprecedented and helped 
to increase anxiety in amidst the country’s first change in leadership since 1980. False 
reports revolved around the whereabouts of Mugabe and his family, including reports 
that Mugabe’s wife Grace Mugabe had fled to Namibia, something which the Namibian 
government publicly denied. The spread of unverified reports intensified the public’s 
anxiety and fears during the country’s unprecedented political transition. Fake stories 
also spread about which of Mugabe’s allies had been arrested or killed. In the shadow 
of conspiracy, and in the absence of trustworthy news sources, the rumour mill went 
into overdrive. False information also fuelled political attacks on the opposition in the 
lead up to the elections in July 2018. For example, state controlled media attacked the 
main opposition MDC Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa with falsified reports of his 
campaign strategies and actions, such as the story that Chamisa was mingling with 
former President Mugabe, who had since been removed and become an object of 
vilification by the media. More fake stories abounded on social media during this time.  
Another example was that of Kirsty Coventry – the Olympic swimmer who is 
Zimbabwe’s Minister of Youth, Sport, Arts and Recreation – who was incorrectly said 
37 
 
to have quit the government out of disgust at the abuses. She issued a statement on 
social media disclaiming the false news.”  
 
“Mberi (2019) argues that the, “[m]edia environment “in Zimbabwe has long been 
polarised. State media are blindly in support of the government while the private media 
back the opposition, and also self-censor to avoid harassment”. Regardless, when 
major events happen, the main news sources for many Zimbabweans currently is 
WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter (Mberi, 2019). “Thus, with a discredited government 
press, and slow and often unreliable mainstream media, there is no doubt that 
Zimbabwe is a goldmine for purveyors of fake news” (Mberi, 2019). “With its own 
communications structures in disarray, the government is arguably desperate to find 
a way to fight back against the rise of fake news posts and websites”. Given the 
continuing political contestations, it is only fair to say that the political environment in 
Zimbabwe has augmented the problems of fake news. While the Zimbabwean 
government blamed social media for spreading fake news in January 2019, resulting 
into the shutting down of the internet, critics, opposition politicians, and media scholars 
tended to be sceptical of government motives. In general, scholars are wary of the 
tendencies by governments to scapegoat fake news while advancing their hegemonic 
tendencies (Yglesias, 2016).”  
 
There is a dearth in literature systematically engaging the history of ‘fake news’ in 
Zimbabwe. There are no existing studies of its genealogy, its local features, how it 
started or how it is defined.  What is not in is the fact that “fake news” has existed in 
Zimbabwe prior to its contemporary online manifestation. It might not have been called 
fake news, as it is now, but certainly it existed in one form or another. During Mugabe’s 
tenure, constant speculation of a political nature circulated every now and then. For 
instance, rumour persisted throughout Mugabe’s reign that he was infertile, and 
therefore that his children were not his. News on the street about his wife, Grace 
Mugabe, proliferated in whispers about her alleged affairs. Deaths of politicians such 
as Moven Mahachi and Border Gezi, and socialites such as Peter “Pams” Pamire, and 
other citizens such as Rashiwe Guzha, were whispered to have been caused by a 
hidden hand. Purported “fake news” on his death and divorce circulated widely during 
his tenure. Mugabe himself noted these rumours, when he stated in 2012, “I have died 
many times. That’s where I have beaten Christ. Christ died once and resurrected once. 
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I have died and resurrected, and I don’t know how many times I will die and 
resurrect.”22 The iron-grip that Mugabe had on the free circulation of dissenting political 
opinions were the fertile ground for these whispering campaigns.  
 
It seems that “developments around “fake news” within the Zimbabwean context 
should be understood in relation to broader Zimbabwean political developments” 
(Masuku, 2019). “Although its meaning has evolved over the years, social media has 
amplified political discourse and positioned “fake news” as a focal point in current 
political debates”. “As social media continues to provide endless opportunities to have 
emotionally charged and one-sided or multi-sided discussions, it is important to note 
how these public discussions, including those about “fake news,” have implications for 
society and are believed by some to be the truth”. “For this reason, the phenomenon 
of “fake news”, the discourses that surround it and responses by audiences and the 
journalistic community have to be understood within particular social, cultural and 
political contexts”. Thus, the issue of social media regulation should not be separated 
from the current, highly charged, political context prevailing in Zimbabwe. There is no 
doubt that ‘fake news’ (at least the fake news that we are interested in in this current 
study) have increasingly taken a strongly political and ideological form, and that this 
has become intricate and complex.” 
 
Merlo (2017:26) observes that “[h]ostile government actors have also been involved 
in generating and propagating fake news, particularly during election times”. This 
harps back to the point already made that social media is a double edged sword. The 
uses of social media are not limited to anti-government formations. Thus, the 
Zimbabwean government also stands accused for aiding and abetting fake news, a 
strategy that has been linked to a statement made by the current President. Emerson 
Mnangagwa was quoted at a rally in 2018 instructing his (ZANU PF) party youth to 
engage ruthlessly with opposition supporters on social media: “Tambai navo muSocial 
Media imomo. Musakundwe muSocial Media. Pindai, morakasha vanhu muSocial 
Media” (Loosely translated as “Go and engage with them on social media. Make sure 
you defeat and destroy our opponents on social media” (Moyo, 2019). “This saw the 





whose purpose appears to be to cyberbully or harass government critics into silence”. 
The continued confrontations between the Zanu-PF’s “online warriors” against 
the MDC’s “Nerrorists” (after Chamisa’s nickname, “Nero”) in the unprecedented 
online propaganda war has also contributed to the rise of ‘fake news’ on social media. 
“One particular incident in January 2020, between presidential spokesperson George 
Charamba and a supposed Murakashi (singular for varakashi), Kudzai Mutisi, tweeting 
as @ KMutisi, inadvertently gave credence to the belief that the government pays 
online social media trolls”. “Charamba chastised Mutisi for failing to toe the official line 
and said he was holding to ridicule “the very system that pays [him]”. “This raised 
eyebrows: a senior member of the government seemed to be admitting that 
government paid trolls to defend the party and attack opponents”.” 
 
“Despite it being something of a cliché, it is true that in contexts like Zimbabwe with 
restricted media spaces, social media plays a key role in democratising public 
discourse, expanding sources of information and enabling the enjoyment of inalienable 
rights as espoused in the 2013 Constitution (Mare, 2018). The Zimbabwean media 
environment is heavily politicised and the media are inevitably caught up in this very 
conundrum. The media, for instance, has been blamed for the lack a sense of balance 
and fairness in their coverage of issues (Mare, 2018). State-owned media parrot the 
ruling party’s line and disparage the opposition, while independent media patronise an 
anti-government line that is also largely sympathetic to the opposition MDC-A. As such 
questions arise on the ability of the Zimbabwean media to play their role as the fourth 
estate in the interest of the public and of democracy. The need, and the ability, for 
media to abide by its principles such as to seek truth, act independently and to 
minimize harm is compromised (Oosthuizen, 2014).”  
 
Some scholars point the finger at the Zimbabwean government’s repressive media 
policies, which they say drove Zimbabwean political discourse onto social networking 
platforms where people could experience relatively unfettered political exchange 
(Mare, 2017). This is the sense in which social media could be said to have “emerged 
as an alternative public sphere in a context where the repressive system has 
“decapitated” the mainstream media” (Moyo, 2011). “Social media emerged as arenas 
enabling Zimbabweans to contest government’s, ruling party’s, and security forces” 
narratives about the economy, human rights abuses, corruption, and real or perceived 
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electoral malpractices (Moyo, 2011).The rise in online activities in Zimbabwe has thus 
resulted in the exponential growth of new media sites such as Bus Stop TV, Magamba 
TV, CITE, Big Saturday Read, Gravitas Bulletin, Comic Pastor and @263 Chat. These 
media afford an alternative voice and help to contest dominant narratives. The arrest 
and jailing of whistleblower Hopewell Chin’ono showed that Twitter can be used throw 
authorities into panic and keep power (relatively) accountable by reporting on 
corruption in the public sector and on other issues of public interest. Magamba TV, 
Bus Stop TV and Comic Pastor use political satire to poke holes into the dominant 
narrative promoted by the ruling ZANU-PF and the state mouthpieces such as The 
Herald and ZBC. “Gravitas Bulletin and Big Saturday Read, through op-eds, have 
stretched the limits of traditional media in discussing public affairs.  
 
CITE, meanwhile, has managed to use online documentaries to give voice to the 
victims of the 1980s genocide in Matabeleland who previously had been unheard”. 
However, there are some cases in Zimbabwe that reveal that social media is not 
always a glorious liberating space where democratic voices and aspirations always 
prevail. Social media also challenges hegemonic discourses in Zimbabwe. Mhiripiri 
and Moyo (2016) have shown how the LGBTI community are often hounded out of 
such public platforms like social media. These examples, and that of the Varakashi 
from the other end of the spectrum, shows how some Zimbabweans across the 
ideological spectrum are resorting to online platforms for political communication. This 
is the context in which I discuss the role of social media in Zimbabwe during the 
January 2019 National #Shutdown.” 
 
MEDIA REGULATION IN ZIMBABWE: A SNAPSHOT  
That the “media in Zimbabwe has witnessed varying degrees of control by government 
is now a cliché”(Chuma, 2014;Mhiripiri and Mutsvairo, 2014;Chitagu,2018;Moyo,2018 
and Mare,2018). Media laws in Zimbabwe, particularly “the Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Broadcasting Services Act have been deemed 
excessive and repressive by media groups and journalists’ associations such as the 
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA)” and the “Zimbabwe Union of Journalists 
(ZUJ)”. While the state-owned media typically reports the preferred government line, 
the independent media is shackled by restrictive laws and regulations as well as 
unwritten rules about not piercing the veil of those in power. Whereas the 
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“Zimbabwean constitution promotes freedom of the media and expression, this is 
hampered by the application of laws such as the Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the 
Broadcasting Services Act (BSA)”. These laws are in the process of being replaced as 
part of the Mnangagwa’s government “reform” agenda, but there is not much 
expectation that the news regulations will be any better than those they replaced 
(Moyo, Oluyinka and Chabwinja, 2018).  
 
Observers have not seen any encouraging signs from the rest of the behaviour by the 
Second Republic. Instead, the sense that people get is that the more things change 
the more they remain the same. There is scepticism because, nearly a decade “after 
the adoption of the 2013 Constitution, which ushered a universally acceptable Bill of 
Rights, there has not been any meaningful shift in the country’s legislation or policies 
to make these constitutional gains a reality,” (cf. MISA, 2016).  Furthermore, observers 
have argued that the provisions of the Cyber Bill seem to be targeted at restricting 
social media spaces. POTRAZ, the regulator, is “expected to operate independently 
but, in practice, its independence has eroded over the years, becoming increasingly 
subsumed by security organs of the state. In October 2016, for example, a former 
director within the intelligence agency, Gift Machengete, was appointed as director-
general of POTRAZ, which observers believe is part of the government’s plans to 
monitor and restrict online activities.””  
 
There seems to be consensus that most of the restrictive media laws in Zimbabwe 
were promulgated in the early 2000s at the time when economic and political crises 
took root in the country. To stay in power, one of the things that had to happen was to 
control the narrative. The government of Robert Mugabe thus sought to “manage” bad 
publicity through media control (Moyo, 2009). The tenure of Jonathan Moyo as 
Minister of Information coincided with this shift to a polarised and openly restrictive 
media environment. It is in “such a media environment that new communications 
technologies such as mobile phones, the internet, and satellite broadcasting emerged 
as powerful tools for political mobilisation, advocacy, and citizen participation in the 
national political discourse,” (Moyo, 2009). The course set then still obtains today 
(Moyo, Oluyinka and Chabwinja, 2018). The mainstream public media continue to be 
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typically used by political elites for political manoeuvring, repositioning and 
consolidation of power in the more than two decades-long “crisis” (Chari, 2010) while 
ordinary Zimbabweans, on the other hand, increasingly rely on social media for venting 
their anger and coping with their everyday struggles (Mpofu, 2015; Moyo, 2009). In 
such a context, digital media technologies continue to offer citizens a means to create 
content and speak directly to their own audiences.” 
 
“Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)” 
“The promulgation and coming into law of AIPPA in 2002 under the stewardship of the 
now exiled former Minister of Information, Jonathan Moyo, heralded one of the most 
difficult periods for the media in Zimbabwe. AIPPA governed the “operations and 
general conduct of the media in a way that left the media with little breathing space” 
(Mtetwa, 2016). AIPPA provided for “access to information held by public bodies 
[Section 78], but it was up to the heads of these bodies to decide what they will and 
will not release “in the public interest”. Ironically, it is not the public that decides what 
is in their interest but the government officials. The Act allowed public officials to hold 
information for thirty days after a request for information is made, which may be 
impractical for journalists” (Feltoe, 2003). The stated objective “of the Act was 
summarised in its preamble as follows”:”  
 
To provide members of the public with a right of access to records and 
information held by public bodies; to make public bodies accountable by 
giving the public a right to request correction of misrepresented personal 
information; to prevent the unauthorised collection, use or disclosure of 
personal information by public bodies; to protect personal privacy; to 
provide for the regulation of the mass media; to establish a Media and 
Information Commission and to provide for matters connected therewith 
or incidental to the foregoing (Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act (5 of 2002:5). 
 
Thus, according to AIPPA, “Any published statement, which is intentionally, 
unreasonably, recklessly, maliciously or fraudulently false and either (1) threatens the 
interest of defense, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the state, 
public morality or public health or, (2) is injurious to the reputation, rights and freedoms 




“AIPPA’s trail of shackles for the media can be traced to its enactment in 2002 and the 
plethora of arrests, intimidation, harassment and measures of control which 
immediately followed (Moyo, 2018).These have been directed at media workers of all 
sorts - journalists, editors, photographers, even newspaper vendors and even drivers 
- as well as media outlets, in particular independent print Media (Mhiripiri and Ureke, 
2018). The government’s determination to maintain AIPPA as its shield against 
criticism and exposure of corruption in higher offices came in the wake of the closure 
of the African Tribune Newspapers in February 2005 (Thakurta: 2009).  Since AIPPA’s 
enactment, independent Zimbabwean journalists and media practitioners have 
continued to endure harassment, self-censorship and threats as the media landscape 
continued to wither under the pressure of state censorship .This left the media with 
little space to fulfil its public watchdog status as the fourth estate, which plays and 
speak-truth-to-power role against government. Citizens have thus been systematically 
deprived of their right to know, freedom of expression and the right to access 
information. Media space in Zimbabwe has continuously shrunk since the initial 
closure of Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ), publishers of the mass 
circulating The Daily News and The Daily News on Sunday, on 12 September 2003, 
and the bombing of their printing press.”  
 
Interception of Communications Act  
In light of the discussion in chapter 1 where I observed that the military-led ZANU PF 
government frames social media as an “asymmetric threat” and as intent on 
“command and control”, it became clear – in particular during interviews – that social 
media is firmly in the cross hairs of the military establishment as a national security 
matter. Whether or not this framing is justified, it allows government to treat digital 
networks as tools that are potentially in the hands of hostile forces. This therefore 
justifies, in their eyes, regulations such as the Cyber Bill. Such intent from the 
securocrats was always there. Prior to the Cyber Bill, the Interception of 
Communications Act (ICA), dubbed the ‘spying act’, was signed into law in August 
2007. The purpose of the Act as stated in the overview is:   
 
To provide for the lawful interception and monitoring of certain 
communications in the course of their transmission through a 
telecommunication, postal or any other related service or system in 
Zimbabwe; to provide for the establishment of a monitoring centre; and 
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to provide for any other matters connected with or incidental to the 
foregoing (Interception of Communications Act (6 of 2007:2). 
 
“The Act “empowers the government to open private postal mail, eavesdrop on 
telephone conversations and intercept faxes and e-mails. The chief of defence 
intelligence, the director-general of the Central Intelligence Office (CIO), the 
commissioner of police, the commissioner general of the Zimbabwe Revenue 
Authority (ZIMRA)”, or “any of their nominees are authorised to request interception 
warrants from the minister of transport and communications without any mention of 
court permission being granted for such requests”. “ 
 
According to Section 9 of the Act, internet service providers (ISPs) and 
telecommunications operators must install the necessary monitoring software 
themselves at their own cost to assist the government in its spying mission. The 
interception of communication has been justified as appropriate for national security 
purposes. The definition of ‘national security’ in Section 2 is vague and needs to be 
reconsidered. National security has been defined as “matters relating to the existence, 
independence and safety of the state” (Interception of Communications Act 6 of 
2007:3). During the January 2019 National # Shutdown, analysts argued that The 
Interception of Communications Act 2007 could not be used to justify an internet 
shutdown because the Act does not provide for the suspension of any 
communications. The Act only provided for the lawful monitoring & interception of 
communication. “The minister of state in the office of the president does not have the 
power to switch off the internet. The application challenging the internet shutdown was 
brought by civic society organisations.””  
 
The Cyber Crime, Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill of 2019 
This bill was recently passed in Zimbabwe in October 2019 and was recently debated 
in Parliament. It now awaits assent from the president. While the Bill has not been 
made law yet, it aims to monitor Zimbabweans’ use of social media platforms including 
WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook, and penalise those who are disseminating 
“offensive” material. In its technical sense, the bill seeks to “….. combat cyber-crime 
and increase cyber security in order to build confidence and trust in the secure use of 
information communication technologies.” “More specifically the bill provides for the 
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“provision and approval of codes of conduct and ethics to be observed by all categories 
of data controllers, data protection with due regard to constitutional rights and public 
interest under the Postal, Telecommunication and Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe”. 
It also seeks to “provide penalties for the transmission of data messages inciting 
violence and damage to property, protection of citizens against cyber bullying and 
harassment, measures to address the dissemination of racist and xenophobic 
material”. Moyo (2018) argues that the Bill is politically motivated and an attempt to 
censor what kind of information leaves the country. The bill is said to be an attempt to 
deal with fake news as the bill provides penalties for distribution of information one 
knows is false. Whilst this may be the norm the world over, it will be interesting to see 
how this part of the bill is implemented considering that any time there are protests the 
opposition is said to have incited violence.  Scholars such as Ncube (2019) fear that 
this will become one of the multitudes of ways used to censor opposition parties. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed literature on fake news and social media regulation by 
focusing on definitions, history and developments around the concepts. The literature 
also enabled the discussion of social media use and government responses in various 
countries. From the literature, it is evident that ‘fake news’ still poses some definitional 
challenges to both scholars and governments. In this study, fake news is used to 
denote deliberate disinformation that is a result of purely fabricated, misleading, and 
verifiably inaccurate information spread on social media. Our case study is the January 
2019 National #Shutdown. It was also established that both citizens and governments 
are very active on social media, for different reasons and this has led to a proliferation 
of unverified information. Resultantly, most governments are calling for the regulation 
of social media platforms under the guise of stopping the spread of fake news in order 
to enhance their propagandist and hegemonic tendencies despite the difficulties of 
defining what fake news is.  
 
“Breaking news,” is cited by Zubiaga et al., “(2016) as one of the main functions of 
social media in contemporary societies. The problem is that not all that is being shared 
on social media is credible. It is, however, the pervasive use of bots, a software 
program that systematically posts automated attention-grabbing tweets to promote a 
person, product, or ideology, which has courted controversy for purportedly acting as 
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grounds for potential manipulation among Twitter users”. “These concerns have been 
compounded by findings in a recent study that 15% of Twitter’s current community of 
active users are bots” (Varol et al., 2017). “From a business perspective, it is 
understandable why social media platforms account for much of what the “fake news” 
empire produces and disseminates. These platforms generate advertising revenue 
(Picard and Pickard, 2017). “Another problem arising from the absence of clear 
definitions is that national laws criminalising ‘‘fake’’ or ‘‘false’’ news are susceptible to 
misuse and abuse through arbitrary interpretation and enforcement. The next chapter 










































This study is informed and guided by Jürgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere 
which, I argue, not only manifests in the cyber sphere but is an aspect of political 
communication. This is important because I am not only looking at fake news as 
entertaining gossip or something with which to kill time but an element of political 
contestation. Social media thus transforms the public sphere into a public political 
arena. Fake news is therefore seen not just as any pointless distraction but, rather, 
political spectacle, or spectacular politics. If the military sees fake news as a platform 
for “command and control”, and something with targeting with a Cyber Bill, then, the 
public sphere cannot just be a social real for forming public opinion. Instead, it 
becomes a civic and political realm for forming political opinions. There is an element 
of participation in it, which makes it transformative rather than just an elite bubble. This 
chapter therefore discusses key theoretical concepts on the public sphere and 
explains their importance and applicability to the study. The discussion will centre on 
how Habermas’ notion of the public sphere can be applied to social media and to the 
Zimbabwe situation obtaining in January 2019. 
 
Contextualising the public sphere 
Habermas’ public sphere, as a social realm in which public opinion is formed when (A 
portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private 
individuals assemble to form a public body) (Habermas 1974: 28), is critical to this 
study because it spells out the process whereby people, on being presented with a 
dialogic platform, make up their own minds in a manner that benefits themselves and 
society. We cannot underestimate the value of people making up their minds about 
what is going on in their surroundings. Habermas defines the notion of the public thus: 
“We call events and occasions ‘public’ when they are open to all, in contrast to close 
or exclusive affairs” (Habermas 1989c: 1). For Habermas, the concept of a public 
sphere plays an important role in realising democracy. But before the public sphere 
can work, the public needs to have both right and opportunity to express and exchange 
their opinions on public affairs (Tang and Shi, 2001). This public sphere is also 
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considered as both a process and space given that in times of mobilisation, the 
balance of power between the general population and the ruling government is 
disturbed (Habermas,1996). Initially, cultural, communication and media studies 
rooted the idea of a public sphere in the mass media. However, with the emergence 
of the internet, and the flourishing of social media, the notion of a public sphere has 
morphed into cyber sphere, with Habermas himself returning to the concept, revising 
and updating it (Wright, 2012). 
 
For Habermas, ([1989] 1991: 27) ‘public sphere’ resonates with a place where private 
people come together as a public for the purpose of using reason to further critical 
knowledge.  In order for this ‘space’ to be called a ‘public sphere’ and for it to function, 
it requires unlimited access to information, equal and protected participation, and the 
absence of institutional influence, particularly regarding the economy. The public 
sphere concept is multi-faceted and can be approached from different angles. To 
complicate it further, Habermas makes a distinction between the political public sphere 
and the literal one. The literal one, he writes, refers to ‘a realm of our social life in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed. ‘The political public sphere on 
the other hand refers to when ‘public discussion deals with objects connected to the 
activities of the state” (Abioye and  Mnyongani, 2009: 182-198).The realisation or 
actualisation of these two public spheres depends on the existence of an environment 
that guarantees certain rights and freedoms. These guaranteed rights and freedoms 
are access to the public sphere, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom 
of expression. 
 
“Various scholars have come up with theoretical arguments extending Habermas’ 
“public sphere” to social media (Fuchs 2012; Jenkins 2006; Loader and Mercea 2011; 
Papacharissi 2010; Sørensen 2016)”. “Social media’s general structure appears to 
provide unlimited access to information and equal, protected, participation (Kruse, 
Norris and Flinchum, 2017). These are some of the prerequisites that Habermas 
identified as necessary for the ‘public sphere’ to function. In addition to this, scholars 
observe that the “internet is relatively accessible and, in theory, anyone can distribute 
information, making both participation and information acquisition free from outside 
influence (Fuchs 2012; Halpern and Gibbs 2013; Jenkins 2006; Loader and Mercea 
2011; Van Dijk 2012). Fuchs (2012) further argues that social media sites, Facebook 
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in particular, offer favourable conditions for the public sphere. In support of this notion 
of social media sites being spaces for ‘public sphere’, Loader and Mercea argue that 
social media may revitalize the public sphere by allowing people “to challenge 
discourses, share alternative perspectives and publish their own opinions(2011:760). 
For Shirky (2008, 2011), social media has revitalized the public sphere. The scholar 
further argues that the networked population is gaining greater access to information, 
more opportunities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake 
collective action (2011: 29). 
 
Thus, while access to the public sphere is said to be open to all, state authority it is 
excluded. The political public sphere sets the context within which state authority can 
be understood and defined. The exercise of political power must account to the 
democratic processes and the people, and only when this happens will the political 
public sphere be realised. The possibility that cell phones and the internet will 
empower citizens, relative to their regimes, has long been embraced by the cyber-
utopians. As Fuchs (2012) observes, the freedom to connect is like the freedom of 
assembly, only in cyberspace. It allows individuals to get online, come together, and 
hopefully co-operate” (Fuchs, 2012). Conversely, it can be argued that with the 
exception of censorship and regime interference, the negative qualities of social media 
are most relevant to users in democracies. 
 
“Jürgen Habermas’ (1981) public sphere theory describes an environment in which 
individuals are able to critically discuss relevant issues and reach consensus regarding 
public matters. Much has been written regarding the evolution of the public sphere and 
its modern profile and function. When formulating his thesis, Habermas recognized 
that the public sphere was being expressed and manifested in coffee houses, table 
societies, salons, and other public places”. WaThiong’o seems to be suggesting that 
a concept such as Habermas’ public sphere was not exactly new to Africa (Cf. 
Tomaselli, Mboti and Ronning 2013). More importantly, he seems to be dramatising 
the concept of an alternative public sphere that spills out from the restricted and elite 
walls of the coffee house. However, this study explores how the public sphere has 
been manifested in the online community, utilizing social media which many 
individuals exchange information and opinions and discuss relevant matters. In this 
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particular study, there is need to explore the nature of “fake news” that was present 
on this cyber sphere that led to the government to shut down the internet. 
 
The public sphere is a space where individuals exchange ideas, debate, and ideally 
reach some consensus on issues of political relevance. It is essentially a 
communication network where citizens can interact and share information and 
opinions that can have an influence over the state and its rulers (Habermas, 1996). 
Social media such as Facebook, Twitter are public sphere spaces used by 
Zimbabwean people as communication tools to highlight the height of what was 
happening during the demonstrations. This is despite having some of the population 
still cut form internet access. The interactive nature of the digital media platforms has 
given rise to talk of digital public sphere. In the available literature, it is generally 
agreed that the growth of the digital public sphere in Zimbabwe has largely been 
influenced by the repressive nature of Zimbabwean politics, especially post-2000 
(Chibuwe and Ureke 2016; Moyo 2009, 2011). 
 
The sharing of information and exchange of opinions in the bourgeois society that 
Habermas examined took place in the salons, coffee houses, and table societies, 
though in modern society this exchange occurs in a variety of locales. A variety of 
spheres, including mass media, the Internet, and a multitude of social networks 
intersect and overlap to form a global, multimodal communication space, what Castells 
terms ―the new global public sphere (2012: 89-90). The public sphere, in 
contemporary society, has been shaped by the conditions in which modern society is 
situated. Much in the same way that citizens have changed how they communicate 
and obtain information, so has the environment in which they discuss and critique 
change. The public sphere by definition connotes the idea of citizenship in the open, 
accessible to all (Habermas, 1981; Papacharissi, 2002); however, various limits are 
often imposed on the communication process. In the context of a network society, the 
public sphere has undergone transformations that distinguish it from the ideal of the 
bourgeois public sphere that Habermas initially described; it has become what Castells 
refers to as the new public sphere. The public sphere is no exception and has taken 
on new characteristics as a result of the networking of virtually everything. Castells 
calls this the new public sphere or the new global public sphere (2008). Manuel 
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Castells identifies that modern society is a highly connected one whose social 
structure is made up of networks powered by microelectronic-based information and 
communication technologies (2004: 3); Castells calls this the network society. 
 
“A network society is an open, evolving structure comprised of a series of 
interconnected nodes, bearing no centre (2004; 2006). Society is by its very nature 
composed of overlapping social networks; however, the distinction here is that a 
network society is mediated by Information Communication Technologies (ICT) and 
Internet access, which facilitates a social structure based on these modern 
technologies. Firstly, the new public sphere has grown past national borders, mainly 
through the advent of global media-systems, which, for Castells, includes: 
 
Mass self-communication networks ...that is, networks of communication 
that relate many-to-many in the sending and receiving of messages in a 
multimodal form of communication that bypasses mass media and often 
escapes government control. (Castells, 2008: 90) 
 
This is a key characteristic of modern society: the ability to communicate 
internationally in an unrestricted manner. This is what the social media has enabled 
before this current call from the various governments to have this platform regulated. 
This study explores the lexus between social media regulation and fake news during 
the January 2019 National #Shutdown in Zimbabwe where various authors believe 
that the citizens had come together to discuss national issues on the social media 
(Mberi, 2019). 
 
Not only are individuals and groups able to communicate locally and globally, but they 
are able to share and access information as well as form interest groups. The nature 
of the Internet also allows this information to be stored for later access, creating a 
―repository of the ideas and projects that feed public debate (Castells, 2008: 79). 
Facebook and other social media tools are chronicling a history on the Internet that 
can be accessed and used from virtually anywhere in the world by anyone with a 
smartphone or Internet connection. These stores of information are useful at the local 
and global level and are representative of the informationalism of the network society. 
Facebook are often accused of being used for mostly trivial purposes; users are free 
to create their own content. The Internet allows individuals to not only communicate 
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with one another, but also collaborate and share information. Shirky (2011) identifies 
that all the above forms of communication have migrated to the Internet. This produced 
a ―denser, more complex, and more participatory media population (Ibid: 2) creating 
the conditions for a better informed, more discursive, and more inclusive environment. 
The first major element of the public sphere is universality. Universality presupposes 
equality among participants (Habermas, 1989). When the status of participants 
elevates them over others, their arguments are elevated with them, removing the 
ability for consensus to be reached through discussion and argumentation and 
preventing any agreement reached from reflecting the group. The Internet has proven 
to be a space that is highly conducive to this type of universality, as individuals can 
much more easily hide their identities. The only indicators of an individual’s social 
status on Facebook are their username – not necessarily their real name – and profile 
picture – should they choose to use one. 
 
It can be argued that the Zimbabwean government panicked as the calls swelled and 
the posting of what was happening gained momentum. “In a frantic effort to counteract 
what they expected to be a condemnation” of civil rights abuse from all corners of the 
world, the government cut off Internet and mobile phone networks across the country. 
This can be considered as a move of desperation on the part of the government. They 
had run out of options at that point, (Mberi, 2019). Thus, the internet blackout was 
indicative of just how threatened the government was by Internet technologies. 
 
Although social networks seem to be public spaces, where masses of people have 
similar and simultaneous experiences, in reality we have to deal with countless sets 
of private conversations that take place without our knowledge. The ghost of the public 
sphere is fragmented and submerged in billions of individual capillaries. (Mberi, 2019) 
The notion of censorship is commonly associated with totalitarian regimes. It should 
not be confused with a certain form of control that states can and must exercise on 
information for legitimate purposes, such as the protection of human rights or the 
safeguarding of public interest. An extreme right troll, for example, should not (and 
could not) be blocked on the Internet, but the algorithms that ensure its public attention 
can and should be controlled. Thus, it can be argued that if people choose to believe, 
“fake news”, this becomes real news and hence regulation must not interfere with 




This theoretical framework is therefore ideal for this study because it has a link to both 
the ordinary events and political dimension which include issues that touch on public 
participation, democracy and the current economic challenges that the country is 
facing. This theory also resonates well with the research objectives that seek to 
explore the nexus of fake news and social media regulation in Zimbabwe using the 
January 2019 National # Shutdown as a backdrop to understand exactly how “fake 
news” figures in the media regulation matrix.  
 
The exchanging of ideas and the interaction between the individuals has reached a 
high level, thanks to the use of social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter and 
WhatsApp. Users can communicate freely with each-other and consequently can 
come together for a certain theme (Fuchs, 2011). Communicating online means to 
publish online, which on the other hand refers to being connected online with other 
people. The published content in the social media is reachable from anyone 
throughout the world. This eliminates the physical and infrastructure obstacles, which 
means that freedom of the speech is now the freedom of the press and as a 
consequence the freedom to gather together (Fuchs, 2014:185). It was never as easy 
as it is now for the people to come together and be organised to express their criticism 
or to contradict a certain matter that concerns a certain community. Habermas asserts 
that events and occasions are public when they, in contrast to closed or exclusive 
affairs, are open to all, in the same sense as we speak of public places or public 
houses (Habermas 1989:1). 
 
The public sphere appears as a specific domain, the public domain versus the private, 
where communicative action can flourish and form public opinion (Ibid: 2). It is through 
communicative actions in the public sphere that lifeworld gains its potential for 
opposing the system, by fostering the public’s role as a critical judge (Ibid). 
Cyberspace therefore holds potential for a stronger diversity of opinions and 
expressions, as they actually exist in society, thus strengthening the public discourse 
and sphere. The increased focus on Internet regulation, whether by applying existing 
laws, developing Internet-specific laws, applying content-based license terms to ISPs, 
or governments’ encouragement of self-regulation by private parties, are all examples 
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of the political system gaining control over still more areas of the initially free public 
sphere of the cyberspace (Cela, 2017). Keller (2017) suggested that the public sphere 
theory provides important theoretical understanding of the spheres and its relationship 
to democracy. He noted that social media have created new spaces for political 
intervention that have potential to invigorate democracy while fostering greater 
manipulation and social control. 
 
On the other hand, various scholars draw our attention to the limitations of the theory. 
Kovisto and Valiverronen (1996:18-36) see the public sphere not as domain, but as a 
process of counter-hegemonic struggles. Baumgartner and Morris (2010), Fuchs 
(2012) and Gladwell (2010) argued against the notion of social media having 
revitalised the public sphere, noting the absence of equal access and participation on 
these platforms. Jenkins (2006) pointed out that not everyone has access to internet, 
adding that the social media have not been free of institutional influence. On the other 
hand, Papacharissi (2002) argued that social media have brought a new dimension to 
the discussion of the public sphere. A public sphere emerges where people struggle 
for a better society and their struggle is a process of constituting the public that creates 
spatial domains of resistance in the public. Despite the criticism of this theoretical 
framework, it resonates very well with what was happening in Zimbabwe during the 
January 2019 National #Shutdown. The creation of public spheres does not just take 
place in the West, but also in many parts of the world in times of global capitalist and 
social crisis. 
 
In Africa, the idea of public sphere has been found to be very useful especially for 
political communication (Suleiman, 2017). However, despite its usefulness, the notion 
poses certain conceptual difficulties given the historical underpinnings in Africa. 
Furthermore, the literature on the possibilities, or not, of the internet and online 
platforms enabling the emergence of virtual public spheres and inclusive citizens’ 
political participation is abundant (Dahlgren, 2005; Downey and Fenton, 2003; 
Papacharissi, 2002). “Some researchers argue that such social transformations are 
brought by the social media and are already manifesting in the twenty-first century 
Africa, (Manganga, 2012; Mustapha, 2012; Ya’u, 2012). Manganga (2012:103) for 
instance, demonstrated that the internet has proved to be a useful alternative public 
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sphere for Zimbabweans both at home and in the diaspora for engaging the 
government and broadening political participation in the country. Thus, in Africa, 
“public sphere” is implied in discussions of the relationships between the media, civil 
society and the state in the continent thereby making critical, rational debate all nigh 
impossible.  
 
There is little doubt that social media is being reinvented to increase political 
engagement in Africa as evidenced by the various African politicians who have taken 
advantage of this relatively new public sphere (Jacobs, 2015). Many countries where 
information used to be subject to absolute government control have seen 
unprecedented public debate and the arguable emergence of a fresh kind of public 
sphere (Deane, 2005, p. 181). On the other hand, Fraser (1990) suggests that the 
conception of the public sphere set out by Habermas effectively excluded the poor. A 
similar exclusion of the poor from the modern public sphere is arguably happening 
today, witnessed in the growing lack of interest by the media in public interest issues. 
Many authors have stressed the potential for, or limit of, the social media to advance 
political communication (Benkler 2006; Dahlberg 2001, 2004; Dahlgren 2005, 2009; 
and Papacharissi 2002, 2009), whereas a smaller number have also stressed that 
aspects of the political economy of the media and the social media relate directly to 
the concept of the public sphere (Garnham 1992; Sparks 2001). Social media would 
be “coordinating tools for nearly all of the world’s political movements, just as most of 
the world’s authoritarian governments (and, alarmingly, an increasing number of 
democratic ones) are trying to limit access to it (Shirky, 2011:30). Shirky further noted 
that there are attempts to control, censor and monitor social media, but argues at the 
same time that these attempts are unlikely to be successful in the long run and that 
social media are long-term tools that can strengthen civil society and the public sphere 
(2011:32). 
 
Papacharissi (2010) argues that there is a limitation to the public sphere because 
unmediated public debates on social media are now being run by selfish people. Fuchs 
(2011) argues that the democratizing potential of social media platforms is now being 
mediated by trolls and bots, who have a leading role in spreading fake news. Trolls 
are people who are paid to provoke disagreements and doubts with offensive posts. 
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They can also be considered as people who are hired to create positive propaganda 
about a politician or even a whole country (Tornberg, 2019).  Reda (2018) added that 
trolls manipulate the public opinion by using misleading campaigns, fake news and 
clickbait which are not supported by facts. 
 
Habermas, Lennox and Lennox (1964: 49) postulate that by public sphere, we mean 
first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can 
be formed. They further argued that policies and decisions by governments are 
influenced and shaped through this public sphere on social media. To Gerhards and 
Schäfer (2010) public sphere serves as a space to share information and debates. 
Papacharissi (2009) sounds a note of caution when she makes the observation that 
only a few individuals who are able to access the internet are the ones who enjoy its 
benefits as a public space; hence, the idea of the internet being an open public sphere 
remains an illusion. In addition, Papacharissi (2009) suggests that online political 
discussions are somewhat too specific to achieve Habermas’ notion of an ideal public 
sphere, in the sense that online communication usually takes place between 
individuals who already know each other offline. On the other hand, it can thus be 
argued that with the growing popularity of mobile phones and social media especially 
amongst youths globally, information spreads rapidly in a viral nature within a short 
space of time. 
 
Social Media as a Public Sphere 
Previously, the media worked as a link between information providers and audiences. 
However, this has changed with the advent of social media where information is not 
only generated but also propagated. Thus, social media is often accused of shaping 
public debate and unfairly engineering people’s behaviour and undermining the 
democratic process instead of nurturing a healthy public sphere (Marda and Milan, 
2018). Social Media acts as a facilitator of democracy by providing the public with 
equal access to information and equal opportunities to participate. The public sphere 
is the nexus between public life and civil society. It is that space of the society where 
access is guaranteed to all the citizens to engage and discuss the matters of general 
interest to form a public opinion (Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox, 1964). Evolution of 
social media and its increasing role as a platform for its users to express their opinions 
has guaranteed freedom in an unrestricted way. Social media collects information and 
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opinions from all its audiences irrespective of whether they belong to the bourgeois or 
proletariat – and thus provides a neutral space for all those who are a part of the civil 
society to discuss any issue of common interest. Since it fulfils the basic pre-requisites 
of providing space, albeit digitally, for free speech of participants, it becomes a public 
sphere virtually. 
 
At the same time, how civil society uses social media creates a dilemma. If social 
media is an effective public sphere or merely acts as a chaotic echo chamber for the 
public reason being, it has fewer central nodes, gatekeepers or agenda setters than 
the traditional media. This makes social media susceptible to unverified and 
misleading content viz. fake news. Fake news on social media has a massive impact 
on the opinions of people across the world. The proliferation of social network sites 
has led to what Castells (2007) calls horizontal forms of communication, which in turn 
have led to mass self-communication. That these networks are hosted on the mobile 
phones, among other platforms, enables the majority of people to access them thereby 
forming the public sphere. Implied in the foregoing is that social network sites enable 
citizens to participate more in the production, distribution, and consumption of 
communication. This has led scholars to argue that the Internet and these social 
network sites provide a digital public platform that enhances democracy. However, 
regimes, especially despotic ones, always try to impede the free flow of information on 
these platforms. This theoretical framework is therefore very relevant to this study as 
this will show how the public sphere on social media in Zimbabwe is also independent 
of government involvement in understanding the nexus between fake news and the 
regulation of this public sphere on social media. 
 
While the public sphere does not perform a decision-making function, in our truth-
tracking ideal, the public sphere should therefore be credited for acting as a function 
of articulating and raising the problems, claims, and interests (not to mention hopes 
and dreams) upon, and about, which decisions are taken. The public sphere produces 
public opinion. Therefore, social media may revitalize the public sphere by allowing 
people, to challenge discourses, share alternative perspectives and publish their own 
opinions (Loader and Mercea, 2011:760). Thus, social media in the Zimbabwean 
context emerged as arenas enabling Zimbabweans to share government’s, ruling 
party’s, and security forces’ abuses, corruption, and electoral malpractices (Moyo, 
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2011).  On 12 January 2019, President Mnangagwa made an announcement that fuel 
prices would go up by at least 150%. This was a trigger for citizens, already reeling 
from rising inflation, who then started to group and discuss the issue on Social media 
(Mberi, 2019).The fearlessness characteristic of debates on the digital public sphere 
could have been a result of the sense of security derived from the anonymity of citizens 
in online spaces—an anonymity that simultaneously provides netizens a platform to 
freely express themselves and to abuse others” (Chibuwe and Ureke, 2016). 
 
Social media platforms have not only enabled civil society, interest groups, 
governments, political parties and candidates to deploy social media in electoral 
processes, but have also enabled citizens to actively take part in these processes 
(Chatora, 2012; Strandberg, 2013). Thus, the application of Habermas’ public sphere 
theoretical framework makes it ideal to understand the Zimbabwean government’s 
response to “fake news” during the #Shutdown and through this framework, the 
relationship of “fake news” and (social) media regulation would be brought to the fore. 
Social media are therefore a vital and permanent part of that public sphere, if for no 
other reason than that so many people get their basic information about what is going 
on in the world from social media (including whether it is raining or not). The problem 
of fake news points to new challenges brought about by the rise of social media as 
central actors in the public sphere. As such, any discussion of digital media democracy 
and political participation frequently falls back on Habermas’ concept of the public 
sphere”. “This is understandable as it is one of the few prominent theoretical 




This chapter discussed the theoretical framework applied to the study. The discussion 
revealed that the theory was initially rooted in the mass media. With the emergence of 
the internet, and the flourishing of “social media”, comes the cyber sphere, the online 
version of the public sphere. Habermas returned to the concept, revising and updating 
it. The theory is used to explore how this cyber space was utilised to communicate 












This is an exploratory study grounded in qualitative research. Qualitative research is 
a type of research that focuses on developing and understanding naturalistic human 
phenomena, whether small or large (Savenye and Robinson, 2003). Mack et al (2005) 
argued that qualitative research seeks to understand a given research problem or topic 
from the perspectives of the local population it involves. The methodology is relevant 
for this study which seeks to understand the nature and role of “fake news” in the 
January 2019 National #Shutdown in Zimbabwe and to comprehend what the 
Zimbabwean government’s response to “fake news” during the #Shutdown tells us 
about the relationship of “fake news” and social media regulation. The qualitative 
research methodology helps people to make sense of their social worlds and how they 
express these understandings through language, sound, imagery, personal style and 
social rituals (Mack et al, 2005).  
 
Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005:8) describe qualitative research methods as 
methods aiming at determining the dynamic and changeable nature of reality by 
collecting subjective data, presented verbally by participants. For some scholars, 
qualitative research refers to any type of research that bring about findings that are 
not arrived at by statistical measures or by any other quantification methods” (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998: 10; Snape and Spencer 2003: 17). Although Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) contend that qualitative research results in qualitative findings, they however 
note that some qualitative research studies can be realised using quantification 
methods although the bulk of the analysis for qualitative research is interpretative. 
While qualitative research helps locate the researcher in the world (Denzin and Lincoln 
2000: 3), it also promotes the creation of reality by human beings depending on their 
worldviews. In view of this study, I aim to explore how the Zimbabwean government 
responded to ‘fake news’ during the January 2019 #Shutdown and to understand how 




The study was located in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe (where the #shutdown 
was more prevalent), and conducted with purposively selected key informants within 
government, civil society, media policy making circles and the media. The findings 
presented in this chapter were drawn from twelve (12) semi-structured key informant 
interviews. Some of the interviews are not captured in these findings because, while 
participants agreed to be interviewed (and indeed were interviewed), they strictly 
insisted on being off the record and, even more significantly, asked not to have their 
interviews transcribed. The key-informant interviews contributed to an understanding 
of fake news and media regulation around the January 2019 National #Shutdown in 
Zimbabwe. With Harare being the epicentre of the demonstrations, it only made sense 
to limit interview with informants based in the city.     
 
Semi-structured face-to-face key-informant interview data 
As already noted, the study findings are drawn from twelve (12) interviewees with 
different media industry experts, politicians and civil society members on the issue of 
fake news and media regulation during the January 2019 #Shutdown protests in 
Zimbabwe. Out of more than twenty (20) prospective interviews, planned with the aim 
of getting as much interviews as possible to reach saturation, the study ended up 
obtaining twelve relevant interviews firstly because approximately a third of the 
participants who agreed to be interviewed opted not to be recorded and secondly 
because saturation was reached at about the halfway stage into the sample. The 
reluctance to be recorded by some of the interviews signified the very real, but also 
(to my mind) surprising, fear of reprisal that many Zimbabweans in positions of power 
feel. I say surprising because one would expect the key informants I interviewed, some 
of them from within government and ZANU-PF, to be more confident to be on record. 
For instance, those in opposition have access to lawyers compared to ordinary 
Zimbabweans who can be victimised without legal remedies. Another finding linked to 
this refusal to be on record is that it seemed those key informants in government 
actually wanted to contradict their (and the government’s) public positions and 
standpoints.  
 
As such, they felt safer off the record. They found my study and my interview to be an 
opportunity and platform to vent and speak their minds, but not for public consumption. 
In other words, they told me that they wanted to be frank with me, but only on condition 
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that none of what they said constituted the public record. Of course, this condition 
defeated the whole purpose of the research, but since I was very keen to hear what 
they had to say, I let them speak. It is a rare opportunity to hear intimately from insiders 
in Zimbabwean elite and governing circles. As a former journalist, I know a scoop when 
I see one. It was a pity, however, that I could not (for ethical reasons) use this scoop 
except in heavily redacted circumstances. Out of respect of the participants’ wishes, I 
could not make use of what they told me in a manner that could out the identity of the 
speakers. It was striking that these informants felt that even a verbatim transcription 
of what they said would tracked and traced back to them. As such, it seems that the 
fear that the security establishment and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) 
was able to listen in and shadow the recordings was real. Indeed, one of the officials I 
interviewed insisted that the interview be conducted not only off the record but off site. 
Another put on Jah Prayzah’s music in the background, as if (or so I speculated) to 
create background noise to confound any listening devices.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the participants who refused to be recorded were 
some of the high-ranking officials within the government who were closely involved in 
the shutdown of the internet. I found it mildly amusing that these participants even 
resorted to appearing be refusing to be interviewed by me, when in fact they had 
agreed and even went ahead with the interviews. It was as if they were playing to the 
gallery and keeping up appearances, merely to stave off suspicion from whoever they 
suspected was watching them and listening. As I have already intimated, it was 
somewhat surprising to learn that people in power, and who publicly give of the aura 
of being in control of the narrative, also actually live in fear! Interestingly, these senior 
officials’ answers were very informative and insightful. The insights will be weaved into 
this study in a way and manner that does not reveal the identities of the speakers or 
what they said directly. I have not only anonymised their submissions by not 
mentioning names, but also including their answers in the “latticework” and interstices 
of the information of other interviewees who agreed to be recorded. In other words, 
what I heard from these informants is buried in the data collected from other interviews. 
I could not find any other way to include this information in a safe way that respected 




This way of including such information was an innovation I thought up in order to 
include the important insights without breaching ethical considerations. I also found 
this unfolding situation to be an important and interesting methodological challenge in 
terms of the meaning of consent in general and informed consent in particular. What 
are we to do as researchers out there in the field in cases where participants give their 
consent with such intricate conditions? It was clear that the participants wanted to be 
heard, but they did not feel that traditional anonymisation was adequate to protect 
identities. They wanted to be heard but not recorded. They wanted me to know what 
had happened but not in a form that could be transcribed. Basically, they were 
burdening me, the researcher, to find a way out of the conundrum. What was I to do? 
In future studies (perhaps in a journal article) I hope to further interrogate my 
methodological intervention to “bury” sensitive information by some reluctant-to-be-
recorded participants inside the information of other willing-to-be-recorded 
participants. All participants, in any case, were anonymised, even the ones who 
agreed to be recorded and used in the study. Not a single key informant agreed to be 
referred to by their real identity. This, for me, spoke volumes about the fear and 
insecurity felt not only by some Zimbabweans but Zimbabweans in positions of power. 
 
Of the twelve interviewees, four were females and eight were males.  In order to meet 
the objectives of the research, questions were structured and categorised according 
to the five areas below: 
 
1. January 2019 National #Shutdown 
2. Government’s role in the shutdown of the internet 
3. Social Media participation 
4. Fake news in Zimbabwe 




Interviews are an important strategy in data collection (Ryan et al., 2009). In this study, 
a total of 12 semi-structured, key informant, interviews were conducted with 
purposively selected participants within government, civil society, and media policy-
making circles. Given (2008) states semi –structured interviews is a form of qualitative 
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data collection strategy in which the researcher asks the informant a series of 
predetermined but open ended questions. While there are no fixed responses to the 
questions (Oslen, 2012:33), this type of data collection requires collaboration between 
the researcher and informant (Given, 2008). The advantage is that semi-structured 
interviews have the ability to render rich and experiential accounts from the 
participating individuals (Al-Saggf and Williamson, 2004). Ryan et al., (2009) conclude 
that semi – structured interviews allow spontaneous and in-depth responses. They are 
flexible and the questions are not rigid, hence the researcher can probe accordingly. 
For instance, questions varied among informants depending on their background and 
expertise. The rationale behind key informant interviews, on the other hand, was their 
ability to draw useful insights from people who had an understanding of the subject. 
Participants already had an idea on the subject, and this made it easier for the 
researcher to get the required information. Key informants have exceptional 
knowledge about a particular (Lavrakas, 2008). 
 
The purpose of these interviews was to elicit responses to questions about the 
relationship between fake news and media regulation in Zimbabwe, in light of the 
January 2019 #Shutdown.Semi-structured interviews with the key informants were 
therefore considered effective. The researcher was nevertheless aware of the 
limitations that comes with the use of key informants, which include the possibility of 
getting biased and misleading information considering that some informants belonged 
to partisan organisations and stood to benefit from pushing one-sided narratives. 
Drawing from various sectors was therefore important in allowing for varied and 
multiple perspectives on the January 2019 #Shutdown and media regulation. The 
researcher understood the need for reflection and action required on the nature of 
communication between the researcher and the participant, especially where semi –
structured interviews are employed. The researcher therefore made sure that 
interviews were productive for both the study and the participants. 
 
SAMPLING 
Lavrakas (2008) defines sampling as, ‘[t]he selection of a given number of units of 
analysis from the population of interest.’ He further emphasises the importance of 
sampling in research, singling out feasibility and time management as some of the 
major benefits of sampling. The study used non-probability sampling. The advantage 
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of using non-probability sampling is that of being able to apply a specific subjective 
method or criteria to choose the participants deemed satisfying by the researcher. 
Specifically, purposive sampling was used to select key informants for the semi-
structured interviews. Purposive sampling focuses on particular characteristics of a 
population, deemed of interest to the researcher, which facilitate addressing the 
research questions (Marshall, 1996). It is one of the most common non-probability 
sampling methods where subjects are grouped depending on pre-selected criteria that 
are significant to a particular research (MacDougall and Fudge, 2001). The overall 
objective of this type of sampling is to come up with a sample that can be logically 
assumed to be a representative of the population with the researcher applying expert 
or subjective selection criteria of the participants. The research targeted individuals 
who had commented on the issue of fake news and social media regulation in the 
context of the January 2019 #Shutdown. Twelve participants were drawn from various 
informant groups including the Ministry of Information, MISA-Zimbabwe, the 
Movement for Democratic Change Alliance and ZANU PF. Participants also included 
media law experts and key influencers on social media who commented on ‘fake news’ 
during the January 2019 #Shutdown. The researcher visited these key informants in 
situ, in places that the interviewees were comfortable with. 
 
While the sample may have been small, it was sufficient to generate the required 
output. The key informants had direct interests in the subject matter and therefore 
provided important insights. The researcher also made sure that informants were able 
and willing to take part in the semi-structured interviews. One way the researcher 
utilised was to investigate what they had posted and commented in relation to fake 
news during the #Shutdown. The researcher was well aware of the political instability 
in Zimbabwe that might have affected participant recruitment hence a sample was 
drawn from a wide selection of informants. The researcher grouped key informants 
according to their affiliations and the platforms that they used to comment on the issue 
of ‘fake news’. The researcher then crosschecked if the selected interviewees were 
typical enough of the groups they represented. Social media platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter were used to get the key informants who were well versed in 





UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
Vogt defined unit of analysis as, “[b]asically the main object which a researcher aims 
to examine in order to fulfil the objectives of the study” (2011) while Lewis-Beck et al 
(2004) refer to a unit of analysis as the most significant element of a research, which 
involves those subjects which the researcher interprets to produce results for the 
overall study. Furthermore, as some scholars noted such as (Gunter, 2000), once the 
most appropriate unit of analysis has been chosen for the study, it becomes much 
easier to select and employ the data analysis methods accordingly. The unit of 
analysis for this study refers to the 12 key informants selected by the researcher and 
the responses that the researcher received from these participants. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
In qualitative research, different methods of analysing data are available for selection 
by researchers (Williamson, 2004b). This study makes use of thematic analysis. A 
wide range of data sources may be used in a thematic analysis, including interview 
transcripts, field notes and information written by participants 
(Mills,  Durepos and Wiebe, 2010). Thematic analysis   involves discovering themes 
in the interview transcripts and documents reviewed and attempting to verify, confirm 
and qualify them by searching through the data and repeating the process to identify 
further themes and categories” (Chadwick et al., 2008: 429). The data will be 
transcribed and coded before it is interpreted according to different themes. Braun and 
Clarke's (2006) version of thematic analysis, which consists of familiarising with data, 
generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming 
themes and lastly, producing the report was used.  Braun and Clarke (2006) state that 
thematic analysis is a qualitative process of identifying and analysing various themes 
within given data. Furthermore, they note that themes are capable of capturing 
significant aspects about data in relation to the research questions and they represent 
a certain level of patterned response or meaning within the data set.  This version of 
thematic analysis was chosen because of its strength to “yield insightful interpretations 
that are contextually grounded” and because of its flexibility. 
 
Taylor and Gibbs (2010), qualitative data analysis (QDA) is the range of processes 
and procedures whereby we move from the qualitative data that have been collected 
into some form of explanation, understanding or interpretation of the people and 
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situations we are investigating. In simple terms, data analysis entails interpreting what 
participants said and what the researcher read. The process of analysing data involves 
moving back and forth”. In line with this, Goodwill and Goodwill (1996:142) maintains 
that qualitative data analysis is closely tied to data collection, and occurs throughout 
data collection as well as afterward. This view is upheld by Burnard et al., (2008:429) 
who note that in qualitative research, data analysis does not occur after all the data 
has been collected, but that after every session with a respondent the researcher will 
start transcribing. It also entails the writing of comments by the researcher as soon as 
a session with a participant is ended and these comments can be thoughts, feelings, 
and ideas for the next stage of data collection. 
 
The basic analytic strategy used in thematic analysis is coding, a process of closely 
inspecting text to look for recurrent themes, topics, or relationships, and marking 
similar passages with a code or label to categorize them for later retrieval and theory-
building.  That is, coding refers to the process of indexing text with codes and in due 
course themes with notable variation between approaches and disciplines in exactly 
how these terms are used (King and Brooks 2018). Hence the importance of 
considering how a particular writer employed them.  This is why the researcher chose 
to use Braun and Clarke’s version. Following King and Horrocks (2010), King and 
Brooks (2018) define themes as ‘recurrent and distinctive features of participants’ 
accounts, characterising particular perceptions and/or experiences, which the 
researcher sees as relevant to the research question’ (2018: 150). 
 
The process starts when the analyst begins to notice, and look for, patterns of meaning 
and issues of potential interest in the data – this may be during data collection. The 
endpoint is the reporting of the content and meaning of patterns (themes) in the data, 
where themes are abstract (and often fuzzy) constructs the investigators identify [sic] 
before, during, and after analysis (Ryan and Bernard, 2000: 780). In analysing data, 
the researcher began by familiarising with concepts of fake news and social media 
regulation before reading on what transpired during the January 2019 #Shutdown to 
know what the key informants commented regarding the event. For a successful 
analysis, it is important for a researcher to be well versed in all aspects of the data 
since this phase provides the foundation for the rest of the analysis (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). Furthermore, some researchers even argue it should be seen as a key phase 
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of data analysis within interpretative qualitative methodology (Bird, 2005: 227), and 
recognised as an interpretative act, where meanings are created, rather than simply a 
mechanical one of putting spoken sounds on paper (Lapadat and Lindsay, 1999). It is 
at this stage that the researcher started taking “notes or ideas for coding during this 
phase”. Since the researcher was working with verbal data from the key informant 
interviews, the data was then transcribed into written format for thematic analysis to 
take place. 
 
The second phase involved generating initial codes with Braun and Clarke (2006) 
describing coding as involving the process of organising data into significant groups. 
The researcher identified important elements of the collected data before interpreting 
it. For Braun and Clarke, ‘[t]hematic analysis is a relatively straight-forward form of 
qualitative analysis, which does not require the some detailed theoretical and technical 
knowledge similar to critical content analysis, (2006: 68). The third phase involved 
searching for themes. At this stage the researcher categorised the different codes into 
potential themes, and collating all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified 
themes. Basically, it is at this stage that the analysis of the codes was initiated. Within 
the fourth stage, which involves the reviewing of themes, the researcher refined and 
validated the themes in relation to the set data.  
 
By the end of this exercise, the researcher was able to know the different themes 
available before defining and naming the themes in the phase that follows. It is 
therefore within this fifth phase that concise names for the themes were developed. 
Final analysis and report writing were done in this final phase. The researcher 
summarised the complexity of the data collected to show the validity of the analysis. 
According to Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis is not a complex method that 
is very flexible in qualitative research. However, the paradox regarding the place of 
generic thematic analysis in qualitative research continues and yet it on the other hand 
it continues to be widely used. By 2018, Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis 
article had received nearly 33,680, (King and Brooks, 2018), thus proving that the data 
analysis method still offers an accessible and theoretically-flexible approach to 







Due to the fact that the actions of civil society during the #Shutdown were regarded 
by government as illegal, it was important to clarify beforehand that the study was 
academic and was not in any way supportive of either government or opposition or 
civil society, and was not linked to illegal activities. During the data collection, the 
researcher remained neutral and unbiased. The researcher also undertook to conduct 
research that meets all the ethical standards, as prescribed in UJ’s Ethics Codes 
(Academic and Research Ethics) policy document. Through an invitation letter, the 
nature and purpose of the study was clearly explained to all the participants so that 
they may make a decision to participate or not. Participants were not forced to 
participate in this study, and this was communicated verbally and in the letters of 
introduction and consent forms. Participation was strictly voluntary, and no payment, 
reward or incentives was offered for participation. Participants were informed of their 
right to withdraw from the interviews at any time, and for any reason, without having 
to explain why. The participants were also informed that they would not be subjected 
to any harm. Rather, they were informed that they were under no compulsion to 
answer questions that they wish not to answer. All interviews were recorded using a 
mobile phone, and participants who were reluctant to be recorded were not recorded. 
Although the researcher did not expect the research to pose any undue risks to 
participants due to the objective, academic and fairly uncontroversial nature of its 
research questions, the political situation is Zimbabwe is often volatile. As such, the 
researcher took steps to anonymise participants and respect confidentiality. This was 
the case in particular since the interviews included members of the opposition as well 
as key informants from government ministries. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the research methodology employed in this study. The 
researcher discussed, in detail, the qualitative research methodology, data collection 
methods, sampling strategy and methods of data analysis utilised in this study, whilst 
also giving the strengths and limitations of these methods. In addition, the chapter 
highlighted the ethical issues that the researcher observed while conducting the study. 







DATA PRESENTATION ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION FINDINGS 
 
Introduction   
This chapter presents data and findings obtained during the exploration of the nexus 
of fake news and social media regulation in Zimbabwe. The January 2019 National 
#Shutdown was used as the basis for this discussion on how ‘fake news’ figures in the 
media regulation matrix. The chapter also explains the relevance of the study’s 
location by providing a background and significance of obtaining data exclusively from 
Harare. Findings on the nature and role of “fake news” in the January 2019 National 
#Shutdown in Zimbabwe, and what the Zimbabwean government’s response to “fake 
news” during the #Shutdown reveals about the relationship between “fake news” and 
(social) media regulation are presented and analysed. During the shutdown, 
government officials raised alarm on the spread of “fake news” and used the pretext 
to shut down the internet. The data was analysed using Braun and Clarke’s thematic 
analysis guidelines. 
 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
For the purpose of coding, presentation and analysis the twelve interviewees were 
named Participant 1 to 12 (i.e. P1 to P12). The table below indicates the demographic 
representation of the participants selected for this study. This includes information on 
the participant’s gender, sector in which they are employed, whether they were present 
in Harare during the 2019 National #Shutdown and if they are active on Social media 





















P1 Male Media and Policy  Yes  Yes  
P2 Female Civil Society Yes  Yes  
P3 Male Media and Policy Yes  Yes  
P4 Female Government Yes  Yes  
P5 Male Government Yes  Yes  
P6 Male Government Yes  Yes  
P7 Male Media and Policy Yes  Yes  
P8 Male  Government Yes Yes  
P9 Female Civil Society Yes  Yes  
P10 Male Civil Society No  Yes 
P11 Female  Civil Society Yes  Yes  
P12 Male Government Yes  Yes  
Table 1: Demographic representation of the participants selected for this study 
 
The participants’ gender also gives an indication of the responses received. Moreover, 
the different sectors represented by the participants had an impact on the type of 
responses they gave. For instance, informants from the government sector were very 
formal, technical and impersonal in their responses – almost as if speaking to a script. 
Once again these “scripted” answers spoke to what I thought was the fear of reprisal 
or losing their jobs – a fear that is understandable in Zimbabwe’s polarised, militarised 
and factionalised political space. The majority of participants stated that they were in 
Zimbabwe physically during the January 2019 National Shutdown, except for one 
participant (P10) who was not available at the time as he had travelled out of the 
country on business during the shutdown. By some coincidence (certainly this was not 
a criterion in my purposive selection of who to interview), all interviewees were very 
active on social media and some had the opportunity to also send in their comments 
on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter regarding what was happening during the 




An account, from each participant, of the events that took place in Zimbabwe on 15 
January 2019 is presented in the table below: 
 
Participants What is your version and recollection of what happened during the 
January 2019 National #Shutdown? 
P1 It was an order by the state security minister in response to what has been 
muted by various activists’ especially non-government actors. It was 
essentially a protest against the government. 
P2  Everything, communication was cut off because of the harsh economic 
conditions. People do not buy newspapers anymore because people have 
now moved on to social media. Government is paranoid, it fears free 
speech. There is free speech on social media. 
P3 I was not part of the demonstrations, but we were covering the shutdown. 
P4 There were some demonstrations about to happen in Zimbabwe. Fake 
news were just circulating around and that had the effect of actually 
threatening the economy of the country. In fact, there was going to be a 
strike, so people were circulating fake news around that issue. 
P5 Well, there was an increase in fuel prices announced by the president I 
think, on 13 January 2019. There was a huge leap in prices and it resulted 
in protest in some parts of the country. People were protesting what they 
felt as unjustified price increases. 
P6 The shutdown in January was not the first of its kind. Eh, it came against 
the background of other shutdowns stretching back to 1997. 
P7 It was a demonstration that was plugged by the opposition to protest 
against eh… well the protest was what they were calling the living 
conditions which were deteriorating economic conditions, etc.  
P9 Around that time, what happened was that, government believes they are 
the owners of the media. And be that as it may, they feel that they can 
control – one, the people and two, the media.    
P10 I was arrested following the January disturbances, though I was not around 
as I was in Namibia that time. According to the government, they wanted to 
stop fake news that was being circulated by protestors and also pictures of 
the destruction that was going ahead which in their view was serving the 
purpose of motivating other communities.  
P11 The government identified the internet as a threat to national security and 
they shutdown the internet. They thought by doing so they would be able 
to stop the protest, cut their means of communication and the likes.  
P12 That was an opposition inspired, of course, it has quite a number of 
combination of other central groups’ perhaps civic society who ought to 
express their political resonance of a number of issues around politics of 
the economic situation in the country. 
Table 2: Participants’ framing of the January 2019 National #Shutdown? 
 
Participants’ framing of what happened in Zimbabwe during the January 2019 National 
#Shutdown varied, tending to reflect whether one supported (or sympathised with) the 
government’s response or criticised it and sympathised with the protestors. Some, like 
P10 were directly affected, by being arrested. Participants’ views about their 
understanding of what led the government to shut down the internet in the country 
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during the week 15 to 23 January therefore tended to reflect this standard binary split 
not only in the Zimbabwean political sphere but also in its public sphere. P1, P2, P9, 
P10, and P11’s responses speak directly to the concern that the government 
responded to the #shutdown with its own shutdown of the public sphere. In fact, I noted 
quite early in the interviews that the participants’ who were critical of the government’s 
responses not only seemed to sympathise with the “fake news” but did not seem to 
believe that it was “fake news” at all. Rather, they tended to believe that the 
government was merely using “fake news” as a convenient excuse to crack down on 
the opposition. Furthermore, the participants who were critical of the government 
response tended to see a form of public sphere where government saw “fake news”. 
This polarisation was a persistent feature of the interviews. On the one hand, it 
reflected the typical polarisation that infects Zimbabwean political life, and on the other 
hand it showed an emerging perspective that one man’s fake news is another man’s 
public sphere. Interestingly, those who were critical of the government’s response did 
not specifically engage with the definition of fake news. Rather, they took their position 
in opposition to the government.  
 
Whatever the government hated was therefore a good thing, and whatever it liked was 
surely bad. In fact, whatever the government said, people were supposed to read the 
opposite. If the government cried “fake news”, they saw “truth”!  The fractures in the 
Zimbabwean political infrastructure run deep that I am compelled to invent a term to 
describe them: infrafractures (infrastructure + fracture, a reference to the persistence 
of deep fractures in the national political infrastructure or body politic). That is, the 
fractures are now so deeply imbedded in the national body politic that they inform and 
filter most interpretations. Fundamentally, an infrafracture is a hidden crisis that is 
either slowly (but inexorably) boiling to the surface or is the hidden driving force or 
motive force behind things that are happening. A government hampered by 
infrafractures therefore targets the wrong things, and therefore the crisis persists 
rather than ending. In the words of celebrated Afro-jazz Zimbabwean musician Oliver 
Mtukudzi in the song “Handiro Dambudziko” (That is not the problem): 
 
Kunzwa musoro kutema mukoma  
Handiro dambudziko mukoma     
Wanzwa musoro kutema mukoma  
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Handiro dambudziko mukoma  
Chapa musoro kutema mukoma  
Ndiro dambudziko mukoma  
Chapa musana kudzimba mukoma  
Ndiroka dambudziko mukoma  
 
Ongorora chikonzero chaita musoro uteme              
Ugogazirisa chikonzero chaita musana ubande   
Kusimbirira mhopo, mhopo pamusana  
Mhopo iri pamusana iwe une ziso rine mbonje     
Kusimbirira kurapa mhopo pamusana                           




Having a headache brother 
That is not the problem brother 
Feeling a headache brother 
That is not the problem brother 
What caused the headache brother 
Is the problem brother 
What caused the back pain brother 
Is the problem brother 
 
Investigate what caused the headache 
And solve the problem that caused the back pain 
Being persistent with a wart, a wart on your back 
A wart on your back, when you have a black eye 
Persisting to cure the wart on your back 
The wart on your back when you have a black eye 
 
In this study I use Tuku’s words as a reference to Zimbabwe’s infrafracture: deeply 
imbedded and deeply seated perennial problems that the government has done 
nothing to address. In fact, the reason there is a crisis to begin with is because the 
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government persists (and insists on) in solving symptoms. In this study, a core finding 
is that the “public sphere” arises to draw attention to this crisis (the infrastructure) and 
the government solves it by shutting down the symptoms (social media). The 
shutdown causes the problem to disappear, not because it has been solved but 
because it has been suppressed. Thus, we can trust the problem to come back again, 
in unending cycles. This, in short, is the story of Zimbabwe. It tells us, for instance, 
that the coup was not a solution, but a cosmetic measure. Replacing Mugabe with 
Mnangagwa is not an authentic solution. The cycle of problems is bound to return. 
 
Based on the responses, there were a lot of infrafractures in the various accounts of 
what led to the events that took place in Zimbabwe during the course of the January 
2019 National #shutdown. However, the main infrafractures, in the participants’ 
perspectives, tended to coalesce and to be located around the issues of the 
deteriorating standards of living, government’s hold on power and the announcement 
of the increase in the fuel price, which acted as the trigger for the protests. Not 
surprisingly, a common answer was that it was therefore this increase in fuel prices 
that triggered the protests, and prompted the government to shut down the internet. 
Basically, the #Shutdown, although it was a hashtag, proved to have an origin in a real 
socioeconomic problem. The cost of fuel is a baseline cost which affects all the other 
costs, particularly of basic commodities like sugar, bread and cooking oil. By 
dramatically increasing the price of fuel, Mnangagwa was impacting struggling 
Zimbabwe personally and where it hurt most: livelihoods.  
 
These livelihoods have been precarious for more than two decades, and have been 
heavily contested in elections voting patterns as well as in previous strikes, shutdowns, 
boycotts and union-led mass stayaways. This was exactly the point made by P6 who 
said, “The shutdown in January was not the first of its kind. Eh, it came against the 
background of other shutdowns stretching back to 1997”. This answer to me reflects 
what, above, I have called infrafractures. The #shutdown is not only deeply imbedded 
in the political behaviour of Zimbabweans, but dates back to 1997 when Black Friday 
occurred. Black Friday occurred on 14 November 1997. Matsilele (2019: 316) states 
that “14 November 1997 (is) when Zimbabwe’s current economic, social and political 
problems began”. He argues that 1997 marked the end of Lancaster House 
Agreement, as well as exactly 100 years since the end of the 1st Chimurenga. 
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(Interestingly, the “Operation Restore Legacy” coup also began on 14 November 2017! 
This is exactly 20 years since Black Friday!). Hence: 
 
Essentially, it was on that date that Zimbabwe unofficially “closed for 
business”. That is, one remembers how the collapse of November 1997 
was precipitated by IMF and the World Bank closing lines of credit and 
recalling loans, among other things. These events were precipitately 
followed by the food riots of 19-23 January 1998, marking the end of one 
socio-economic and socio-political order in Zimbabwe and its 
replacement by a new order (Matsilele 2019: 316). 
 
If Matsilele is correct about the genealogy of Zimbabwe’s problems, it would confirm 
my assertion that Zimbabwe suffers under deep infrafractures. Interestingly, Matsilele 
(2019) traces these infrafractures to 1897 when the first Chimurenga was crushed. 
Unfortunately, due to reasons of space, the study of this lengthy genealogy of 
“infrafractures” falls outside the scope of this study. However, I have made a note to 
follow this promising line of questioning in future studies. 
 
In the view of some participants, there is no question that the government fears the 
unfolding public sphere spurred on by social media. Basically, the power of social 
media is to expose long existing infrafractures, something which the government 
supposedly lives in trepidation of. Hence P2 says that the government was paranoid 
as it fears free speech on social media, which in this case was being mobilised as a 
tool used to mobilise people. To this participant, there is no other explanation for the 
government electing to cut off all communication. The Zimbabwean government, 
perhaps in obedience to underlying infrafractures, has been known for exerting control 
on the media fraternity in the country. This has resulted in people losing trust in the 
government-controlled media or mouthpieces (such as the Herald Newspaper and the 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Television – ZBC). Some of those in Zimbabwe who used to 
depend on state media have therefore resorted to get news from social media, as the 
new public sphere. Thus, ironically, government’s traditionally repressive control of the 
media is also another factor that led to the shutdown.  
 
The cycle of crisis cannot be solved by creating another crisis. The Shona word is 
kuvirikidzana (layered-ness). When the crises are layered (akavirikidzana), the only 
“solution” is to suppress and postpone them, leading to other, greater crisis in the 
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future. Thus when people speak of the “Zimbabwean crisis”, or the so-called “decade 
of crisis” (1998-2008), I see Zimbabwean crises (in the plural). Another factor that was 
highlighted was the deteriorating living and economic conditions in the country. The 
increase in fuel prices fed into this perspective. Finally, the Zimbabwean government 
has always blamed the opposition for any misdeeds that happens in the country, 
especially if this is targeted towards the government. This is another way it plays into 
exacerbating infrafractures. P12 believed that the protests were inspired by opposition 
groups and civic society through mobilising for large scale demonstrations across the 
country over a number of issues including that of the economic situation in the 
country.P1 indicated that the protests were against the government.  
 
The table below illustrates participant views on the internet shutdown in Zimbabwe. 
Regarding the internet shutdown, interviewees were asked two questions, one on who 
should shut down the internet as well as why they think the Zimbabwean government 
shutdown the internet? 
 
Who, if anybody, has the right to shut the internet down? 
P1 No one has that power including the executive. No one, if you look at our 
laws, there is no provision whatsoever in the law that compels any person 
to actually shutdown the internet. The High Court categorically stated that it 
was illegal in its ruling.  
P2 The minister of national security is the one who gave the directive to all 
internet providers, which is an infringement to our rights, freedom of speech, 
and access to information. Internet access is a right, according to UN treaty. 
So the government has no right to switch off its citizens, it is a violation of 
the basic human rights. 
P8 It depends on what we shutdown the internet for. If it’s a technical need to 
expand capacity, the service provider should request for permission. The 
whole idea of shutting down the internet is not premised on fake news. 
There is a difference between fake news where you just lie on the internet 
and we live with that every day and you cannot close the internet for that 
reason. But if a movement like Zanu Ndonga says we want to launch an 
attack on the authority or we want to do a march to state house. People 
already start to say if there a probability that this can be a threat to national 
security because it will be used not to propagate fake news. So that 
shutdown was then instituted as a command and control tool for people who 
want to do things that are unlawful. Remember fake news has always been 
there…makuhwa agara ariko. You think the country can be stopped 
nemakuhwa nhai… 
P9 The government does not have a role to play in switching off the internet 
because I feel Econet and other platforms had the right or could have opted 
to shut down but it was the government who were on the forefront to say 
let’s shutdown.  
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P10 There should never be a reason why the internet should be shutdown. You 
look at how the internet was developed. It is owned by no one…If you look 
at history of shutdowns of internet, only rogue regimes have ever done that.  
P11 For me as a citizen I don’t think it is necessary to shutdown the internet.  
P12 The only institution with capacity to shutdown it is the state. There has to be 
a reason to shutdown, very exceptional grounds.  
Why do you think the government shutdown the internet? 
P3  The reason is so obvious. They felt that people were gathering and 
upstaging an unrest mainly because of the tools being provided by the social 
media and also the virality of information and messages that were now going 
around, encouraging people to go onto the streets and some encouraging 
others to be violent. They felt threatened that the more they leave the people 
to communicate like that and felt that they can control the people by 
switching off the internet.  
P5 At the time there was a growing concern within government that there was 
deliberate misinterpretation of the fuel price increase. And obviously those 
opposed to the government took an advantage of that and went on to peddle 
that sort of narrative. As a result, the government felt that there were a 
number of groupings for instance #Tajamuka who were rallying their 
members using social media and they were coordinating their 
demonstrations using social media. So that was the justification of shutting 
down that space to thwart the protests.  
P6 The internet is quite pervasive. It reaches many people very quickly just by 
clicking your phone, your iPhone or your laptop. So, the government did not 
want people to have access to information about what was happening in 
real time. 
P9 Up to this point they know and they felt that should they leave it to filter 
whatever information it would cause the scenario to be worse than it is or it 
was at the particular time. In that they had their little skeletons in their 
skeletons in their closet that they didn’t want opened and the public was not 
happy as well with whatever was happening.  
Table 3: Who should shut down the internet? And why do you think government 
shut down the internet? 
 
From Table 3 above two set of questions were posed to participants. Who, if anyone, 
should have the right to shut down the internet? Why do you think the government 
shut down the internet? The common response was that no one, including the 
government, for whatever reason, should shut down the internet. This answer 
indicates the deep distrust of the government from the participants. Although the 
government should ideally work for its citizens, most of the participants did not believe 
that the Zimbabwean government was capable of executing this mandate faithfully, 
fairly, objectively or with integrity. The common feeling seemed to be that the 
government is anti-people and corrupt. At any rate, shutting down the internet, as 
noted in Chapter 3, is a violation of human rights. Other participants focused on the 
legal process. For instance, P8 argues that a shutdown can only take place for 
technical purposes, especially when expanding the internet, but a service provider 
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should request permission. Some participants, like P8, were unsympathetic to the 
protestors. In fact, P8 took the position that, in Chapter 1, I highlighted from the words 
of General Chiwenga as “asymmetric threat” as well as from the literature on 
“command and control”. Thus P8 indicated that if some political movements announce 
attacks on government or marches towards the state house, this can be deemed as a 
threat to national security and hence shutting down the internet can be effected.  
 
P12 suggested that the state is the only institution that can shut down the internet, but 
must have exceptional grounds to do so. What is interesting from these findings is how 
much the internet, and even social media, are seen as fundamental human rights. This 
is interesting because social media are not only recent technologies, but are 
technically not human rights. There is no human right to WhatsApp, Twitter or 
Facebook. Rather, these are privately owned platforms which are run for profit. The 
view that a platform like Twitter or WhatsApp is a right is an illusion. At the same time, 
it reflects how people can repurpose these private technologies into weapons with 
which to fight for their rights. So, in that perspective, social media is a tool which can 
be repurposed to safeguard essential rights. It is only a “right” indirectly and by 
extension. People would still have rights if there was no social media. However, social 
media can enhance the discourse of human rights.  
 
Table 4 below illustrates participant views on who actually defines what is true and 
what is false in Zimbabwe. This question was aimed at generating understanding on 
the concept of “fake news” from the different perspectives of the working environments 
of the participants and information disseminated to the public.  
 
 In Zimbabwe, who defines what’s true and what’s false? 
P1  The challenge we have in a polarised society like ours is that the fake news that 
is disseminated is usually the affirmation of one’s opinion, belief, and inclination 
towards an idea or ideal.  
P2 The state defines for the citizens what is true or false. When you go out and say 
that MDC wants to bomb all the tall buildings in Zimbabwe, when you know that 
MDC does not have military and has no capacity to recruit terrorists. That is 
basically where this thing of fake news by government starts.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
P3 
Well you can’t then have a uniform system coming from parallel systems. The
MDC and Zanu Pf example are like parallel. The most important thing now it is on 
content creators to cross-check or confirm facts. Half the time people have the 
agenda to smear people’s images.  
P8 There is no one who decides. Remember social media is something that has just 
come out. It’s a new dimension, but generally there has always been some 
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regulatory bodies that regulate operations of the media. For instance, we have 
Zimbabwe Media Commission, it has provision that look at issues to do with fake 
news in traditional mainstream media. But obviously if something now becomes 
fake on the internet there must be a complainant, but those issues are not 
generally provided for in the acts that were meant for mainstream media. So, 
people end up taking each other to courts. 
P9  That is a very big challenge that we’ve got because honestly speaking, for 
somebody to get real news or what they would call real news it’s difficult. Honestly 
speaking, there is no way we can continue to be like the Deputy Minister and 
continue to paddle lies and think it’s okay because I have just said my bit and 
nobody should verify and they should be grateful with. I really honestly would like 
to find a situation whereby we go back to giving out news that is authentic, news 
that is, I don’t know when that will be.   
P10 You know in a polarised society like Zimbabwe, that’s almost impossible because 
there is always a version from the other people 
P11 Reality on the ground will prove fake news from real news. If you do research on 
any issue that is published by the government and the opposition say it’s fake. If 
you do a thorough research on that you can tell as you are doing today, you can 
tell what fake news from what is not fake news is. The reality on the ground defines 
what fake news is. You saw that our minister of finance gave us fake news when 
he was presenting the 2020 Budget; then the Chinese embassy had come out and 
said the Zimbabwean government is like they gave us a parable that we gave 
Zimbabwe five chickens and they accounted for two in their budget   
P12  If a fake news item is favourable to your political party’s agenda, you hold it dear 
even if you know it is false because it speaks to your primary political interest 
which is to delegitimise your opponent.  
Table 4: Who defines what is true and what is false in Zimbabwe? 
  
The table above sought to solicit answers on who decides what is true and false in 
Zimbabwe. The participants had widely divergent views on this. A notable response 
was that Zimbabwe is a deeply polarised country thereby making it difficult to ascertain 
who really decides what is true or false. As P10 says, “You know in a polarised society 
like Zimbabwe, that’s almost impossible because there is always a version from the 
other people”. Every position is contested, and filtered through political binaries and, 
even, political party factions. Thus, P1 and P10 all singled out the polarity of 
Zimbabwean society as a challenge to the concept of truth. On the other hand, P12, 
P2 and P3 all noted that each political party decides what truth is. Thus, truth is 
ideological, an element of what Foucault calls “regimes of truth”. Overall, the ruling 
class is said to hold the apparatus of power which it uses to coerce people into 
regarding as constituting the truth. Pro-government participants, and those within 
government itself, mainly indicated the need for the Zimbabwe Media Commission to 
look into the new dimensions brought about by new media. What I found problematic 
in the emphasis on political polarisation as a reflection of “polarised truth” is the fact 




Participants were asked about their understanding of “fake news” and how they 
defined it. This question was key in understanding how fake news was understood in 
Zimbabwe and how it manifested during the January 2019 National #Shutdown. How 
“fake news” was defined also contributed to the understanding of how government 
respondent to the protests. Table 5 below shows the responses from participants. 
 
 What is your understanding of “fake news” and how would you define it? 
P1 It is an oxymoron, in that if it is news, it then can’t be fake………. 
P2 When it is fake, it is not news. I will prefer to call it false news and it has grown 
to be defined as Information that is false, malicious, unfactual, not true, 
unverified, sensationalised and exaggerated, one that can be used as opinion 
passed as fact. 
P3 Fake news is fake news, is news that is fake and not authentic and not 
credible, and that is created mainly for the purposes of misleading the reader 
for whatever purposes. 
P4 From my own understanding, fake news is that news which is not true or which 
cannot probably be true, which has the effect of actually causing perhaps alarm 
and despondence. 
P5 My understanding of fake news, I think there is continuum of fake news. You 
have mild fake news and extreme fake news so to speak. There is deliberate 
misinterpretation of what happened, which can be fake. Then there is fake-fake 
news. Blatantly, fake news where someone says so-and-so has died when they 
have not died. 
P6 I want to use two words. Fake news is doctored news. Fake news is distorted 
news. Fake news is inaccurate news which is not balanced. 
P7 Fake news, basically can be defined from two terms, whereby somebody 
knowingly creates news that they know it is fake or its untrue or its unverified, 
then they just put it social media either deliberately to cause despondence, alarm 
amongst citizens or somebody unknowingly pushes certain news that have not 
been verified and then they just trust it into the national discourse through social 
media and then like it vilified and spread and it’s unverified. 
P8 I never really sought to come up with a definition of fake news. If I define fake 
news it would be from my experience as a citizen. Fake news I would take it to 
be any news which is premised on anything other than fact. It is untrue, this are 
false–faults, fabricated or created to create a certain impression or throw a 
certain idea but with derogation. So, fake news to me anything is not factual that 
is not true. 
P9 Fake news from my own understanding is news that is not telling the situation as 
it is, news that causes alarm and despondency unnecessarily, and news that 
does not hold water. 
P10 Fake news, I think obviously is just news that is circulated by the people with the 
intention of deceiving members of the public. Something that has no truth in it 
which is intended to mostly push a certain narrative that benefit the people that 
pursue that fake news. 
P11 There are many variants of fake news. Propaganda is fake news because it gives 
half-truth mixed with political motives with false information. We have individually 
created news about things that did not happen that is fake news. My definition 
will be fake news is spreading of false information particularly on media 
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P12 Fake news is the deliberate dissemination of false news item for public 
consumption. 
Table 5: What is your understanding of “fake news” and how would you define 
it? 
 
It is evident that the concept of “fake news”, even to the participants, does not have 
an agreed definition. This was interesting because this is borne out in the literature. 
As alluded to in Chapter 2, the concept “fake news” is considered controversial, this is 
all because, in part, it is “poorly defined and there is no standard, universal or broadly 
accepted definition for it in academic literature or media discourse,” (Wasserman and 
Madrid-Morales, 2018; Ribeiro and Ortellado, 2018). Also, some scholars have argued 
that “fake news” is an aspect of psychology, because people tend to effortlessly trust 
false information as long as it backs their existing worldviews, (Weeks and 
Garrett, 2014). The above hence confirms the literature on “fake news” that defining 
and determining what constitutes “fake news” belongs to a complex and contested 
terrain as argued in Chapter 2. 
 
From the participant responses, varied words and phrases are used to explain and 
define “fake news”. These include propaganda, half-truths, deliberate 
misinterpretation of facts, deliberate dissemination of false news, inaccurate news, 
untrue facts and spreading of false information. As we saw in Chapter 2, some 
scholars insisted on “fake news” being propaganda and the deliberate dissemination 
of false news. McNair (2017), insisted that there is nothing new about “fake news” 
noting that is a mere latter day interaction and manifestation. Arguing in the same 
breath, Ogola (2017a) equated “fake news” to the deliberate dissemination of false 
information expressly intended to misinform. Participant 11, interestingly, mentioned 
that there are types of “fake news”, citing political motives and individually created 
news about things that did not happen. This is one of the few answers that indicate an 
interest in what I would call a “taxonomy” of fake news. Because fake news is complex 
and ever-evolving, such a taxonomy is needed, and yet currently does not yet exist. 
 
Participants were also asked who produces fake news in Zimbabwe and whether there 
were instances of “fake news” cited or reported in Zimbabwe before January 2019. 
The main aim of asking these questions was to understand the reasons why the 
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government of Zimbabwe resorted to shutting down the internet under the pretext of 
dealing with “fake news”. Table 6 below shows the responses from participants. 
 
 Who produces fakes news in Zimbabwe, and before January 2019 did fake 
news exist? 
P1 Anyone can produce fake news and it has always been there. 
P2 Fake news in Zimbabwe has always existed. In fact it was worrisome that fake 
news actually began to exist in the mainstream media among professionals in 
the form of propaganda, sensationalism, exaggerations and so forth, so as for 
citizens we are there to blame because they feel that is how news and 
communication should be packaged. 
As for who, I think it’s at two levels  
1. Are deliberate actors, people that actually sit down not necessarily for click 
baiting. For example, Baba Jukwa who mixed truths, false news, half-truths, and 
truths, it actually works to confuse people. You know how counter intelligent 
works. I tell you something to be true today, after three days, I have your trust 
So there is a real industry of manipulation and is unfortunate that it is across the 
political divide. Secondly,  the normal citizens, in their sharing .Obviously it is 
packaged in an interesting way 
P3 People produce fake news. 
P4 It can be anyone, it can be political actors or some NGO activists. Some political 
actors masquerade as NGO activists and also spread fake news. Even some 
individuals can also spread fake news about certain individuals 
P5 You can’t point one individual that this one produces fake news but it’s the open 
nature of social media that breeds mischief. It’s open to everyone. Everyone now 
is able to generate content, unlike before when we didn’t have social media. It 
does, it does in huge quantities. 
P6 Uhm, media trolls produce fake news. Apart from those social media trolls, eh, 
the polarisation of the political climate in Zimbabwe is also contributing to the 
production of fake news. The polarisation in itself is a compost that is nourishing 
fake news because we have two antagonistic forces, the MDC and they 
ZANUPF. They are competing for political space. So, what they do is they 
disseminate false messages in order to outdo each other. Fake news has always 
existed, but it’s now so prevalent on social media 
P7 Basically, those two fronts. I can refer to those two fronts -We have proponents 
who mischievously push fake news and others who are just naïve and then they 
also fit into that agenda 
P8 Obvious. But the only difference is fake news was not so prevalent. Why? 
Because it was traceable. When somebody lied like for instance the story of 
soldier was buried without a head that was fake news. That was not true, I was 
actually in the military by that time…. So people in general produce the fake 
news. 
P9 Well, they have mushroomed and they are in their numbers and they are 
amongst all of us; they are amongst the bigwigs; they are amongst you know. 
It’s like all over, it’s mushrooming and there are a whole lot of people doing it. 
P11 Ah, ZBC would be 60%. If we are to scale out of 100%, ZBC would score about 
60% in terms of dispersing fake news in Zimbabwe. The prevalence is more. 
Yes, state-owned media lead by ZBC online that handle always gives us false 
information. I had said ZBC would score 60% of fake news circulating online. 
Diplomacy peddled by government ministers is fake news in most cases. Then 
we have opposition politicians claiming or giving us some assumptions as if it’s 
true for political purposes which is fake news as well. 
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P12 Individuals who are aligned with certain political groups and civic groups are 
responsible for the spreading of fake news. If you are an official spokesperson 
of the government, yes you can put up some propaganda but then to write a fake 
news item deliberately which is fake then it is very, very difficult. It has to come 
out as propaganda than fake news.  
As a deputy minister of information, his duty is to protect the interest of the state 
and also means just like any other official of government in another country is 
also to spread some propaganda. I think he later on realised that, no, the 
propaganda item that he had unleashed was not credible. They tried to justify 
what the government had done. I think it was the wrong way of doing the right 
thing. It was prevalent. 
Table 6: Who produces fakes news in Zimbabwe, and would you say that before 
January 2019 there was such a thing as fake news? 
 
The responses gathered from this question reveal that any individual can produce fake 
news. These could be individuals in civil society, media or politics trying to push their 
agendas. They could also be bots, although no one mentioned this feature of fake 
news. P4 indicated that some political actors masquerading as NGO activists were 
also spreading fake news. Another point that stood out was the state-run media’s 
propensity to produce “fake news”.  P11 singled out The Herald and the ZBC as the 
biggest producers of “fake news” in the country. This reason could be grounded in the 
fact that government only allows news favourable to it to be covered by state media, 
while opposition elements are demonised. Worth noting also is the fact that the view 
that ZBC and The Herald are major producers of fake news accords with the point not 
only that fake news is nothing new but also that it is interlinked with propaganda. 
 
On the question of whether fake news existed before January 2019, participants were 
unanimous that “fake news” has always existed in Zimbabwe. P2, for instance, cited 
its existence in mainstream media. In addition, P8 alluded to a story that appeared in 
the independent media, in 1998, which reported that a decapitated Zimbabwean 
soldier had been buried in Nyanga district after dying in the war in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. This story was later debunked as false. From the responses, 
it was clear that, “fake news” was not viewed as having come into existence during the 
January 2019 National #Shutdown. If “fake news” has always existed, why then did 
the government then blame “fake news” for the internet shutdown? During the first day 
of the internet shutdown, the then Deputy Minister of information, Energy Mutodi 
blamed “fake news” as the cause (cf. Mberi, 2019) In order have a clearer 
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understanding of this, participants were further probed on the instances of “fake news” 
circulated during the shutdown. 
 
Table 7 below shows what participants considered instances of “fake news” during 
the period when the government shut down the internet. 
  
 Any instances of “fake news” circulated during the January 2019 National 
#Shutdown.  
P1 Certainly, images from violence that occurred in Kenya circulated purportedly to 
have happened in Harare during the shutdown.  
P2 There was nothing that was false. Everything was genuine. The false news that I 
know was largely from the state media.  
P3 Yes true. We were not following people were sending. Rather we were privileged 
enough to go around. We did eight places, Mufakose being the noisiest, 
Highfields, Mabvuku and Tafara. People would send that the other neighbourhood 
is on fire and yet we were there. And we would see that was fake news.  
P4 There were some mobilisations were being done on the internet, pertaining to 
something which was false. People now discuss everything on social media. So 
basically, you can get anything from there. 
P6 There was a lot of pictorial footage on social media showing incidents around the 
country but some of the pictures were photo shopped. They were not real pictures 
of what was happening during that time. But these were pictures or footage from 
other incidents elsewhere. 
P7 I would actually need to do a kind of research to give you two instances. But 
definitely I can say authoritatively we had fake news which was propounded 
during that time. 
P11 What I can say is  most of the pictures that have been circulating online because 
we were now using some other ways after they shutdown the internet 
Table 7: Any instances of “fake news” circulated during the January 2019 
National #Shutdown 
 
Participants are convinced that “fake news” was posted during the January 2019 
National #Shutdown. But what was notable was the fact that the participants did not 
seem to agree on the definition itself. This related mainly to images of incidents that 
happened in other countries such as Kenya that were purportedly said to have 
happened in the Harare suburbs. Participant 3 concurred with P1 on the fake images 
that were being circulated on social media. He added a personal experience of 
receiving images of houses supposedly burning in Mufakose while he was there and 
could tell that nothing of the sort was happening.  P2 denied the presence of “fake 
news” during the shutdown, indicating that everything that was being posted during 




In order to understand the link between fake news and social media regulation in 
Zimbabwe, participants were asked about their views regarding social media 
regulation. Table 8 shows the responses to this question. 
 
 Is social media a threat that should be contained or regulated? 
  
P1 I wouldn’t say it is a threat although it does have challenges. The best way forward 
will be self-regulatory and let the space be. I would say Social media is actually 
on the contrary a welcome platform, a conduit for citizen to enjoy rights to free 
expression, to access information and actually a vehicle towards enhanced 
communication among people.   
P2 Never, it should not be regulated. 
P3 You can’t regulate social media, you don’t regulate it, you must not regulate. You 
can regulate communication. Social media is a social platform, it is like trying to 
regulate how people think and laugh. I am strongly opposed to AIPPA same as 
social media regulation.  
P4 It must be regulated I think. Because we cannot have people just spreading fake 
news on social media. There is need to regulate that in my view. 
P5 I feel it must be regulated, personally. Number two, even if you want to regulate it 
- it is difficult to regulate. It has to be an incumbent upon an individual to say okay 
don’t worry about Facebook because there is a lot of abuse that happens there. 
No one dies from not being on social media. 
P6 Uhm, if it’s possible to regulate it, yes, I would go for that because social media 
and citizen journalism have done harm to society. 
P7 Why are we now talking about regulating the media in 2019, why didn’t we talk 
about it in 2010? It means that over the course of 9 to 10 or so years, there have 
been certain developments that prompted people to begin to think about it, maybe 
we need regulation. 
P8 The problem is when you say social media, it is pregnant term. To say social media 
is threat I am not sure but what I know for certain is that the internet is. There are 
instances on social media or the internet which is the carrier are a threat and there 
are instances when there are a serious advantage. 
P9 I feel social media must be regulated. It is getting out of hand in that it is spreading 
falsehood and by spreading falsehoods, eh, it is not doing justice to the public. 
P10 The whole world is moving towards an unregulated social media. My view is that 
it must remain largely unregulated so that it gives ordinary people the opportunity 
to express themselves without the excess of different governments that stumble 
upon people’s rights. 
P11 Yes it must be regulated within but the regulation must be in line with dictates of 
the constitution. It must not be absolute – it must be minimal. 
P12 Obviously, it should be regulated because you are not operating in a vacuum. It 
can be used to cause harm, to cause violence just like the radio broadcast in 
Rwanda. 




The issue of social media regulation remains a highly contested issue. This was 
evident from the responses gathered from participants. Participants were evenly 
divided on whether social media was a threat that should be regulated or not. Those 
who were against regulating social media pointed to the difficulties that would come 
with trying to contain social spaces. P3 indicated that he was strongly opposed to 
social media regulation and equated this to trying to regulate how people think and 
laugh. P1 did not see social media as a threat, but as a conduit for citizens to enjoy 
free expression. Some of the participants mentioned that social media is supposed to 
be regulated given that it has been used to cause harm. For example, P9 indicated 
that social media is being used to spread falsehoods. P4, P5, P12 and P6 all concurred 
with the need for social media regulation. I sensed that part of the reason government 
is not trusted to regulate social media is because of its past track record in misusing 
power. Interestingly, distrust of government is not an exclusively Zimbabwean thing. 
Rather, it is a universal phenomenon, one framed differently in different contexts. As 
we showed in Chapter 2, many African governments are jumping onto the bandwagon 
of internet shutdowns. In the last three years, internet shutdowns have been 
experienced in Chad, Gabon, Ethiopia and Sudan. Legislation to limit social media has 
been proposed or promulgated in Zambia and Tanzania. 
 
Participants were asked which law would be used to regulate social media in 
Zimbabwe. Table 9 below presents the responses. 
 
  What law must be used to regulate fake news? 
P1 I am aware of the various versions on the Cyber Crime, Cyber Security and Data 
Protection Bill of 2019 that have to the point where we are now. And this is what 
can be used. 
P2 There are laws that they are trying to craft, several laws, cybercrime, MOPA, also 
is AIPPA that has been remodelled, can be used to persecute and prosecute 
people on what they say on social media. 
P3 The Cyber bill, which is a useless piece of legislation. 
P4 We have the, I am not quite of the laws … It should be protection of privacy we 
have protection of privacy rules which are been actually being enacted. There are 
undergoing law making process I am sure. 
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P5 We have different laws or bills that are before parliament or at different stages of 
promulgation that will regulate the media industry, the mainstream media industry 
so to speak. 
P6 Any law that has to do with media regulation, such as the proposed cybercrime, 
cyber security bill. 
P7 Currently we are at stage whereby government is exploring the cyber bill. 
P8 Cyber bill being proposed and is a better step in the right direction. 
P9 Cyber bill which is going to replace the AIPPA. 
P11 The government doesn’t have the law or policy to regulate the internet. 
P12 We do have the cyber bill that is coming out 
Table 9: What law must be used to regulate fake news?  
 
The responses indicate that most of the participants knew about the impending Cyber 
Bill. This suggested that the Bill was a much-awaited (by pro-government participants) 
as well as much-derided (by pro-social media participants) piece of legislation. There 
is a realisation by some participants that such legislation is inevitable, while others are 
adamant that social media should remain unregulated. A middle way between the two 
extremes seems, however, to be the most prudent position. Of interest as well was 
whether social media fuels demonstration or promotes uprisings (Table 10), and 
whether social movements – which mobilise through social media – impact on politics 
in Zimbabwe (Table 11). Table 10 and 11 below summarises the responses. 
 
The responses in Table and 10 and 11 indicate a universal belief in the power or 
potential of social media, although there was no agreement on exactly the nature of 
such power or potential. What was interesting about these responses was that even 
when participants said yes to the question, they still tended to disagree about the 
reasons for saying yes. The pro-government participants saw the concurrence that 
social media fuels demonstrations as proof that it must be regulated or even shutdown 
during protests. The pro-opposition participants, however, thought that social media 
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was an important tool of democratisation and that fuelling demonstrations was an 
element of this. 
 
 Does social media fuel demonstrations or promotes uprisings? 
P1 I think social media is just but another vehicle. If people are going to demonstrate, 
they won’t demonstrate because they have access social media, they will 
demonstrate because they believe they have a reason to demonstrate/protest. If 
people are generally violent, what is violent is not the media. 
P2 It doesn’t help to spread, Social media is an idea whose time has come and you 
cannot reach it away in that it is a cheaper avenue or platforms that allows citizens 
to interact, communicate, integrate, and collaborate. 
P3 Guns do not kill people, people kill people, we can blame guns all we want.-Social 
media is a tool, people will use it whichever way they want. Do not blame the social 
media for what is happening, you blame the people who are behind it. 
P5 Social media is double-agent. It has its good side and it has its bad side. It can be 
used to incite insurgency, mobilise people because it allows you to rally people in 
one place at a kick of a button. 
P8 Sometimes, yes 
P9 In a way like I indicated earlier, it causes alarm and despondence… 
P10 You see demonstrations are a constitutional construct of any democratic society 
and social media must play a role of facilitating the enjoyment of that right by 
citizens. I don’t understand why it can be said to be a reason to cause the 
spreading of violence or whatever 
P11 It creates the necessary mood. The necessary atmosphere because you know 
that the most people affected by situation in the country are the people who work; 
are the people who are in urban areas; are the people who have the smartphones. 
It creates the necessary mood for a revolution. We saw it during the Arab spring 
revolutions. 
P12 It really depends on the scenario 
Table 10: Does social media fuel demonstrations or help in the spreading of 
uprisings? 
 
To further understand how government responded during the January 2019 National 
Shutdown, participants were asked about the impact of social media movements such 
as BabaJukwa and ThisFlag on Zimbabwean politics. Table 11 below shows some of 




 Social movements impact on politics in Zimbabwe? 
P1 Yes they did. 
P2 Yes they have actually revolutionised the way politics is done in Zimbabwe. 
That’s is why we have Zanu Pf paying trolls Varakashi. Charamba exposed 
them.  
 
P3 They have greatly impacted on the politics in the country 
 
P4 Definitely,….. 
P5 These movements are playing a very important role… 
P6 Yes… 
P7 These movements have had great impact…. 
P8 Obvious, they are playing one particular agenda in support of one faction of our 
political set-up. 
P9 Yes. They created a big impact. The bulk of the people relied on okay I will call 
someone or I will text someone for the news or I will do it later but there are people 
who are already on the ground. 
P10 Definitely. 
P11 They are the ones who even starting crying about #MugabeMustFall. They are the 
one who started that thing. The system saw an opportunity and then they arrested 
the opportunity. But they are the ones who started the pressure. They are the ones 
who got the fire burning.  
P12 They do promote political discourse about the political affairs of the country and 
yes, it is debatable whether some of the information was true or false. 
Table 11: Understanding the impact of social media movements on the politics 
of Zimbabwe 
 
Participants were asked if there is a link between “fake news” and social media 
regulation. This was done to understand what government’s response to “fake news” 
during the #Shutdown tells us about the relationship of “fake news” and (social) media 
regulation. Table 12 below shows the responses from participants. 
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 Is there a link between fake news and social media regulation?  
P1 There would be, to be honest. What else would you want to regulate in such a 
manner to shut down the internet for example, if it is not political. 
P2 It is political, they are paranoid.  
P3 There is a thin line between the two. The Herald and Daily News lie with their 
ink. We can’t say social media is the source for fake news.  
P4 With social media it is difficult to detect because some people can generate fake 
news and just post it on social media and that news actually do spread like fire, 
you know. 
P5 Personally, I don’t have a clear answer on this. 
P6 Media regulations has always been there without social media, because if you 
look at social media, social media is a recent thing from 2000 going upwards but 
media regulations has always been there, even in this country prior to 
independence, the colonial government, you know it, there was law mark, the 
official secret act. So, to say that there is a link, yes, there could be a link because 
social media unlike your mainstream media, social media is so pervasive and it 
has the capacity to make a lot of influence on a large scale unlike the mainstream 
media. 
P7 Definitely there is a link because what we see there is… 
P8 The problem with the internet to the state is not about fake news. Every day people 
are lying on the internet about the state and things like that. 
P9 There could be a link or even none 
P10 Look, if there is going to be cause for some regulation particularly to deal with fake 
news then that is a noble thing to do. 
P11 Yes, I think so. But in Zimbabwe the main agenda is not to regulate fake news 
because government lives through fake news. Like what Professor Jonathan 
Moyo said ZANUPF will not reform itself out of power. 
P12 I haven’t seen any research in that direction. You are one of the very few now 
beginning to explore that particular area. 





From the responses gathered from the participants, there is really a thin line between 
“fake news” and social media regulation. P3, P4, P5 and P9 believe that it is very 
difficult to identify link. On the other hand, P1 and P2 indicated that the only link 
between “fake news” and social media regulation is political. For P7and P11, there is 
definitely a link between the two. However, P12 indicated that he hasn’t read much on 
the subject and therefore did not have enough information. 
 
Discussion 
Several salient themes emerged from the interviews. These include the complex 
(hard-to-define) nature of fake news, contestations about social media regulation, 
media polarisation, social media participation and government control and 
propaganda. These broad themes covered a wide range of issues that came out of 
the collected data. To answer the research objective of this research that of the 
exploration of the link between “fake news” and social media regulation in Zimbabwe, 
I will therefore present a detailed analysis of the themes. But firstly, I will present a 
word cloud of the most common words that I picked from the data analysis . These 
words better situate the responses from the participants within the broad themes 
identified. 
 
Figure 2: Common words found in the data 
 
Theme 1: Complex nature of fake news and misconceptions about it 
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This theme emerged from questions that sought to understand how participants 
understood the concept of “fake news”, how they defined it, what they considered 
instances of “fake news” during the January 2019 National #Shutdown in Zimbabwe, 
who produced it and whether it was a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. The issue of 
“fake news” was very important to this study. Understanding this concept would assist 
in understanding how ‘fake news’ figures in the media regulation matrix. When the 
Zimbabwean government ordered the shutting down of the internet on 15 January 
2019, the issue of the spread of dangerous “fake news” (dangerous to national peace 
and security) was reported to be the reason behind the shutting down before the 
government made an about turn. Then network congestion was fingered as the reason 
behind the intermittent and limited internet coverage. So, it is important to understand 
how the participants understood the concept. From the data collected, it was evident 
that the participants were familiar with “fake news” in general, although the definition 
varied across participants. 
  
The concept of “fake news” remains a highly contested area given the different 
explanations attached to it. It was evident that the concept of “fake news” does not 
have a single definition. What cannot be denied from the data collected was that of 
“fake news” having altered politics in the country. Rodny-Gumede (2018) emphasises 
the impact “fake news” has had on politics. Participants used varied terms and phrases 
to explain and define “fake news.” These included propaganda, half-truths, deliberate 
misinterpretation of facts, deliberate dissemination of false news, inaccurate news, 
untrue facts, spreading of false information. For P8, defining “fake news” was very 
cumbersome since the concept could be defined from different standings. P8 pointed 
out that: 
 
I never really sought to come up with a definition of fake 
news. If I define fake news, it would be from my 
experience as a citizen. Fake news I would take it to be 
any news which is premised on anything other than fact. 
It is untrue, this are false–faults, fabricated or created to 
create a certain impression or throw a certain idea but 
with derogation. So, fake news to me anything is not 
factual that is not true... (Table 5: P8) 
 
Participants had different perceptions of fake news and this complicated the question 
of determining whether “fake news” contributed to the January 2019 National 
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#Shutdown or not. Ogola (2017a) states that “fake news” is the deliberate 
dissemination of false information expressly intended to misinform. Since I also sought 
the nature and role of “fake news” in the January 2019 National #Shutdown in 
Zimbabwe, the responses from participants made it impossible to determine the role 
“fake news” played in the January 2019 National #Shutdown.  
 
Tandoc et al, (2018) indicated that “fake news” could appear in the form of manipulated 
images and videos intended to create false narratives. It was evident that during the 
January National Shutdown, a lot of images were circulated on social media purporting 
to be from the suburbs. Instances of “fake news” that circulated during January 2019 
National #Shutdown included images from other countries. P6 alluded to these 
manipulated images that were being posted on social media, saying: 
 
There was a lot of pictorial footage on social media 
showing incidents around the country but some of the 
pictures were photo shopped. They were not real 
pictures of what was happening during that time. But 
these were pictures or footage from other incidents 
elsewhere…. (Table 5: P6) 
 
But if the images were true despite not being from the shutdown, should these still be 
referred to as “fake news”? What then constitute “fake news”? The theme of “fake 
news” misconception in Zimbabwe points to new challenges brought about by the rise 
of social media as central actors in the public sphere.  
 
Most of the participants conceded that “fake news” was an omnipresent reality on 
social media, although – due to political polarisation – they tended to differ on what 
exactly constituted fake news. What was not in question was the fact that social media 
has become a meeting place for people to share news and information. This echoes 
the literature review (Chapter 2) and also the theoretical framework (Chapter 3) for this 
study which suggests that the social media has become a “public sphere” where 
people meet to discuss issues of national interests. P4 stated that “fake news” is 
everywhere on social media and that “People now discuss everything on social media. 




There was consensus that fake news in Zimbabwe did not just come with the January 
2019 National #Shutdown, but pre-existed it by. Hence, for instance, the former 
president, Robert Mugabe, and the current vice President, Constantino Chiwenga, 
“died” several times on social media. False messages about their deaths circulated on 
social media. During the coup in 2017, “fake news” became so rampant on social 
media, especially regarding the whereabouts of the former ‘First Family’, hence the 
issue of “fake news” did not just sprout with the shutting down of the internet in January 
2019. This insistence draws a sharp distinction with the observation made in Chapter 
2 that fake news in a standard sense is a recent phenomenon which cannot be 
divorced from the internet and, indeed, the proliferation of social media. However, it is 
broadly true that fake news is as old as the Garden of Eden! Thus, for P2, “fake news” 
had always existed and began in mainstream media: 
 
Fake news in Zimbabwe has always existed. In fact it 
was worry some that fake news actually began to exist in 
the mainstream media among professionals in the form 
of propaganda, sensationalism, exaggerations and so 
forth, so as for citizens we are there to blame because 
they feel that is how news and communication should be 
packaged…(P2) 
 
Nevertheless, the interminable rise of social media platforms has seen large upward 
swings in the numbers of the population making use of the platforms (Ogola, 2019). 
For instance, the statistics for social media use in Zimbabwe are 980.0 thousand as 
of January 2020 (Kemp,2020). Most of the communication is now happening on social 
media, and people go on these platforms to share jokes, to laugh and vent their anger 
against the current government. This has been exacerbated by the crippling economic 
conditions that the people of Zimbabwe have been subjected to. 
 
Theme 2: Political and media polarisation 
Against the backdrop of a much-discussed and continuously deteriorating socio-
economic environment, polarisation is one of the themes that emerged from collected 
data. Participants repeatedly mentioned the issue of polarisation both politically and in 
the mainstream media. What then stood out was mainstream media in Zimbabwe 
being seen as exacerbating political polarization by creating “echo chambers” which 
prevent people from being exposed to information that contradicts their pre-existing 
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beliefs. Similarly, political polarisation, continues to insulate people from opposing 
views about current events. In Zimbabwe, the mainstream media, especially the state 
sponsored media such as the Zimpapers stable and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation (ZBC) have since been labelled “Government Mouthpieces” for 
consistently and uncritically advancing the ruling government’s ideologies (Ncube, 
2019).This has been referred to as “patriotic journalism” (Chambwera,2020), an 
inflection of Terence Ranger’s concept of “patriotic history”. Resultantly, Zimbabweans 
have turned to social media to get information and read about current events. 
 
The prevailing conditions in Zimbabwe have thus been blamed for creating the 
breeding ground for “fake news”.  P6 blamed the political climate for the production of 
“fake news”: 
the polarisation of the political climate in Zimbabwe is 
also contributing to the production of fake news. The 
polarisation in itself is a compost that is nourishing fake 
news because we have two antagonistic forces, the MDC 
and they ZANUPF. They are competing for political 
space. So, what they do is they disseminate false 
messages in order to outdo each other. Fake news has 
always existed, but it’s now so prevalent on social 
media... (Table 6: P6) 
 
So it was evident that on the political front, both ZANU PF and MDC have been blamed 
for the production of the “fake news” in the country. The two political parties actually 
have online supporters that stand for the party’s ideologies: #Varakashi (the 
destroyers – for the current government) and the #Nerrorists and #TeamPachedu (For 
the MDC Alliance). One of the participants mentioned how government was paying 
#Varakashi to pounce on the #Nerrorists/#TeamPachedu. As pointed out in Chapter 
1, President Emmerson Mnangagwa is on record urging the #Varakashi to go in their 
numbers on social media and trounce the opposition supporters. 
 
As for the media polarisation, Chatora (2012) argues that Zimbabwean people have 
resorted to social media to counter official discourse given the hostility and rigidity of 
mainstream media. Moyo (2011) concurs that social media, in the Zimbabwean 
context, emerged as arenas enabling Zimbabweans to share government and security 
forces’ abuses, corruption, and electoral malpractices. Participants from civil society 
highlighted the need for diverse reporting from the media in order to address the issue 
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of “fake news”. P11 blamed state mouthpieces for the spread of “fake news” and the 
subsequent migration of the masses to social media: 
 
…Ah, ZBC would be 60%. If we are to scale out of 100%, 
ZBC would score about 60% in terms of dispersing fake 
news in Zimbabwe. The prevalence is more. Yes, state-
owned media lead by ZBC online that handle always 
gives us false information…. (Table 6: P11) 
 
Zimbabweans are said to be hungry for information as they are angry and bored from 
receiving the same propaganda information from state media. Moyo (2020) alluded to 
social media being the go-to alternative for a country hungry for information. One 
important example given by the participant was the announcement in December 2019 
of a decrease in school fees for the school term starting January 2020. What happened 
in January 2020 was the opposite; the fees for all schools trebled.   
 
Theme 3: Regimes of truth 
Foucault (1978) asserts that the production of truth at any given moment is intricately 
intertwined with power relations hence every regime of truth has to be understood in 
the context of existing power relations. This speaks to the complexity and highly 
contested nature of “fake news” as a concept. The polarity of the Zimbabwean society 
posed a challenge in really determining who defines what’s true or false in the country. 
P1 stated: 
 
The challenge we have in a polarised society like ours is 
that the fake news that is disseminated is usually the 
affirmation of one’s opinion, belief, and inclination 
towards an idea or ideal. (Table 4: P1) 
 
Most participants, with the exception of those from the government sector, indicated 
that the “state of the nations” was responsible for defining for citizens what should be 
considered as true or false. P2 explained: “When you go out and say that MDC wants 
to and bomb all the tall buildings in Zimbabwe, when you know that MDC does not 
have military and has no capacity to recruit terrorists. That is basically where this thing 




On the other hand, participants from within the government sector indicated that there 
was no one to decide what is true or false for anyone. P8 noted: 
 
There is no one who decides. Remember social media is 
something that has just come out. It’s a new dimension, 
but generally there has always been some regulatory 
bodies that regulate operations of the media. For 
instance, we have Zimbabwe Media Commission, it has 
provision that look at issues to do with fake news in 
traditional mainstream media. But obviously if something 
now becomes fake on the internet there must be a 
complainant, but those issues are not generally provided 
for in the acts that were meant for mainstream media. So, 
people end up taking each other to courts. (Table 4: P8) 
 
Thus, in as truth or falsity are concerned, the ruling government decides. In any 
country, what is true to one party is “fake news” to the other party. As P11 observes: 
 
If you do research on any issue that is published by the 
government, the opposition says it’s fake news. If you do 
a thorough research on that you can tell as you are doing 
today, you can tell what fake news from what is not fake 
news is. (Table 4:11). 
 
Some participants highlighted that reality in the real world defines what is true or false 
for the citizens. Participants pointed out how government ministers lied to people, 
thereby betraying who defined what was true or false in Zimbabwe. The more the 
power individuals had, the more likely they were to generate “fake news’. P11 pointed 
to an incident that happened in December 2019: 
 
You saw that our minister of finance gave us fake news 
when he was presenting the 2020 Budget; then the 
Chinese Embassy had come out and said the 
Zimbabwean government is like they gave us a parable 
that we gave Zimbabwe five chickens and they 
accounted for two in their budget (Table 4: P11). 
 
Thus, what is undeniable is the complexity of what is happening on the online public 
sphere. Morgan (2019) blames this on the declining levels of trust in institutions and 
experts. P3 also noted that in the case of Zimbabwe, it has become very impossible 
to have a uniform system coming from parallel systems. Habermas notes that the 
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public sphere is both process and space: “In periods of mobilization, the structures 
that actually support the authority of a critically engaged public begin to vibrate. The 
balance of power between civil society and the political system then shifts” (1996:379). 
A significant number of people in Zimbabwe have now resorted to using social media 
for their communication while shunning ZBC and the rest of the state print media. This 
current online public sphere is definitely a threat to the government. To counter this, 
the government unleashed their online “Varakashi” to destabilise the online public 
sphere against its enemies.  
 
Theme 4: Tyranny, control and propaganda 
It was important to establish what the Zimbabwean government’s response to “fake 
news” during the #Shutdown reveals about the relationship of “fake news” and (social) 
media regulation and why the government blocked the internet. The issue of tyranny, 
control and propaganda is not new, especially to African governments (Ogola, 2017).  
In most cases, the desire to control the internet is rooted in government’s 
determination to control the political narrative. From the analysis, it was observed that 
there is a deliberate tendency by the government to conveniently dismiss most news 
disseminated by social media as “fake news”. In fact, if it upsets the authorities, it is 
fake news. The Herald, the leading state-controlled daily newspaper, blatantly “lies” in 
favour of the government, and government sees it as authentic. This makes the “fake” 
tag problematic and complex.   
 
When the internet shutdown took place, the then Deputy Minister of Information, 
Energy Mutodi denied government interference citing congestion caused by people 
posting videos on social media23. The Zimbabwean government used control and 
propaganda in dealing with January 2019 protests. It went further to block the internet. 
P6 indicated that the shutting down of the internet was done to protect the government 
from international shame regarding its violent crackdown of the demonstration. There 
was a suggestion that the government did not shutdown the internet because of “fake 
news”. P8, who is from the government, called shutting the internet a ‘command and 






with the January 2019 internet blackout. Further to this, it was revealed that social 
media is not a problem to the government since people lie everyday about government 
dealings every day: 
 
So that shutdown was then instituted …as a command 
and control tool for people who want to do things that are 
unlawful. Remember fake news has always been 
there…makuhwa agara ariko. (Fake news has always 
been there) You think the country can be stopped 
nemakuhwa…. (Table 3: P8) 
 
Any government will use propaganda to ensure that its ideologies are protected. P11 
affirmed this: 
But in Zimbabwe the main agenda is not to regulate fake 
news because government lives through fake news. Like 
what Professor Jonathan Moyo said ZANUPF will not 
reform itself out of power (Table12: P11). 
 
Most African governments will do anything to thwart any threat that might arise (Ogola, 
2017). Zimbabwe is not the only African country that has shut down the internet in an 
attempt to control the narrative against the efforts of its citizens to flip the discourse. 
Several other countries such as Chad, DRC, Congo Republic, have all joined this 
bandwagon of governments that have shutdown internet. P5 pointed out that: 
 
No government is in power to relinquish it. Government 
is in power to stay. If anything threatens their stay in 
power, I am sure they will justify to-do that. It’s a trend all 
over. (P5) 
 
The above shows how authoritative governments are responding to the growing online 
presence of their populations. While the response is not uniform, it is nevertheless 




Theme 5: Social media regulation 
The interest of regulating social media is rooted in the need for the government to 
enhance control and extend its hold on power. Social media has necessitated the 
dissemination of much information within countries and has played a very important 
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function in communities (Rodny-Gumede and Hyde-Clarke, 2014). Rodny-Gumede 
and Hyde-Clarke add that news media play a vital role in the public sphere and the 
link between social media and democracy in the public sphere remains uncontested. 
Social media has become an indispensable meeting place for most people where they 
discuss issues affecting their lives and also to laugh and pass on jokes. Celliers and 
Hatting warned that the increased use of social media exposes the public sphere to 
misleading information and satire (2020). A public sphere emerges where people 
struggle for a better society, and their struggle is a process of constituting the public 
that creates spatial domains of resistance in the public. Moreover, there is no doubt 
that Zimbabweans have increasingly come to rely on social media for news and 
information about politics. Increasingly, social media has emerged as a fertile soil for 
deliberately produced misinformation campaigns, conspiracy, and extremist 
alternative media (Neudert, Howard and Kollanyi 2019, 1). 
 
The issue of social media regulation in Zimbabwe has not spared the government from 
being blamed for violating the basic human rights in its bid to protect itself. Participants 
believe that social media is not a threat but it has challenges. These include that of 
“fake news” being peddled by people. However, this should not warrant regulation if 
the information does not threaten national security. P1 indicated that regulating the 
social media platforms would rob the citizens of their freedom of expression: 
 
I wouldn’t say it is a threat although it does have 
challenges, the best way forward will be self-regulatory 
and let the space be. I would say Social media is actually 
on the contrary a welcome platform, a conduit for citizen 
to enjoy rights to free expression, to access information 
and actually a vehicle towards enhanced communication 
among people ( Table 8: P1). 
 
The social media are now a permanent part of the lives of the people in Zimbabwe. 
People now get their basic information from Social media. The public sphere produces 
public opinion which in turn articulates the problems for which a truth-tracking 
democratic system seeks solutions. And most important in Habermas’ 
conceptualisation was that anyone could participate in this public sphere. This notion 




In a democracy people have freedom of choice including the choice to be on social 
media. However, autocratic governments find themselves struggling to accommodate 
these platforms. Thus, the Zimbabwean government ended up blocking the internet 
fearing mobilisation against its authority. Gukurume (2017) and Morgan (2018) argue 
that social media provides a discursive space for ordinary citizens to articulate their 
problems and to challenge the excesses of the government, which are epitomised by 
endemic corruption, bad governance and massive unemployment. 
 
There were concerns that the issue of regulating the internet poses a number of 
challenges. While there was need for social media regulation, proper institutions had 
to be put in place to make it possible: 
 
You can’t regulate social media, you don’t regulate it, you 
must not regulate. You can regulate communication. 
Social media is a social platform, it is like trying to 
regulate how people think and laugh. I am strongly 
opposed to AIPPA same as social media regulation…. 
(P3) 
 
The whole world is moving towards an unregulated social 
media. My view is that it must remain largely unregulated 
so that it gives ordinary people the opportunity to express 
themselves without the excess of different governments 
that stumble upon people’s rights… (P10) 
 
I feel it must be regulated, personally. Number two, even 
if you want to regulate it - it is difficult to regulate. It has 
to be an incumbent upon an individual to say okay don’t 
worry about Facebook because there is a lot of abuse 
that happens there. No one dies from not being on social 
media…. (P5) 
 
Yes it must be regulated within but the regulation must 
be in line with dictates of the constitution. It must not be 
absolute – it must be minimal…. (P11). 
 
Various African governments are rushing to regulate social media platforms under the 
guise of protecting the nation form “fake news”.  In Zimbabwe, the Minister of 
Information, Monica Mutsvangwa publicly announced that social media was being 
used to peddle falsehoods about government thereby having a negative effect on what 
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she referred to as ‘national security’24 This has however, allowed many governments 
to extend control over any voices that are critical of the government rather than control 
fake news (Mutsvairo and Bebawi, 2019). A lot of questions have thus been raised on 
the link between “fake news” and these social media regulations that have seen most 
governments instituting especially in Africa. It was revealed that there is a very thin 
line between “fake news” and social media regulation. The main idea to regulate the 
internet was blamed on the need to advance political ideologies of the ruling party and 
government: 
What else would you want to regulate in such a manner 
to shut down the internet for example, if it is not political… 
(P1) 
 
It is political, they are paranoid… (P2) 
 
There is a thin line between the two. The Herald and 
Daily News lie with their ink. We can’t say social media 
is the source for fake news… (P3) 
 
I haven’t seen any research in that direction. You are one 
of the very few now beginning to explore that particular 
area… (P12) 
 
Participants also revealed that the various laws that are being drafted in Zimbabwe 
would not assist in the flow of communication. By 2019, Zimbabwe did not have the 
appropriate law to regulate “fake news” on social media, hence there was a rush to 
promulgate the Cyber Bill. Participants from the government sector contend that the 
Cyber Bill was a positive step towards the right direction.  The Bill has since been 
published in the Zimbabwe Government Gazette, on 15 May 202025 . 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, data was presented, analysed and interpreted in order to understand 
the link between “fake news” and social media regulation, using the January 2019 
National Shutdown as the context for the study. The concept of infrafractures was 
introduced, to express the phenomenon of Zimbabwe’s cyclic crises. Five broad 
themes were analysed, using thematic analysis, to address the research questions of 






news” and social media regulation. The link between the two is blurred by the political 
and media polarisation currently existing in Zimbabwe. It was also established that the 
concept of “fake news” remains a poorly defined area and this poses a challenge to 
narratives that use this concept. While the issue of “fake news” on social media cannot 
be ruled out, regulation requires appropriate laws for dealing with the new forms of 
media. Most people have now resorted to online public sphere to discuss issues 
concerning their lives and economies. As such, most autocratic governments are in 
fear hence the rush to impose social media regulation in order to safeguard their 










































The purpose of this study was to explore the nexus of fake and social media regulation 
in Zimbabwe, using the January 2019 National #Shutdown, and to understand how 
‘fake news’ figures in the media regulation matrix. This chapter gives a conclusion to 
the findings of this study. The research was informed by the research questions below, 
which formed the basis for the semi-structured interviews that were undertaken with 
key informants in Harare. The study turned on the following research questions: 
 
1. What was the nature and role of “fake news” in the January 2019 National 
#Shutdown in Zimbabwe?  
2. What does the Zimbabwean government’s response to “fake news” during the 
#Shutdown tell us about the relationship of “fake news” and (social) media 
regulation? 
 
It is evident that “fake news” still poses some definitional challenges not only to 
scholars, but to government and general citizens as well. The lack of a standard 
definition for “fake news”, that is yet to be established is therefore a cause for  concern 
when trying to understand issues that involve this concept. Another notable problem 
arising from not having a clear cut definition for “fake news” is that of national laws 
criminalising ‘‘fake’’ or ‘‘false’’ news being susceptible to misuse and abuse through 
arbitrary interpretation and enforcement. 
 
The world over, both citizens and government have become very active on social 
media platforms. This, for different reasons has seen a proliferation of unverified 
information on the different social media platforms. However, despite the difficulties 
surrounding the definitional aspect of “fake news” various governments are calling for 
the regulation of social media platforms under the guise of curbing the spread of “fake 
news”. This has been interpreted as a calculated move to enhance the different 
government’s hold on power. Understandably, some have argued on potential 
positives of such government’s stance towards the need to regulate social media. But 
in all this hullabaloo, most governments that have been caught in this storm have been 




Interestingly, social media have become a vital and permanent part of the “public 
sphere” as many people have now resorted to getting basic information from social 
media. In Zimbabwe, the media, which is supposed to give unbiased information to 
people, has been blamed for polarisation. The prevailing situation in the country has 
pushed majority of the citizens to source for alternative news and their only hope is 
from social media.  As alluded to in the theoretical framework of this study in Chapter 
3, Habermas’s “Public Sphere” comes into being in which private individuals assemble 
to form a public body. In this, people make up their minds in a manner that benefits 
their worldviews and society.  And this move could not be underestimated. Although 
the “public sphere” does not perform decision making functions, the truth is that social 
media has been used to raise awareness on problems, claims and interests. 
Zimbabwe has not been immune to this. Social media has transformed the “Public 
Sphere” into the public political arena. Social media in Zimbabwe has become a civic 
and political realm for forming political opinions and this played a key role in what 
happed during the January 2019 National #Shutdown. 
 
Twelve key informants in Harare were interviewed for this study and these were from 
different sectors such as, government, civil society, media policy organisations as well 
as the mainstream media. In fact, twenty participants were interviewed, but about a 
third of them requested to be off-the-record, although they expressed willingness to 
talk to me about what they knew about the #shutdown. The refusal to be recorded 
made me reflect that there was a deep rooted fear of reprisal by many Zimbabweans 
especially those in positions of power. The January 2019 National #Shutdown was 
used to illustrate how “fake news” figures in the social media regulation matrix. 
Furthermore, thematic analysis was used to analyse the data collected during the 
semi-structured interviews with the selected key-informants. 
 
From the analysis, it was established that most of the “fake news” that was circulated 
on social media before the lockdown was instituted were mainly pictorial images of 
events that had happened in other countries such as Kenya. As such, it can be argued 
that to some extend social media users, including government, were well aware of 
these images. However, this boiled down to what really constitutes “fake news.” If 
these images were a true representation of what had happened in Kenya two years 
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ago, what was really “fake’ about them? If government knew that the images were of 
events that happened in Kenya, why then did it shut down the internet under the guise 
of stopping the spread of “fake news” as if the January 2019 demonstrations had given 
birth to “fake news” in the country?  It was also established that the idea of “fake news” 
ought not to be seen in a monolithic way. The definition depends on how one is 
positioned. Hence the definition that “fake news” depend on context, one’s preferred 
reading and ideological camp (Ellis, 2018) suggests that people would tend to 
effortlessly trust false information as long as it backs their existing worldviews (Weeks 
and Garrett, 2014). 
 
Moreover, the idea of social media regulation also depends on where one stands 
within the economic circle. This was also confirmed by the High Court ruling that later 
found the government guilty of instituting an unlawful shutdown of the internet. From 
the analysis, it also emerged that government was well aware that “fake news” has 
always existed and that those incidences from the demonstrations, exacerbated by 
the increase in fuel price, were far away from affecting ‘national security’. Thus, the 
“fake news” during the January 2019 demonstrations was not really the ultimate 
provocation of the blackout of the internet as claimed by the government during that 
time. The explanations appear to have been a cover up for a government caught in a 
panic by the latest cycle of crisis. I have referred to these cycles of crisis as 
infrafractures because they reflect a deep seated fractured polity and body politic. 
 
Furthermore, it was established that Zimbabwe is in a very volatile space politically. 
As P1 stated “The challenge we have in a polarised society like ours is that the fake 
news that is disseminated is usually the affirmation of one’s opinion, belief, and 
inclination towards an idea or ideal”. P10 also stated that “You know in a polarised 
society like Zimbabwe, that’s almost impossible because there is always a version 
from the other people”. This alone has led to polarisation in the country, with the 
mainstream media being accused of lying with their ink. The state-owned media, 
mainly The Herald newspaper and the ZBC have been accused of being the ruling 
government’s mouth-pieces which leave the population information- and news-hungry. 
This has resulted in the migration to social media platforms which, theoretically, 
Habermas conceptualised as ‘online public spheres’ (Kruse, Norris and Flinchum, 
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2017). P11 asserted that “Ah, ZBC would be 60%. If we are to scale out of 100%, ZBC 
would score about 60% in terms of dispersing fake news in Zimbabwe. The prevalence 
is more. Yes, state-owned media lead by ZBC online that handle always gives us false 
information….” Many Zimbabweans are now connected to these social media 
platforms where they meet to discuss everyday struggles that they are experiencing 
economically. However, despite this leap, social media participation in Zimbabwe 
remains at an evolving stage. Urban dwellers have better access to information 
technologies than their rural counterparts. 
Thus, most citizens in Zimbabwe seem to have formed their own “Public Sphere” in 
which they discuss issues affecting them. As mentioned earlier, the “Public Sphere” in 
the country have become transformative participation given the element of 
participation within the political realm. The existence of polarisation, as affirmed by the 
interviews revealed the type of “public sphere that exists in Zimbabwe. One man’s 
“fake news” has become another man’s “public sphere”. The platforms appear to pose 
a constant threat to the government, which frames them as an “asymmetric threat” 
and regime changers who are being used for “command and control” type of attacks 
on the country’s national security grid. This “asymmetric threat” has been referred to 
significantly in military literature but is difficult to prove. Also, where there is citizen 
anger, these issues can blend, and dismissing citizen anger merely because there is 
the possibility of cyber-attacks by a hostile foreign entity is dishonest. At the same 
time, foreign and national security threats can take many forms, and citizen anger can 
be weaponised by hostile foreign entities. Still, the cries of Zimbabweans for social 
and economic justice remain relevant, and cannot be delegitimised by a government 
that has shown repeatedly that it is had no abiding interest in fundamental change. 
 
The Zimbabwean government had felt the impact of other social media movements, 
such as #ThisFlag, which had compromised the politics of the country, hence would 
not tolerate the online mobilisations that were taking place during the January 
#shutdown. The study also found that there was a thin line between “fake news” and 
social media regulation in Zimbabwe. Whilst the presence of “fake news” on social 
media platforms is undeniable, the move to regulate the platforms was politically 
motivated. It was also established that many authoritarian African governments were 
also implementing similar steps of shutting down the internet in order to hide atrocities 
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being committed to the citizens during times of demonstrations and Zimbabwe was 
not exempted from this. To add on to this, it was established that given that social 
media platforms are new types of media, laws to regulate them were not readily 
available hence the rush to establish them. In Zimbabwe, the Cyber Bill was gazetted 
on 15 May 2020, hence the internet shutdown in January was done outside the law 
given the absence of a law that specifically addressed the issue of “fake news” on 
social media. While the regulation of social media was met with mixed reactions, the 
study found that it was important for the government to roll out campaigns on “fake 
news” and how to detect it so that the population would be aware of these. While social 
media has brought alternative avenues for communicating, the issue of “fake news” is 
of growing concern and has resulted in the rush to regulate social media. The study 
also concluded that “fake news” had nothing to do with the internet shutdown during 
the January 2019 National #Shutdown. It was however, the fear by the government of 
a repeat of the Arab Spring wave. The government’s response to the demonstrations 
reveals the authoritarian nature of the government of Zimbabwe which is eager to 
protect its political narratives. 
 
Against the backdrop of the regulatory furore over “fake news”, I would recommend 
that further studies be conducted, especially on the link between social media and 
“fake news” because alternative explanations to the findings of this study cannot be 
ruled out. The study could also be expanded to include the link between “fake news” 
and state security, which has not been researched in Zimbabwe. I would also 
recommend that technology companies in Zimbabwe be autonomous of government 
institutions in trying to counter the manipulation of the online public sphere. Moreover, 
long-term social media policies should be enacted to inform the publics about how the 
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Appendix 3: Invitation Letter 
      
 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Fake News and Social Media Regulation in 
Zimbabwe: A case study of the 2019 National #Shutdown. 
 
RESEARCHER NAME: GRACE GAMBIZA 
 
This invitation letter and informed consent form may contain some words that are 
unfamiliar to you. Please ask questions about anything you do not understand or 
anything you want to learn more about. 
 
You may take home an unsigned copy of this consent form to think about or discuss 
with family or friends before deciding. 
 
Once you understand, and if you agree to take part, you will be asked to sign your 




Hello, my name is Grace Gambiza. I am a student at the University of Johannesburg. 
I would like to invite you to take part in this study. I am conducting this research for my 
Masters’ degree. I have selected you to participate in this study because i believe that 
you are well knowledgeable on the issues surrounding fake news and social media 
regulation and the 2019 National # shutdown in Zimbabwe.  
 
YOUR PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY  
Before you decide whether to be in this study, I would like to explain the purpose, the 
risks and benefits, what is expected of you and what you can expect from me. 
 
It is up to you whether you join the study. You may choose to leave this study at any 
time.  
 
AIM OF THE STUDY  
The study aims to investigate the nexus of fake news and social media regulation in 
Zimbabwe using the January 2019 National # Shutdown as a backdrop to understand 
exactly how “fake news” figures in the emerging media regulation matrix. 
 
RESEARCH  
The study will conduct semi-structured interviews. During the individual interviews, I 
will ask direct questions and write down your answers, in order to have in-depth 
understanding of the topic. The interaction will be recorded using a phone, and the 
audio will be downloaded onto a secure and encrypted hard drive where it is protected 
from any third party. The notes and the recording will not contain your name or other 
identifying information and will be stored on a computer that is password protected. All 
the audio recordings will be destroyed after 5 years 
 
What are my rights as a participant? 
118 
 
Your participation is voluntary. You are free to decide if you want to take part in the 
research. You can refuse to participate or stop at any time without giving any reason. 
The study will be carried out at a place that you are comfortable with, and where you 
will be free to communicate. Participation is strictly voluntary, and you will be fully 
informed of the purpose of the study, and the uses to which your data will be put, prior 
to the commencement of collecting data. 
 
Are there any risks or discomforts involved in interviews?  
The study is purely academic, and thus has minimal risk; it is not expected that 
participation will in any way put you in any harm whatsoever.  But should you wish to 
be permitted to leave the interview and/or focus group at any point, without having to 
give reasons for this. You are under no compulsion to answer questions that you wish 
not to answer 
 
Are there any benefits? 
There are no material benefits to participating in the study. However the study will 
contribute to the broader work of research in the area.  
  
Is there any cost to me taking part in the interview?  
There is no cost in taking part in this study. The study is also not expecting to make 
any money from your participation.  
 
Will I be paid? 
No payments or reimbursements are attached to this study.  
 
Will what I tell you remain confidential?   
Participants’ identities will be protected. As a participant, you will fully be treated as 
autonomous individual able to exercise their autonomy possible, including the right to 
privacy and the right to have private information remain confidential. 
 
ETHICAL APPROVAL 
This study proposal has been submitted to the University of Johannesburg Research 
Ethics Committee. 
 
PROBLEMS OR QUESTIONS  
If you ever have any questions about this study, you can contact: 
 
Researcher contact details: ggambiza@gmail.com; Mobile: 0761344183 
 
Supervisor contact details: nmboti@uj.ac.za 011 559 2929 
 












Appendix 4: Informed Consent Form 
 
Informed Consent Form 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM (SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW)  
This form is called a Consent Form. It will give you information about the study so you can make an 
informed decision about participation in this research. We encourage you to take some time to think 
this over and ask questions now and at any other time. If you decide to participate, you will be asked 
to sign this form and you will be given a copy for your records. 
 
I agree to participate in this study titled Fake News and Social Media Regulation in Zimbabwe: A 
case study of the 2019 National #Shutdown being carried out by Grace Gambiza from the University 
of Johannesburg.  
The purpose of this document is to specify the terms of my participation in the project through being 
interviewed. I can confirm that: 
  
1.   I have been given sufficient information about this research project. The purpose of my 
participation as an interviewee in this project has been explained to me and is clear.   
2.   My participation as an interviewee in this project is voluntary. There is no explicit or implicit 
coercion whatsoever to participate.  
3.   Participation involves being interviewed by (a) researcher(s) from the University of 
Johannesburg.  The interview will last approximately [20] minutes.  I allow the researcher(s) to take 
written notes during the interview. I also may allow the recording (by audio/video tape) of the 
interview. It is clear to me that in case I do not want the interview to be taped I am at any point of 
time fully entitled to withdraw from participation.   
4.   I have the right not to answer any of the questions. If I feel uncomfortable in any way during the 
interview session, I have the right to withdraw from the interview.   
5.   I have been given the explicit guarantees that, if I so wish, the researcher will not identify me by 
name or function in any reports using information obtained from this interview, and that my 
confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure.  In all cases subsequent uses of 
records and data will be subject to standard data use policies at the University of Johannesburg 
(Data Protection Policy).  
6.   I have been given the guarantee that this research project has been reviewed and approved by 
Prof. Nyasha Mboti by the Department of Communication Studies, and by the Faculty of Humanities 
Ethics Committee at the University of Johannesburg. For research problems or any other question 
regarding the research project, the Faculty of Humanities Ethics Committee at the UJ may be 
contacted through Prof. T Chagonda, 011 559 3827.   
7.   I have read and understood the points and statements of this form.  I have had all my questions 
answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.   
8.   I have been given a copy of this consent form co-signed by the interviewer.   
______________________   ______________________  
Participant’s Signature      Date 
I have explained the study and the implications of being interviewed to the interviewee and I believe 
that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation. 
________________________ ______________________  


















● What was the nature and role of “fake news” in the January 2019 
National #Shutdown in Zimbabwe?  
● What does the Zimbabwean government’s response to “fake news” 
during the #Shutdown tell us about the relationship of “fake news” and (social) 
media regulation? 
 
QUESTION 1: What was the nature and role of “fake news” in the January 2019 
National #Shutdown in Zimbabwe?  
 
 
Were you in Zimbabwe during the January 2019 National #Shutdown? 
 
Can you tell me more about the January 2019? National #Shutdown? 
 
What really happened in January? Was the government under threat?  
 
Who should shut down the internet? Is it the companies (Econet, Facebook, Google 
etc.) or government?  
 
Are you on social media? 
 
Why do you think government shut down the internet during January 2019 National 
#Shutdown? 
 
How would you define ‘fake news” and how do you understand it? 
 
Does ‘fake news’ exist? 
 
How do you define it? 
 




Can you identify two instances of ‘fake news’ that was posted on social media during 
January 2019 National #Shutdown? 
 
Why do you say it was ‘fake news’ and were they really ‘fake news’? 
 
Did ‘fake news’ contribute anything to the January 2019 National #Shutdown? 
 
Would you say Zimbabweans are aware of ‘fake news’? 
 
Has ‘fake news’ ever affected you in some way? 
 
Who do you think produces ‘fake news’? 
 
What type of ‘fake news’ should be punishable and what sort of punishment should 
be enforced? 
 
QUESTION 2: What does the Zimbabwean government’s response to “fake 
news” during the #Shutdown tell us about the relationship of “fake news” and 
(social) media regulation? 
 
How did government respond to the claims of fake news? 
 
Do you think social media must be regulated? 
 
Is social media a threat that should be contained? 
 
What law must be used to regulate ‘fake news?’ 
 
Are you aware of the Cyber Crime, Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill of 2019? 
 
Does the bill infringe on civil liberties? 
 
How would this affect the production of ‘fake news’? 
 
Do you think politicians must be on social media? 
 
Do you think social media fuels uprisings? 
 
Is there any link between ‘fake news’ and social media regulation? 
 
What type of information would you deem to be offensive if posted on social media? 
 
Some say government is complaining about ‘fake news’ spread to protect personal 
interests, do you agree with this? 
 








What really happened in January? Was the internet really shutdown or (as 
Mutodi suggested), it was network issue and it was just data bundles that were 
depleted? 
 
There have been several shutdowns in Africa (give examples). Is shutting down the 
internet a good thing?  
 
Does shutting down the internet help? What does it help? Or hinder? 
 
Does fake news threaten national security? In what ways? What is the link between 
national security and fake news? 
 
What is your view of VPNsand other ways or circumventing controls of internet 
connectivity? 
 
There are reports that the government has procured social media monitoring tech. Is 
this true? Does the government have the technology to monitor Whatsapp and other 
social media? (Who is the supplier? China? Israel?) 
 
Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning were charged with treason for digital 
offences. In other countries they propose the death penalty or flogging etc. (Give 
examples).  
 
What should be the appropriate punishment for spreading “fake news” in Zimbabwe? 
Why? 
 





What is the government’s view of deep fake videos? What is being done to counter 
the growing sophistication of “fake news”? 
 
 
